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Abstract	
	
This	thesis	interrogates	incapacitation	as	it	developed	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	in	the	United	States	to	
conduct	a	genealogy	of	the	conditions	of	emergence	of	actuarial	justice	(Foucault,	1981;	Feeley	and	
Simon,	1992;	1994)	as	it	is	enacted	within	this	particular	knowledge-power	formation.	Incapacitation	
is	a	penal	rationale	that	concentrates	on	anticipating	future	crimes,	and	preventing	offenders	from	
committing	crimes,	effectively	prioritizing	public	safety	above	all	other	considerations.	My	mapping	
of	incapacitation	demonstrates	that	it	is	recursively	performed	along	two	mutually	conditioning	poles	
that	are	illustrative	of	Foucault’s	account	of	biopolitics	and	security	(1978,	2003,	2007).	These	poles	
are:	technocratic	penal	managerialism,	which	regulates	the	actions	of	diverse	agents	and	authorities	
as	they	participate	in	a	program	of	reducing	recidivism	within	a	mobile	population	of	offenders;	and,	
danger	management	of	this	distributed	population	of	offenders,	driven	by	a	desire	to	anticipate	and	
selectively	incapacitate	the	most	dangerous	offenders.	
	
This	analysis	supports	the	mapping	of	actuarial	justice	provided	by	Feeley	and	Simon;	however,	my	
typology	 uses	 Galloway’s	 (2004)	 concept	 of	 protocol,	 to	 extend	 and	 refine	 their	 diagram	 about	
actuarial	 power.	 Given	 the	 high	 levels	 of	 scientific	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 efficacy	 of	 selective	
incapacitation	as	a	penal	policy,	and	the	poor	predictive	powers	of	actuarial	instruments	in	accurately	
classifying	high-rate	offenders	in	the	early	1980s,	my	analysis	demonstrates	how	protocollary	power	
established	 the	 rules	 for	modulating	 the	participation	of	 autonomous	 and	diverse	 agents	 that	 are	
enlisted	within	the	distributed	networks	of	actuarial	justice	to	propel	its	movement	forward,	this	being	
the	birth	of	evidence-based	penal	policy	and	practice.	This	protocol	projects	an	ontological	view	of	
recidivism	 derived	 from	 criminal	 career	 research	 that	 filters	 and	 experiments	 with	 probabilistic	
actuarial	 codes	or	profiles	of	 risk.	These	biopolitical	 codes	 regulate	 future	 research	 into	advancing	
knowledge,	 predicting	 and	 controlling	 levels	 of	 dangerousness,	 and	 auditing	 of	 governmental	
performance	 in	 reducing	 recidivism,	all	of	which	are	contingent	upon	 the	anticipatory	 longitudinal	
tracking	of	an	aleatory	population	of	offenders	within	the	penal	environment.		Protocol	is	a	biopolitical	
form	of	management	that	 is	central	 in	the	 logistical	control	of	this	penal	network	and	 its	nodes	of	
operation	 and	 decision-making,	 constantly	 mining	 data	 for	 new	 possibilities.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 I	
demonstrate	 that	 this	 will-to	 knowledge	 uses	 its	 technocratic	 expertise	 to	 distort,	 exaggerate,	 or	
conceal	difference	in	its	struggle	for	authority	given	high	levels	of	uncertainty	about	recidivism	and	
how	to	control	it.	
	
Cover	image:	This	is	one	of	the	carceral	photos	reproduced	by	Peter	Brooke	that	reviewed	Josh	Begley’s	Prison	obscura,	an	
exhibition	that	documented,	using	aerial	photography,	the	scale	of	the	5,300	county	jails,	state	prisons,	federal	
penitentiaries,	immigrant	detention	facilities,	and	private	prisons	in	the	United	States.	This	exhibition	opened	at	Parson’s	in	
February	2015.	https://www.wired.com/2015/01/josh-begley-prison-map/	,	Accessed	on	6	December	2017.	
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Introduction	
	
1.1	 Incapacitation	and	selective	incapacitation:	“Getting	‘em	out	of	circulation”1		
	
Incapacitation	emerged	 in	 the	1970s	 in	 the	US	as	 a	quite	basic	penal	 rationale	 that	 “removing	an	
offender	 from	 general	 society”	 could	 reduce	 crime	 “by	 physically	 preventing”	 offenders	 from	
committing	crimes	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	64).	It	gained	momentum	in	the	late	1970s	as	a	sentencing	
policy	proposal	involving	“the	decision	to	imprison	particular	individuals	because	of	the	crimes	they	
themselves	would	commit	if	they	were	allowed	to	go	free”	(Cohen,	1978:	188).	The	appearance	of	this	
rationale	and	the	upturn	in	interest	about	it,	occurred	at	a	time	when	both	general	deterrence	and	
rehabilitation	effects	were	being	questioned	 in	 the	 light	of	 an	absence	of	 substantive	evidence	 to	
demonstrate	 their	 effectiveness	 (Martinson,	 1974;	 Lipton	 et	 al.,	 1975).	 The	 initial	 impetus	 behind	
incapacitation	 was	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 incapacitative	 effect	 of	 imprisonment	 can	 be	
demonstrated	solely	through	its	preventive	effect	on	the	aggregate	crime	rate,	rather	than	any	other	
effect	due	to	deterrence	or	rehabilitation	(Blumstein	et	al,	1978).		
	
By	the	late	1970s	claims	were	emerging	that	argued	that	the	incapacitative	effects	of	prison	could	be	
substantially	improved	by	using	a	tactic	of	“selective	incapacitation”.	This	necessitated	developing	a	
credible	prediction	instrument	to	identify	the	probabilities	that	an	offender	will	commit	a	crime	in	the	
future,	 so	 that	 sentencing	decisions	 could	be	guided	by	an	actuarial	 risk	 classification	 system	 that	
targeted	 and	 sentenced	 the	 high-risk	 offender	 to	 longer	 periods	 of	 imprisonment.	 This	 proposal	
initially	emerged	a	cost-effective	penal	strategy	to	“maintain	long-term	control	over	(these	high-risk	
offenders)	while	investing	in	shorter	terms	and	less	intrusive	control	and	surveillance	over	lower	risk	
offenders”	 (Feeley	 and	 Simon,	 1994:	 175).	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 this	 redistribution	 of	 offenders	 is	
enacted,	 penal	 policy	 begins	 to	 become	 reconfigured	 according	 to	 the	 risk	 management	 of	 a	
distributed	 population	 of	 offenders.	 The	 power	 to	 punish	 is	 channelled	 away	 from	 its	 traditional	
concern	with	individualising	punishment,	in	the	direction	of	the	management	of	risk	aggregates	that	
are	developed	using	mobile	algorithmic	probability	codes	that	 track,	anticipate,	and	control	 future	
crimes,	founded	upon	a	will-to-incapacitate.		
	
The	impetus	behind	my	research	derives	from	a	quite	precursory	comment	made	by	Feeley	and	Simon	
(1994:	174-75;	see	also	1992:	458-59):	
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Possibly	the	clearest	indication	of	actuarial	justice	is	found	in	the	new	theory	of	incapacitation,	
which	has	become	the	predominant	model	of	punishment…Incapacitation	promises	to	reduce	
the	effects	of	 crime	 in	 society	not	by	altering	either	offender	or	 social	 context,	 but	by	 re-
arranging	 the	 distribution	 of	 offenders	 in	 society…These	 aggregate	 effects	 can	 be	 further	
intensified	by	a	 strategy	of	 selective	 incapacitation…incapacitation	 (selective	or	otherwise)	
attempts	to	manipulate	the	public	as	a	demographic	mass	or	aggregate,	by	passing	the	‘res	
cognitas’	of	individuals	altogether,	the	aim	is	not	to	induce	altered	behaviour	as	a	result	of	
rational	calculations	by	individuals,	but	the	management-through-custody	of	that	segment	of	
the	population	that	is	dangerous.	
	
They	suggest	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	(1982)	report	about	selective	incapacitation	resulted	in	“a	
paradigm	 shift	 in	 the	underlying	 rationale	 for	 imposing	 criminal	 sanctions”,	 and	 that	quite	quickly	
embraced	 and	 promoted	 as	 a	 new	 justification	 of	 punishment	 (Feeley	 and	 Simon,	 1994:	 175).	
Unfortunately,	 they	 do	 not	 pursue	 this	 any	 further.	 In	 a	 footnote,	 they	 suggest	 that	 selective	
incapacitation	“is	still	 largely	an	‘idea’,	and	is	not	widely	 incorporated	into	sentencing	laws”	(1994:	
197,	 footnote	3).	2	My	 research	 is	 centrally	 concerned	with	exploring	 the	question:	To	what	extent	 is	
actuarial	justice	founded	upon	a	model	of	selective	incapacitation?	In	critically	reviewing	Feeley	and	
Simon’s	 (1992,	 1994)	 map	 of	 actuarial	 justice,	 I	 extend	 their	 analysis	 to	 incorporate	 Foucault’s	
conceptualization	 of	 biopolitics	 and	 security	 (1978,	 2003,	 2007),	 as	 well	 as	 Galloway’s	 (2004)	
conceptualization	of	protocol.	This	recasts	actuarial	justice	as	being	founded	upon	a	technical	protocol	
developed	in	the	late	1970s	and	1980s	that	attempted	to	predict	high-rate	offenders	using	actuarial	
codes	 derived	 from	 criminal	 career	 research.	 This	 protocol	 operates	 as	 a	 virtual	 force	 or	 abstract	
diagram	of	potential	that	materializes	as	risk	intelligence	data	that	regulates	or	modulates	risk-based	
decision-making	 and	 practices	 at	 multiple	 nodes	 within	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Selective	
incapacitation	does	not	reside	at	one	site	or	within	one	technique,	it	does	not	need	to	be	elevated	
into	law,	as	it	guides	participation	within	the	distributed	networks	of	criminal	justice.	
	
1.2	 The	rise	of	“actuarial	justice”	
	
It	was	Feeley	and	Simon’s	(1992,	1994)	mapping	of	actuarial	justice	in	the	early	1990s	that	introduced	
criminology	to	the	claim	that	penal	modernism’s	disciplinary	power	strategy	–	what	Garland	(1981)	
coined	the	“welfare	sanction”	–	was	being	reconfigured,	or	had	been	replaced	by	actuarial	forms	of	
power.	Welfare	sanctions	are	enacted	in	sentencing	as	an	individualized	form	of	punishment	designed	
to	rehabilitate	the	offender	using	normalizing	strategies.3	In	contrast,	actuarial	crime	control’s	regime	
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of	government4	is	driven	by	a	concern	with	mapping	the	distribution	and	effects	of	criminal	behaviours	
on	the	population	as	a	whole,	as	well	as	the	effects	of	multiple	regulations	that	are	installed	within	a	
security	 dispositif	 to	 cost-effectively	manage	 the	 conduct	 of	members	 of	 the	 criminal	 population	
(Foucault,	2003;	2007).	In	making	their	diagnosis,	Feeley	and	Simon	adopted	a	broadly	Foucauldian	
method	informed	by	genealogical	analysis	(see	Foucault,	1977a,	b;	1981).	The	first	of	their	sketches	
of	this	emerging	knowledge/power	formation,	has	been	heavily	cited	by	other	researchers,	its	current	
count	being	2,375	citations.5	In	this	section	I	detail	their	account,	in	order	to	tease	out	its	diagnosis	
about	penal	transformation,6	as	well	as	its	possible	shortcomings	in	the	light	of	new	analysis	informed	
by	Foucault’s	account	of	biopolitics	and	security	(2003,	2007,	2008),	that	were	not	then	available	for	
incorporation	into	analyses	of	actuarial	justice	in	the	response	within	criminology	in	the	1990s.	
	
In	 1992,	 Feeley	 and	 Simon	 announced	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 “new	 strategic	 formation…the	 new	
penology”,	comprised	of	three	axes	of	independently	varying	but	mutually	related	domains	of	penal	
practice:	legal	and	penal	policy	discourses	concerned	with	calculations	of	probability	and	risk	applied	
to	population;	“systemic”	objectives	focused	on	the	managerial	efficiency	of	penal	processes	from	the	
perspective	of	efficient	control	of	internal	criminal	justice	system	processes;	and	the	deployment	of	
techniques	of	power	that	“target	offenders	as	an	aggregate”	(1992:	449-450).	The	authors	use	the	
genealogical	method	of	“eventalization”	(Foucault,	1981).	Foucault	(1981:	6)	explains:	
	
I	am	trying	to	work	in	the	direction	of	what	one	might	call	‘eventalization’…It	means	making	
visible	a	singularity	at	places	where	there	is	a	temptation	to	invoke	a	historical	constant,	an	
anthropological	 trait,	 or	 an	 obviousness	 which	 imposes	 itself	 uniformly	 on	 all.	
…Eventalization	 means	 rediscovering	 the	 connections,	 encounters,	 supports,	 blockages,	
plays	of	forces,	strategies	and	so	on	at	a	given	moment	which	at	any	given	moment	establish	
what	subsequently	counts	as	being	self-evident,	universal	and	necessary.	 It	 is	 in	 this	sense	
indeed	effecting	a	sort	of	multiplication	or	pluralisation	of	causes…This	procedure	of	causal	
multiplication	 consists	 in	 analysing	 an	 event	 according	 to	 the	 multiple	 processes	 that	
constitute	it…‘eventalization’	thus	works	by	constructing	around	the	singular	event	analysed	
as	process	a	‘polygon’	or	rather	a	‘polyhedron’	of	intelligibility,	the	number	of	whose	faces	is	
not	 given	 in	 advance	 and	 can	 never	 properly	 be	 taken	 as	 finite…the	 internal	 analysis	 of	
processes	goes	hand	in	hand	with	a	multiplication	of	analytical	‘salients’.	
	
In	this	way,	Feeley	and	Simon	distinguish	the	“new	penology”	from	the	“old	penology”	(1992:	451-
54).	For	the	sake	of	consistency,	I	will	refer	to	the	new	penology	as	being	a	form	of	actuarial	justice	as	
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it	is	depicted	in	Feeley	and	Simon’s	second	paper	(1994).	In	Feeley	and	Simon’s	grid	of	analysis,	these	
three	 domains	 (penal	 policy	 concerned	with	 the	management	 of	 distributed	 risks	 in	 the	 offender	
population,	 actuarial	 techniques	 of	 risk	 classification	 and	 control,	 criminal	 justice	 concerns	 with	
managerial	 efficiency)	 constitute	 the	 elements	 of	 this	 dispositif,	 and	 the	 “system	 of	 relations”	
between	 a	 “thoroughly	 heterogeneous	 ensemble	 (of)	 discourses,	 institutions,	 architectural	 forms,	
regulatory	decisions,	 laws,	administrative	measures,	scientific	statements,	philosophical,	moral	and	
philanthropic	propositions”	(Foucault,	1980:	94).		
	
Actuarial	justice	is	depicted	as	being	composed	of	probabilistic	discourses,	statistical	techniques	for	
predicting	and	managing	risk	within	criminal	populations.	Such	discourses	and	techniques	decentre	
and	derail	 the	central	 institution	of	criminal	 law,	 its	 legal	discourses	of	morality	and	 jurisprudence	
principles	or	law	procedures	for	testing	evidence,	protecting	the	accused	by	means	of	due	process,	as	
well	as	 its	theories	and	penal	policies	for	criminal	sanctioning	 individuals	(Feeley	and	Simon,	1992:	
451-52).	Legal	discourse	becomes	increasingly	rationalized	by	means	of	modern	insurance	regimes,	
focused	upon	“‘how	to	‘manage’	accidents	and	public	safety”	rather	than	criminal	justice’s	focus	on	
individual	criminal	responsibility	(1992:	453).	These	rationalizations	are	justified	by	the	argument	that	
the	management	of	“dangerousness”	can	bring	about	aggregate	effects	that	lower	crime	rates	and	
redistribute	risks	premised	upon	utilitarian	and	managerial	objectives.	Managerial	efficiency	 is	 less	
concerned	 with	 eliminating	 crime	 entirely,	 but	 rather,	 making	 it	 “tolerable”	 through	 systemic	
coordination	(1992:	453,	455).	
	
Actuarial	 justice’s	central	objective	 is	 to	“identify	and	manage	unruly	groups”	by	 installing	a	penal	
management	defined	by	the	actuarial	enterprise	itself,	with	little	concern	with	offender	re-integration	
into	the	community	(1992;	455,	454).	Penal	policy,	whether	it	is	localized	within	sentence	decision-
making,	 correctional	decision-making	 (or	even	policing),	 is	driven	by	 technocratic	 rationalities	 that	
became	more	prominent	in	system	theory	and	public	management	in	the	1960s	in	the	US	(1992:	455).	
This	rationality	rose	to	prominence		in	criminal	justice	institutions	in	the	1980s	as	these	institutions	
began	 to	 measure	 their	 own	 internal	 outputs	 as	 “indicators	 of	 performance”	 that	 insulated	 the	
institution	from	outside	demands	and	pressures	(1992:	456).7	At	that	time	in	the	United	States	penal	
objectives	were	less	concerned	with	the	rehabilitation,	re-integration,	retraining	or	employment	of	
offenders,	 and	 more	 focused	 on	 the	 “variable	 detention	 (of	 a	 distribution	 of	 aggregates	 of	 low,	
medium	 and	 high	 risk	 offenders)	 depending	 upon	 risk	 assessment”	 (1992:	 457).	 At	 every	 level	 of	
operation	along	a	“custodial	continuum”,	quantitative	probabilistic	statistical	techniques	are	used	to	
install	concrete	and	cost-effective	forms	of	actuarial	systems	for	variable	custody	and	control	(ibid).	
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These	techniques	figure	in	the	development	of	actuarial	techniques	for	identifying	and	classifying	risk	
as	 well	 as	 the	 establishment	 of	 “variable	 detention	 depending	 upon	 risk	 assessment”	 along	 a	
continuum	of	custodial	control;	at	the	same	time,	these	same	actuarial	techniques	are	used	to	monitor	
governmental	performance.	
	
The	most	pessimistic	claim	that	Feeley	and	Simon	make	about	actuarial	 justice	 is	 in	relation	to	the	
“waste	management”	of	an	internal	population	where	the	risks	are	considered	to	be	a	“permanent	
condition”	that	must	be	managed	 in	a	way	that	 is	analogous	with	toxic	waste	management	(1994:	
192-96).8		Waste	management	is	driven	by	an	“imperative	of	herding	a	specific	population	that	cannot	
be	disaggregated	and	transformed	but	only	maintained”	(ibid).9	They	are	targeted	and	incapacitated	
within	prison	as	well	as	being	contained	in	cheaper	custodial	spaces	located	outside	of	detention	using	
boot	 camps,	 home	 detention,	 secure	 drug	 centres,	 and	 other	 “low-	 and	 mid-level	 custodial	
alternatives”	(1994:	464	-65).		These	mobile	forms	of	containment	are	described	as	“holding	pens	for	
managing	a	short-term,	mid-range	risk	population”	(1994:	464),	where	it	is	critical	that	risk	screening	
devices	are	installed	to	identify	the	high-risk	categories	that	would	be	excluded	from	these	programs.		
	
Reflections	on	this	diagnosis:	Actuarial	justice,	biopolitics,	and	security	
	
This	 provisional	 cartography	of	 actuarial	 justice	weaves	 together	 some	of	 the	heterogeneity	of	 its	
conditions	of	formation,	and	plots	some	of	its	lines	of	movement	in	the	1960s	through	to	the	1990s	in	
the	 US.	 If	 one	 takes	 any	 of	 its	 expositions,	 whether	 they	 are	 discursive,	 systemic/managerial,	 or	
technological,	they	lack	any	detailed	archival	analysis	of	the	conditions	of	formation	that	are	necessary	
for	an	effective	critical	history	or	genealogy	of	the	rise	of	actuarial	justice.	It	is	evident	that	much	of	
the	basis	of	this	mapping	comes	from	Simon’s	(1993)	genealogy	of	shifts	in	regimes	of	practice	in	adult	
parole	in	California	between	early	and	late	twentieth	century.10			
	
As	actuarial	justice	is	a	mapping	of	the	criminal	justice	system	as	a	whole,	it	is	problematic	to	single	
out	any	one	particular	technology	of	punishment	for	interrogation.	This	a	problem	that	has	plagued	
the	criminological	literature	about	actuarial	justice	as	a	whole.	How	can	actuarial	regimes	of	practice	
at	one	governmental	site	be	connected	with	another	site	of	government?	What	forces	regulate	these	
relations?	If	the	actuarial	machine	seeks	to	regulate	the	entire	criminal	justice	system	by	technocratic	
means,	how	does	it	achieve	this?	Are	there	boundaries	or	limits	that	block	this	movement	given	the	
diversity	of	 rationalities	 and	objectives	 that	 inform	criminal	 justice	 interventions?	 If	 it	 is	 the	 force	
relations	of	power,	 then	where	does	power	reside	 in	actuarial	 justice?	Feeley	and	Simon	have	not	
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provided	 a	 clear	 answer	 to	 these	 questions,	 as	 their	 analysis	 remains	 schematic	 rather	 than	
substantive,	as	well	as	frozen	in	time.		Actuarial	justice	is	better	characterized	as	a	machinic	force	in	
the	Deleuzian	sense,	as	its	powers	reside	in	its	potential	to	affect	particular	agents,	forms	of	authority,	
and	sites	of	government	in	ways	that	seek	to	direct	or	regulate	movement	using	probabilistic	methods,	
algorithmic	 codes	 for	 investigating	 criminality,	 profiling	 criminality,	 predicting	 dangerousness,	
classifying	 risk	 categories	 and	managing	 them,	 estimating,	 forecasting,	 auditing	 and	managing	 the	
differential	forces	that	it	encounters.	
	
I	will	now	delineate	my	conceptual	framework	for	analysis.	Stated	simplistically,	I	understand	actuarial	
justice	as	a	 techno-scientific	enterprise	of	 risk	 intelligence	defined	by	 its	powers	or	 its	 capacity	 to	
affect	 or	 impinge	 upon	 other	 things	 or	 forces	 as	well	 as	 be	 affected	 by	 other	 diverse	 forces	 that	
differentiate	a	field	of	potential	and	actual	actions.	Deleuze	(1986/1988:	75)	re-described	Foucault’s	
genealogies	of	power	(discipline,	biopower,	sovereign	power)	in	the	following	way:	
	
Power-relations	are	 the	differential	 relations	which	determine	particular	 features	 (affects).	
The	actualization	which	stabilizes	and	stratifies	 them	 is	an	 integration:	an	operation	which	
consists	 in	 tracing	 ‘a	 line	 of	 general	 force’,	 linking,	 aligning	 and	 homogeneizing	 particular	
features,	placing	them	in	a	series	and	making	them	converge.	Yet	there	is	no	immediate	global	
integration.	 There	 is,	 rather,	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 local	 and	 partial	 integrations,	 each	 one	
entertaining	an	affinity	with	certain	relations	or	particular	points.	The	integrating	factors	or	
agents	 of	 stratification	 make	 up	 institutions…The	 institutions…are	 practices	 or	 operating	
mechanisms	which	do	not	explain	power,	since	they	presuppose	its	relations	and	are	content	
to	‘fix’	them,	as	part	of	a	function	that	is	not	productive	but	reproductive.	There	is	no	State,	
only	state	control.	
	
Foucault	(1978:	138)	provocatively	introduced	“biopower”	as	a	liberal	governmental	power	“to	foster	
life	 or	 disallow	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 death”.	 He	 identified	 two	 intersecting	 poles:	 the	 diagram	 of	
disciplinary	power	that	targets	the	body	in	order	to	optimize	its	forces	for	docility	and	normalization;	
and	the	diagram	of	biopolitics,	that	targets	“man-as-species”	and	seeks	to	regulate	“relations	between	
the	human	race,	or	human	beings	in	so	far	as	they	are	living	beings,	and	their	environment,	the	milieu	
in	 which	 they	 live”	 (Foucault,	 2003:	 242,	 245).	 Biopolitics	 strategizes	 and	 seeks	 to	 influence	 the	
“population	 as	 a	 political	 problem”	 constituted	 as	 an	 object	 of	 scientific	 truth	 telling	 about	 the	
contingent,	 aleatory	 conditions	 of	 populations/life	 itself	 made	 calculable	 by	 statistical	 analysis	 of	
aggregated	 phenomena	 and	 its	 mechanisms	 of	 statistical	 analysis	 of	 general	 trends,	 statistical	
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estimates	 and	 forecasts	 (2003:	 243,	 246).	 	 Foucault	 understands	 the	 interventions	 that	 regulate	
population	 as	 being	 security	measures	 installed	 around	 the	 random	element	 in	 the	 population	 to	
optimize	a	valued	state	of	life;	biopower	aims	to	“protect,	care	and	sustain	valued	lives	(which	at	the	
same	 time	 is	 to)	 abandon,	 damage	 and	 destroy	 other	 lives”	 (Anderson,	 2012:	 28).	 Its	 regulations	
attempt	 to	 “establish	 an	 equilibrium,	 maintain	 an	 average,	 establish	 a	 sort	 of	 homeostasis,	 and	
compensate	for	variations	within	this	population	and	its	aleatory	field”	(2003:	246).	
	
What	is	remarkable	in	the	literature	that	engages	with	Feeley	and	Simon’s	account	of	actuarial	justice	
is	the	complete	absence	of	any	consideration	of	biopolitics,	including	by	Feeley	and	Simon	(see	also	
Simon,	2013).	This	is	in	part	historical	in	that	Foucault’s	work	on	biopolitics	was	not	translated	into	
English	until	2003	although	it	was	originally	published	in	1997	(see	Foucault,	2003:	239-263).11	While	
the	literature	makes	scant	references	to	Foucault,	in	particular	in	the	context	of	Discipline	and	punish	
(1977a),	no-one	 formally	uses	Foucault’s	conceptualization	of	biopower	 in	 the	History	of	sexuality,	
Volume	1	(1976/1978).	There	are	only	two	substantive	research	projects	that	develop	genealogical	
perspectives	on	actuarial	justice	(Simon,	1993;	Pratt,	1995,	1997)	–	where	biopolitics	is	not	considered.	
	
Actuarial	justice	is	enacted	along	two	poles	using	the	combinatory	logistics	of	statistical	probability,	
forecasting,	and	auditing	–	technocratic	managerialism	which	is	actuarial	in	form	as	it	seeks	to	audit	
and	regulate	the	actions	of	diverse	agents	and	authorities,	and,	danger	management	of	a	distributed	
population	 of	 offenders,	 driven	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 incapacitate	 the	 most	 dangerous	 offenders	 (while	
continuously	 monitoring	 and	 regulating	 the	 population	 of	 offenders).	 Both	 of	 these	 poles	 are	
biopolitical	 in	 form,	 driven	 by	 a	 contingent	 field	 of	 socio-political	 forces	 that	 coalesce	 upon	 the	
problematisation	of	criminal	recidivism	in	the	1970s,	made	visible	as	“the	crime	rate,	understood	as	
the	distribution	of	behaviours	in	the	population	as	a	whole”	(Feeley	and	Simon,	1994:	178).	With	little	
elaboration,	(the	reader	is	referred	to	a	short	footnote),	this	particular	field	of	political	rationality	is	
described	 as	 “part	 of	 the	 general	 movement…towards	 the	 exercise	 of	 state	 power	 as	
‘governmentality’”	where	the	penal	field	is	“following	trends	laid	down	in	health	care,	employment	
policy	and	social	welfare”	(Burchell	et	al.,	1991,	cited	in	Feeley	and	Simon,	1994:	178,	 footnote7).	For	
some	 reason,	 the	 authors	 avoid	 naming	 this	 political	 rationality,	 which	 is	 both	 a	 form	 of	
“governmentality”,	 the	broad	domain	 concerned	with	 “the	 conduct	 of	 conduct…a	 form	of	 activity	
aiming	to	shape,	guide	or	effect	the	conduct	of	some	person	or	persons”	(Burchell,	1991:	2);	and,	the	
neo-liberal	exercise	of	political	sovereignty,	understood	“as	a	novel	set	of	notions	about	the	art	of	
government”	that	use	both		totalizing	and	individualizing	forms	of	biopower,	a	political	deployment,	
described	as	an	“endless	and	open	strategic	game”	(1991:	3-6).12	
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Feeley	and	Simon	map	a	set	of	four	“overlapping	features”	which	are	logistical	strategies	of	actuarial	
justice	 that	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 a	 “singular	 structure”	 (1994:	 177).	 These	 are:	 the	 targeting	 of	
population	itself,	“in	its	biological	and	demographic	sense”;	actuarial	power	aims	at	“preventing	future	
offences”	 (using	 “new”	 techniques	 such	 as	 selective	 incapacitation	 and	 pre-trial	 detention);	 and,	
justice	is	viewed	“through	the	rationality	of	the	system,	redefined	by	“the	rise	of	formal	systems	of	
internal	rules,	analogous	in	many	respects	to	computer	programs”	(1994:	177-78).	In	regards	to	this	
later	logistics,	technocratic	discourses	and	the	enactment	of	their	effects,	holds	considerable	sway,	as	
if	 the	 regularized	 coding	 outputs	 of	 algorithmic	 calculation	 subjugates	 the	 traditional	 juridico-
discursive	 decision-making	 founded	 in	 either	 economico-moral	 concern	 about	 prohibited	 acts	 or	
classical	or	moral	philosophies	of	punishment,	or	any	other	concern	with	the	rights	of	the	offender.	
The	installation	of	actuarial	logistics	would	seem	to	flow	as	follows:	establish	an	actuarial	code	about	
the	probabilities	of	risk,	 install	 it	 (using	either	a	 front	door	 legal	strategy	or	a	backdoor	extra-legal	
strategy)	in	the	criminal	justice	system	as	a	penal	policy.	Soon,	correctional	decision-makers,	who	are	
now	human	monitors	of	levels	of	risk	situated	at	particular	sites	within	the	actuarial	environment,	are	
routinely	entering	 risk	data	 into	a	 computerized	apparatus	as	a	 “flow	of	 information	 for	assessing	
(dangerousness)”	 so	 that	 drug-test	 results	 and	 so	 on	 can	 be	 systematically	 included	 to	 “develop	
profiles	of	dangerousness”	(1994:	179).	Next	the	system	“invites	new	justifications	for,	and	hence	new	
forms	of	custody	and	surveillance”	(ibid).	Back-door	decision-making,	founded	upon	re-calculations	of	
probabilities	 of	 dangerousness,	 justifies	 decisions	 to	 return	 an	offender	 to	 prison	 for	 violations	 of	
routinely	and	easily	obtained	 risk	 information,	as	well	 as	 reconfiguring	 the	 traditional	 functions	of	
probation	and	parole	concerned	with	re-integrating	offenders	into	the	community	into	alternative	to	
custody	for	lower-risk	offenders	(1994:	180-81).	Finally,	criminal	justice	discourses	and	practices	are	
transfigured,	eventually	becoming	rationalized	in	actuarial	terms	and	“deeply	 ingrained	in	the	law”	
(1994:	181;	see	180-81	to	illustrate	this,	and	Harcourt,	2007:	7-16).13	
	
In	his	first	lecture	on	Security,	territory,	population	in	1978,	Foucault	(2007:	6-8)	makes	reference	to	
new	penal	forms	in	American	neo-liberal	discourse	focused	on	the	cost	of	penalties,	to	illustrate	his	
methodological	approach	to	the	study	of	security	and	biopolitics	(see	also	2008).	There	he	retains	his	
commitment	 to	a	history	of	 “actual	 techniques”,	where	 the	analysis	 is	attentive	 to	“the	system	of	
correlations	 between	 juridico-legal	 mechanisms,	 disciplinary	 mechanisms,	 and	 mechanisms	 of	
security”	(2007:	8).	 	He	suggested	that	the	economic	rationalities	that	were	then	being	brought	to	
bear	on	the	cost	of	repression	and	the	cost	of	delinquency	were	not	a	matter	of	the	replacement	from	
discipline	to	regulation	or	some	other	integrative	movement,	but	were	rather	an	explosive	complex	
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edifice	 where	 the	 emerging	 security	 dispositifs	 “took	 up	 again”	 and	 “multiplied	 juridical	 and	
disciplinary	elements”	that	he	asserted	had	incited	“the	most	evident	and	visible	conflicts”	in	the	penal	
field	at	that	time	(2007:	9).14	
	
Actuarial	 justice	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 productive	 site	 of	 neo-liberal	 political	 power.	 It	 is	 a	
“technology”	that	takes	the	“population	as	a	political	problem”	(Foucault,	2003:	243),	which	becomes	
targeted	 in	multiple	ways	using	an	 “environmental	 governmentality”	 that	 relies	upon	probabilistic	
codes	for	risk	management	(2003:	242,	245),	being	particularly	concerned	with	managing	contingent,	
accidental,	 irregular	variations,	uncertain	elements	within	populations	designed	to	“regularize	 life”	
(2003:	 246-247).	 	 This	 technology	 is	 constitutive	 of	 a	 security	 dispositif	 designed	 to	 “protect	 the	
security	of	the	whole	from	internal	dangers”	(2003:	249-50).	Within	this	political	economy,	neo-liberal	
government	 “reflects	 on	 governmental	 practices	 themselves”,	 considered	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 “real	
effects”,	their	relative	“success	or	failure”,	considering	an	art	of	governing	that	is	self-limiting	in	terms	
of	what	it	does	as	a	question	of	truth	(2008:	15-17).	
	
The	diagram	Foucault	provides	is	that	of	a	networked	governmental	space	of	operation	(the	milieu)	
that	takes	particular	uncertain	phenomenon	calculated	as	probable	events	that	threaten	the	stability	
and	ongoing	development	of	circulating	forces,	understood	in	the	widest	possible	sense	as	the	forces	
and	conduits	of	life	itself	(2007:	6-23).	The	techniques	of	security	operate	use	a	modulating,	variable	
mechanism	of	“normalization”	that	at	particular,	punctuated	moments	in	time,	attempt	to	regularize	
the	 cost-benefit	 of	 an	 identified	 threat	 within	 a	 series	 of	 overall	 planned	 spatial	 distributions	 or	
environmental	 regulations	 of	 contingent	 risks.15	 These	 biopolitical	 techniques	 are	 coupled	 with	 a	
series	 of	 economic	 (neo-liberal)	 interventions	 designed	 to	make	 the	 economy	 grow,	 by	means	 of	
innovative,	 metastable	 techniques	 of	 productivity	 and	 regulations	 designed	 to	 promote	 self-
government	and	entrepreneurship	(2003:	253;	2008:	231).	
	
The	security	dispositif	 is	constitutive	of	a	liberal	and	technical	form	of	multiplicative	environmental	
governmental	 regulations	 involving	 the	 general,	 rather	 than	 the	 particular,	 whereby	 the	 state	
indefinitely	 seeks	 to	 facilitate	 a	 state	 of	 prosperity,	 “a	 certain	 global	 level	 of	 existence”	 for	
lives/populations,	by	specifying	an	optimal	mean	within	a	tolerable	bandwidth	of	variation	(Gordon	
1991:	19;	Massumi,	2007:	155-58).			Liberty	is	conceived	as	a	condition	of	security,	whereby	it	is	not	
registered	as	a	right	but	as	“an	indispensable	element	of	the	governmental	rationality	itself”	(Foucault,	
quoted	 in	 Gordon	 1991:	 20).16	 In	 attempting	 to	 govern	 these	 contingencies,	 there	 is	 a	 perpetual	
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interplay	of	biopolitical	relations	of	power	“and	everything	which	never	ceases	to	escape	their	grasp”	
(Foucault,	quoted	in	Gordon,	1991:	23).	
	
Within	this	regulation	of	the	“life	environment”,	normalization	is	no	longer	governed	by	a	prescriptive	
norm	 that	 ultimately	 makes	 divisions	 between	 the	 normal	 and	 the	 abnormal,	 but	 rather	 by	 an	
economized,	and	variable	determination	of	 ‘normal’…that	appears	as	a	 statistical	 constant	on	 the	
collective	level”	(Foucault,	2007:	57;	Massumi,	2007:	156).	These	statistical	regularities	are	consistent	
with	 equilibria	 within	 the	 conditions	 of	 environment	 governmentality	 at	 punctuated	 moments,	
however	these	conditions	are	in	constant	variation,	so	that	government	must	“systematically	modify	
its	variables” by	regulating	effects	rather	than	causes	(Foucault,	2008:	271;	Massumi,	2007:	155).	
	
The	 management	 of	 security	 is	 ideally	 enabling	 and	 inventive	 as	 its	 operates	 within	 a	 milieu	 of	
“unknowns	 and	 transversal	 phenomena”,	where	 the	 space	 to	 be	 governed	has	 its	 own	autonomy	
(Foucault,	2008:	261).	Within	this	environmental	field,	the	rule	of	 law	and	its	enforcement	is	faced	
with	 its	own	 limits	and	must	be	 supplemented	with	 calculations	designed	 to	 create	novel	actions,	
enterprises,	 initiatives,	 and	changes	 that	 regulate	 the	overall	 environment	 in	which	actors-citizens	
freely	circulate	(2008:	260-61).	Normalization	functions	“below	a	system	of	 law,	 in	 its	margins	and	
maybe	 even	 against	 it”,	 to	 achieve	 a	 more	 optimal	 circulation	 of	 good	 and	 bad	 circulations	 that	
operate	“at	the	interplay	of	differential	normalities”	by	“separating	out	and	bringing	them	into	line	
with	each	other”,	thus	intervening	“to	bring	the	most	unfavourable	in	line	with	the	more	favourable”	
(Foucault,	2007:	56,	63).	Security	must	differentiate	the	balance	to	be	struck	between	good	and	bad	
circulations	within	an	economy	of	contingent	distributions.	Its	calculus	of	probabilities	is	integrative	
of	dangers	or	probable	threats	to	the	extent	they	are	tolerable	within	current	bandwidths	of	accepted	
rationalities	and	acceptable	risks	given	reigning	political	affects.	In	Foucault’s	account	the	logistics	of	
security	 is	 concerned	with	 case,	 risk,	 danger	 and	 crisis	 (2007:	 61).	 This	 involves	 a	 discernment	 of	
“relative	danger”	that	distinguishes	the	level	of	risk	that	an	individual	may	pose	within	a	distributed	
population.	And,	 it	 involves	managing	 a	 sudden	worsening	or	 acceleration	 in	 a	 risk	 condition	 that	
carries	 risk	 through	 contagion,	 but	 whose	 regular	 occurrence	 can	 be	 anticipated	 and	 controlled	
through	preventive	measures.17		
	
Control	and	protocol	
	
It	is	my	argument	that	Deleuze’s	diagnosis	about	the	“control	society”,	originally	published	in	1990,	
provides	a	more	historically	specific	account	of	how	actuarial	justice	directs	or	channels	the	flows	of	
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movement	within	its	networked	environment,	along	the	custodial	continuum.	After	describing	this,	I	
will	 draw	on	 the	work	 of	Galloway	 (2004)	 on	 protocollary	 power,	 including	 his	 collaboration	with	
Thacker	on	networks	(2007)	to	provide	a	topological	map	that	can	be	used	to	extend	the	analysis	of	
actuarial	 justice	 to	 better	 understand	 its	 ongoing	 movements	 and	 their	 capabilities.	 Protocollary	
power	refers	to	standards	governing	the	implementation	of	specific	technologies.	Protocols	“govern	
how	 specific	 technologies	 are	 agreed	 to,	 adopted,	 implemented,	 and	 ultimately	 used	 …by	 large	
populations	 of	 participants”	 (Galloway,	 2004:	 7).	 Protocological	 codes	 govern	 “a	 set	 of	 possible	
behaviour	patterns	within	a	heterogeneous	system…(in	order	to)	achieve)	voluntary	regulation	within	
a	contingent	environment”	(ibid).		
	
In	Postscript	on	the	societies	of	control,	Deleuze	historicizes	Foucault’s	later	work	as	being	located	in	
the	proliferation	of	digitalized	information	and	its	logistics	of	“modulation”,	and	“ultra-rapid	forms	of	
free-floating	 control”	 (1992:	 4).18	 “Control”	 is	 described	 as	 an	 open-ended	 series	 of	 continuous	
tracking,	mapping,	and	data	mining	techniques	that	cast	their	reach	everywhere	within	a	continuous	
mode	of	operation	that	is	metastable,	undulating,	dynamic,	open-ended,	“like	a	self-deforming	cast	
that	will	continuously	change	from	one	moment	to	another,	or	like	a	sieve	whose	mesh	will	transmute	
from	point	to	point”	(1992:	4).	At	the	same	time,	the	capture	of	data	and	mobile	bodies	is	constantly	
being	recursively	fed	back	into	a	complex	and	distributed	network	of	techniques19	of	control/security	
that	attempt	to	remain	vigilant	to	the	dynamisms	and	opportunities	of	economic	change	and	possible	
threats	to	its	optimization	of	potential	for	maximizing	profit.	 In	this	formulation,	actuarial	 justice	is	
recast	as	being	an	enterprise	positioned	in	the	global	security	marketplace,	oriented	towards	a	quest	
for	continuous	improvement	in	the	anticipation	of	danger.	
	
The	computer	 is	 the	paradigmatic	machine	of	 the	control	 society.	Computers	“track	each	person’s	
position	–	licit	or	illicit	–	and	effects	a	universal	modulation”	(1992:	7).	In	Deleuze’s	diagram,	control	
logics	necessitate	 the	use	of	 codes	 that	 function	as	passwords	 that	mark	access	 to	 information	or	
reject	 it	 (1992:	 5).	 The	 discursive	 is	 registered	 at	 the	 numerical	 and	 its	 techniques	 of	 economic	
valuation	where	the	control	mechanisms	are	inseparable	variations,	“a	system	of	variable	geometry”:	
dviduals,	 populations,	 samples,	 data,	 markets,	 banks	 (1995:	 4,	 5).	 Codes	 are	 “flexible	 systems	 of	
capture”	that	can	be	quickly	reconfigured	to	regulate	access	to	networks	(Bogard,	2007:	3).	Actuarial	
algorithmic	codes	filter	risk	information	captured	from	offender	populations;	however,	its	protocols	
about	 what	 risk	 information	 should	 be	 included	 or	 excluded	 are	 not	 necessarily	 transparent	 or	
rendered	 intelligible	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 enveloping	 technology	 that	 brings	 them	 into	 being	 (the	
longitudinal	 tracking	 of	 offender	 populations).	 In	 Feeley	 and	 Simon’s	 topology,	 there	 is	 no	
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attentiveness	to	how	algorithmic	probability	codes	are	constructed;	they	are	taken-for-granted,	and	
so	 are	 rendered	 unintelligible.	 If	 anything,	 these	 actuarial	 codes	 are	 described	 in	 sarcastic	 and	
indifferent	terms	(which	underestimates	their	materiality).	
	
Actuarial	 information	about	 criminal	behaviour	 (coded	as	 risk	 information)	 is	 captured	by	 tracking	
populations	 of	 offenders	 indefinitely	 over	 the	 lifecourse	 (see	 Blumstein	 et	 al.,	 1986a:	 198-202;	
Farrington,	2015),	assembling	aggregated	data	about	 life	which	 is	 transmuted	 into	nonorganic	 life,	
becoming	 “subjectless	 patterning”	 (Galloway,	 2004:	 86).	 This	 reconstitutes	 the	 individual	 as	 a	
“dividual”,20	a	distinct	from	the	subject	of	representation	as	a	molar	and	irreducible	political	unit.	He	
or	she	is	constituted	as	a	risk	fragment	or	a	data	code	located	within	a	population	of	aggregate	mass	
whose	movement	can	be	stopped,	directed,	or	redirected	along	particular	terminal	or	access	points	
according	to	the	particular	logistics	of	the	risk	management/surveillance	program.	“Dividuation”,21	is	
the	central	logic	of	control	societies	–	it	locates	members	of	a	mobile	population	and	then	establishes	
“an	 internal	 division	 of	 entities	 (a	 parametrics	 of	 static	 and	 dynamic	 risk	 factors	 that	 anticipate	
recidivism)	into	measureable	and	adjustable	parameters”	(Bogard,	2007:	5).	This	coded	data	bank,	in	
turn,	 can	 be	 sub-divided	 into	 smaller	 samples	 of	 information	 that	 can	 be	measured	 and	 used	 to	
provide	feedback	to	other	users	participating	in	the	network	at	various	situated	locations/nodes	as	
well	as	at	some	later	point	in	time	relayed	back	to	the	database.		
	
Galloway	 and	 Thacker	 (2007:	 35)	 comment:	 “control	 is	 not	 simply	 manipulation,	 but	 rather	
modulation”.	Modulation	manages	bodily	movement	by	establishing	a	“mesh”	that	has	the	capability	
to	“adjust	to	the	body	as	it	moves	and	where	it	moves”,	establishing	controls	that	are	analogous	to	
the	 coils	 of	 a	 serpent	 that	 enclose	 the	 body	 at	 its	 surface	 operating	 as	 “networks	 of	modulating	
pressures”	that	control	or	modulate	bodily	movement	in	intensive	and	direct	ways	within	its	milieu	
(Bogard,	 2007:	 3).	When	 the	 dvidual	 is	 enrolled	 in	 actuarial	 justice,	 a	 system	 of	 permanent	 data	
capture	is	initialized	that	provides	networks	of	control	to	more	closely	monitor	and	apply	pressure	on	
those	dviduals	that	have	not	been	incapacitated,	but	who	are	nonetheless	trapped	within	“a	kind	of	
mobile	confinement”	(ibid).	Modulation	uses	actuarial	codes	in	a	more	flexible	system	of	capture,	as	
passwords	that	at	one	moment	may	permit	an	offender	freedom	of	movement	can	easily	be	changed	
to	incapacitate.	
	
Modulation,	as	coded	information	in	criminal	justice	system	management,	is	like	a	“’moving	form’	of	
coding”	 that	 involves	 continuous	 decoding	 and	 recoding;	 it	 is	 concerned	 with	 metastable	
“modulations	 of	 coded	 information”	 (Bogard,	 2007:	 5).	 Modulation	 is	 parametric	 control	 when	
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sampled	 information	 captured	 within	 the	 database	 is	 mined	 for	 new	 potentials.	 In	 this	 way,	
algorithmic	codes	are	constantly	being	reconfigured	to	invent	new	profiles	of	the	population	that	are	
that	are	marketable.	Biopolitics	decodes	 life	–	for	example,	genetic	science	 is	a	decoding	machine,	
that	 having	 “broken	 the	 molecular	 code	 of	 human	 individuation…proceeds	 to	 experiment	 on	 its	
parameters”	(2007:	6).	Thacker	(2004:	xxi)	comments:	
	
If	the	biological	body	is	a	genetic	code,	and	if	the	genome	is	a	kind	of	computer,	then	it	follows	
that	the	main	area	of	interest	for	portability	will	be	between	the	biological	body	of	the	patient	
and	the	informatics	body	of	the	computer	database	or	computer	profile…some	suggest	that	
it	 will	 be	 diagnostic	 tools	 that	 guarantee	 financial	 sustainability	 for	 biotech	 and	
pharmaceutical	 industries.	The	key	to	success	will	be	the	portability	between	two	types	of	
genetic	codes:	one	in	vivo,	one	in	silico.	
	
In	Deleuze’s	topology,	the	art	of	modulation	is,	at	its	most	abstract	level,	concerned	with	extracting	
potential	 where	 it	 mode	 of	 operation	 situated	 within	 a	 hybrid	 mix	 of	 substantial	 and	 already	
abstracted	elements	that	are	reconfigured	into	release	potentials.	As	Massumi	describes	it,	potentials	
are	 actualized	 as	 “the	 effect	 of	 the	 contingent	 intermixing	 of	 elements”	 being	 logically	 and	
ontologically	 distinct	 from	 them	 (2002:	 76).	 Local	 modifications	 in	 mechanisms	 of	 control,	 are	
designed	 to	 bring	 about	 global	 reconfigurations	 or	 affects.	 Even	 though	 these	 mechanisms	 are	
inevitably	short-term,	programming	through	reiterative	re-modulation	becomes	more	continuous	and	
without	limit	(Deleuze,	1992:	6).	The	mechanics	of	control	are	therefore	congruent	with	Foucault’s	
mapping	of	the	despotic	and	paradoxical	character	of	security	mechanisms	within	present	neo-liberal	
rationalities	and	its	regulations	of	populations.	Each	phase	of	movement	in	a	dispositif	of	control	is	
logically	circular,	being	oriented	towards	a	game-opening	–	a	phase	shift	between	the	substantial	and	
the	potential,	without	which	strategic	movement	would	remain	repetitive	(Massumi,	2002:	77).	22	
	
Galloway	and	Thacker	(2007:	28)	define	“protocol”	as	“all	technoscientific	rules	and	standards	that	
govern	relationships	within	networks”.	Protocol	is	an	abstraction	of	“a	set	of	tendencies	grounded	in	
the	 physical	 tendencies	 of	 networked	 systems”.	 It	 cannot	 be	 parsed	 from	 its	 locatability	within	 a	
network	of	 some	kind	whether	 that	be	biological	or	 informatics,	organic	or	 inorganic,	 technical	or	
natural.		Galloway	(2004:	7)	originally	developed	his	conceptualization	of	protocol	as	it	was	deployed	
in	digital	 computing	on	 the	distributed	networks	of	 the	 Internet.23	He	defined	protocol	 as	being	a	
managerial	 concern	 with	 “standards	 governing	 the	 implementation	 of	 specific	 technologies”.	
Computer	protocols	are	used	to	“establish	the	essential	points	necessary	to	enact	an	agreed-upon	
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standard	of	action”	so	that	packets	of	information	can	be	encoded	and	transported	from	one	node	or	
point	in	the	network	to	another.	Protocol	is	“twofold”:	it	is	both	an	apparatus	that	facilitates	networks	
and	a	 logic	 that	governs	how	things	are	done	 in	the	apparatus”	 (Galloway	and	Thacker,	2007:	29).	
Galloway	asserts	that	this	tension	between	the	total	and	the	specific	 is	 isomorphic	with	Foucault’s	
conception	of	biopower.	He	claims	that	his	conceptualization	is	“consistent	with	the	functioning	of	
protocol,	for	biopower	is	the	power	to	interpret	material	objects	as	information,	to	affect	objects	at	
the	statistical	or	informational	level,	not	at	the	level	of	individual	content”	(2004:	69;	see	also	82-85).	
	
Protocollary	power	is	a	“management	style”	(Galloway,	2004:	3)	that	“regulates	flow,	directs	netspace,	
codes	relationships,	and	connects	life-forms”	(Galloway	and	Thacker,	2007:	30).24	Protocollary	power	
is	conceived	as	being	a	dispositif	in	the	Foucauldian	sense	in	that	it	is	a	technology,	and	a	discourse	
that	 surrounds	 networks	 in	 order	 to	 manage	 participation	 (that	 includes	 moral	 positioning	 that	
according	to	Galloway	and	Thacker	is	de-territorializing	and	to	some	degree	anti-hierarchy),	as	well	as	
particular	to	the	biopolitical	network	that	is	enacted.	It	requires	genealogical	analysis	to	consider	its	
conditions	of	emergence	at	any	particular	biopolitical	site	to	appreciate	its	unfolding	on	the	plane	of	
imminence.	Galloway	 and	 Thacker	 identify	 several	 key	 features	 of	 protocol:	 they	 emerge	 through	
complex	relationships	between	autonomous	agents;	smooth	functioning	protocols	need	to	be	robust	
and	 flexible,	 able	 to	 cope	 with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 contingency	 through	 interoperability	 and	
heterogeneous	 material	 interfaces;	 these	 networks	 are	 inclusive	 rather	 than	 exclusive,	 however	
discrimination,	regulation	and	segregation	of	agents	happen	within	the	protocol’s	network;	protocols	
are	universal	and	total,	“but	diachronic	emergence	of	protocols	is	always	achieved	through	principles	
of	political	 liberalism	such	as	negotiation,	public	vetting,	and	openness”;	protocol	 is	the	“emergent	
property	 of	 organization	 and	 control	 in	 networks	 that	 are	 radically	 horizontal	 and	 distributed”	
(Galloway	and	Thacker,	2004:	29-30;	Galloway,	2004:	81-82).	
	
Galloway’s	account	of	protocol	assists	in	answering	the	question:	how	does	this	form	of	power	work	
as	an	interrelation	between	the	many	participating	nodes	within	any	particular	distributed	networks	
so	that	the	population	of	agents	ideally	control	or	regulates	itself	within	the	network?	(2007:	36-39).	
What	 are	 the	 conditions	 that	 enable	 a	 network	 to	 operate?	 These	 questions	 are	 forms	 of	
problematization	and	governmental	reflexivity	linked	to	the	political	rationalities	of	neo-liberalism	as	
it	 seeks	 to,	 in	 the	 most	 cost-effective	 way	 possible,	 disinvest	 from	 the	 social	 state,	 redistribute	
collective	 risks	 and	 responsibilities,	 reconfigure	 particular	milieus	 of	 governmentality,	 to	 promote	
active	citizenship	and	self-responsibility.	Methodologically,	Galloway	and	Thacker	recommend	that	an	
abstract	 diagram	 is	 required	 that	 can	 provide	 a	 topology	 that	 can	 render	 intelligible	 this	 internal	
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networked	control,	 from	the	horizon	of	control	that	 is	outside	and	above	this	self-regulation.	“The	
network	must	itself	be	articulated	as	an	object	of	design,	implementation,	and	regulation.	Control	in	
this	sense	does	not	pervade	the	network	but	operates	over	 it;	control	 in	this	sense	 is	topsight	and	
oversight”	(2007:	36).	They	comment	(2007:	40):	
	
Control	 in	 networks	 operates…through	 the	 exceptional	 quality	 of	 networks	 or	 their	
topologies.	 What	 matters,	 then,	 is	 less	 the	 character	 of	 the	 individual	 nodes	 than	 the	
topological	space	within	which	and	through	which	they	operate	as	nodes…to	be	a	node	is	to	
exist	inseparably	from	a	set	of	possibilities	and	parameters	–	to	function	within	a	topology	of	
control.	
	
They	continue	by	arguing	that,	the	network’s exceptional character is revealed at points in time 
where a critical decision is made	that	affects	life	within	the	network	along	a	new	line	of	modulation.	
At	 such	 moments,	 “sovereignty touches network	 control” which they suggest may be what 
makes distributed networks exceptional	(2007:	40);	however,	this	mode	of	political	sovereignty	is	
not	based	on	exceptional	events	but	rather	as	a	result	of	fluxes	of	information	or	network	effects,	that	
elevate	nonorganic	life	to	a	threshold	of	importance	and	control/re-modulation	is	exercised	on	the	
basis	of	information	when	it	materializes	and	makes	itself	matter	(2007:	40-42).	
	
1.3	 My	research	project	
	
It	is	widely	acknowledged	that	risk	management	and	its	sorting	of	penal	bodies	spatially	in	relation	to	
the	level	of	risk	they	pose	has	permeated	penal	practice	in	many	Western	justice	jurisdictions	across	
many	of	the	programs	that	operate	within	it	(see	Hudson,	1998,	2002;	Kemshell,	1998,	2001,	2003;	
Brown	and	Pratt,	2000;	Hannah-Moffat,	2013).	The	extent	to	which	these	risk	regimes	are	actuarial	
remains	contested	(Hudson,	2002;	Loader	and	Sparks,	2002;	O’Malley,	1998,	2000).	Critiques	argue	
that	Feeley	and	Simon	have	provided	a	totalising	map	of	risk	management,	as	many	programs	of	penal	
risk	 operate	 in	more	 fluid,	 hybridized,	 or	 different	ways	 to	 their	 actuarial	 diagram	 (eg	 drug	 harm	
minimization	programs,	therapeutic	jurisprudence	interventions	such	as	the	Drug	Court,	restorative	
justice	 and	 so	 on).25	 This	 research	 frequently	 concentrates	 on	 a	 particular	 node	 of	 governance	
(probation,	bail	determination	and	so	on),	typically	finding	a	hybrid	knowledge/power	formation	at	
particular	junctions	of	time	and	place.26	A		hybrid	regime	of	 ‘risk	case	management’	 is	evident	that	
uses	actuarial	risk	management	to	determine	the	level	of	intrusion	and	the	nature	of	risk	control,	and	
that	does	not	fully	abandon	efforts	to	address	the	needs	of	offenders,27		albeit	along	narrowly	defined	
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intervenable	risks	that	have	become	re-inscribed	as	“crimogenic	needs”	that	anticipate	elevated	risks	
of	recidivism	(Hannah-Moffatt,	2005:	31-34).28		
	
There	have	been	no	comprehensive	genealogies	conducted	about	actuarial	justice	other	than	Simon’s	
(1993)	 mapping	 of	 transformations	 in	 parole	 in	 California,	 and	 Pratt’s	 (1995,	 1997)	 genealogy	 of	
dangerousness.	Pratt	 (1995)	concentrated	on	how	discourses	about	 ‘dangerousness’	have	changed	
historically	in	English	speaking	societies,	and	how	actuarial	techniques	have	been	used	in	dangerous	
offender	 legislation	 in	 New	 Zealand	 and	 Australia	 for	 sentencing	 these	 offenders	 to	 preventive	
detention	 since	 the	 1970s.29	 Pratt	 was	 primarily	 concerned	with	 the	 redistribution	 of	 risks	 in	 the	
emerging	neo-liberal	criminal	justice	system,	where	his	emphasis	is	upon	an	archive	concentrated	on	
the	actuarial	prediction	of	dangerousness	or	serious	harm	of	a	sub-set	of	serious	sexual	and	violent	
offenders,	 rather	 than	 the	 offender	 population	 as	 a	whole.30	 In	 his	 genealogy,	 public	 perceptions	
about	these	“intolerable	crimes”	had	become	(an	exceptional	and)	unacceptable	risk	in	the	risk	society	
where	crime	and	victimization	had	become	an	everyday	reality.	In	his	account,	an	“investiture	of	the	
right	to	life”	(1995:	16)31	given	these	pervasive	risks	in	the	re-configuring	neo-liberal	state,	operates	
at	the	level	of	security	for	the	population	as	a	whole,	tying	together	the	actuarial	sentencing	of	these	
offenders	with	the	responsibilization	and	active	self-regulation	of	citizens	and	local	crime	government	
authorities	 (O’Malley,	 1992).	 Pratt	 privileges	 the	 interpolation	 of	 actuarial	 technologies	 into	
sentencing	as	 the	 integrative	event	 that	 raised	 “actuarialism	as	a	method”	 used	 in	 criminal	 justice	
decision-making	into	a	penal	practice	enacted	through	“juridical	power”	(1995:	22).32		
	
Feeley	and	Simon’s	brief	discussion	of	selective	incapacitation,	and	Harcourt’s	(2007:	88-92)	account	
of	 it	 in	 relation	 to	 actuarial	 prediction	 and	 sentencing,	 suggest	 that	 the	 governmental	
problematization	 of	 selective	 incapacitation	 is	 a	 pivotal	 vector	 in	 the	 conditions	 of	 formation	 of	
actuarial	justice.	Feeley	and	Simon’s	account	of	recidivism,	which	they	argue	was	relegated	to	a	less	
significant	focus	in	the	technocratic	administrative	pole	of	audit	government,33	does	not	appear	in	this	
light	when	 the	archive	 is	examined	more	closely.	Actuarial	 justice	operates	along	 its	 two	mutually	
conditioning	poles	of	actuarial	prediction	and	control	of	a	dangerous	 criminal	population,	and	 the	
modulation	of	the	flows	of	risk	information	at	the	multiple	sites	of	the	criminal	justice	system.	Within	
these	networks,	the	will	to	identify	and	incapacitate	high-rate	offenders	gained	strategic	momentum	
towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1970s	 within	 a	 contested	 governmental	 space.	 Subsequently,	 this	 thesis	
conducts	a	bounded	genealogical	analysis	of	selective	 incapacitation	as	a	problematization	of	neo-
liberal	governmental	reflection	and	action.	In	Foucault’s	conceptualization,	problematization	refers	to	
the	“ensemble	of	discursive	and	nondiscursive	practices	that	make	something	enter	into	the	play	of	
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true	and	false	and	constitute	it	as	an	object	of	thought	(Foucault,	cited	in	Rabinow,	2005:	43).	Race	(in	
press:	 6)	 puts	 it	 this	 way:	 “How	 problems	 are	 grasped	 has	 material	 effects,	 since	 the	 process	
anticipates	and	circumscribes	the	range	and	scope	of	possible	responses.34	
	
As	Foucault	makes	clear	in	his	paper,	Nietzsche,	genealogy,	history	(1977b),	the	descent	into	the	past	
by	the	historian,	is	effective	when	it	“deals	with	events	in	terms	of	their	most	unique	characteristics,	
their	most	acute	manifestations”	(1977b:	154).	In	identifying	the	conditions	of	emergence	of	an	event,	
genealogy	 provides	 new	 perspectives	 about	 discontinuity,	 demonstrating	 that	 these	 events	 are	
composed	of	multiple,	heterogeneous,	and	contingent	 forces	 that	struggle	 for	dominance.35	These	
intersecting	 forces	exercise	a	will	 to	power	 to	 raise	 the	 stakes,	 to	 “master	 chance”,	 and	affirm	 its	
particular	view	about	a	body	of	knowledge	and	its	protocols	for	pursuing	truth,	 its	own	perception	
being	“slanted,	being	a	deliberate	appraisal,	affirmation,	or	negation”	of	other	perspectives,	a	“form	
of	 injustice	 specific	 to	 the	will	 to	 knowledge”	 that	 destroys	 or	 excludes	 a	 comprehensive	 view	 of	
difference	(1977b:	157).	
	
Using	discourse	analysis,	genealogy	seeks	to	trace	the	entangled	series	of	(many	minor)	interrelated	
events	that	were	irreducible	to	one	form,	or	discursive-technological	register,36	 	and	that	“begin	to	
intersect	 together	 as	 a	 threshold	 or	 technical	 form,	 inscribing	 a	 field	 of	 entangled	 and	
confused…documents”	 (Foucault,1977b:	139).	A	 threshold	 is	 reached	when	knowledge	and	power	
begin	 to	 become	 combined	 in	 a	 new	way	 according	 to	 this	 emerging	 technical	 code	 or	 diagram.	
Foucault	referred	to	this	threshold	as	being	a	(living)	‘species’	(or	race	or	‘social	type’)	which	inscribed	
itself	on	the	 ‘body’	 (and,	the	body	of	knowledge)	as	“subtle,	singular,	and	subindividual	marks	that	
might	possibly	intersect	in	them	to	form	a	network	that	is	difficult	to	unravel”	(1977b:	149,	145).37	
	
The	research	questions	
	
1. To	what	extent	is	actuarial	justice	founded	upon	a	model	of	selective	incapacitation?	
2. How	does	Galloway’s	(2004)	diagram	about	protocol	assist	in	understanding	the	operations	
of	power	in	actuarial	justice?	
	
Method	
	
In	the	next	two	chapters	I	conduct	a	discourse	analysis	(see	Foucault,	1972)	of	a	bounded	archive	of	
quantitative	research	papers	that	were	published	between	the	early	1970s	and	the	mid-1980s	in	the	
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United	 States	 that	were	 concerned	with	developing	 actuarial	 instruments	 for	 identifying	high-rate	
offenders,	as	well	as	probability	models	designed	to	demonstrate	that	selective	incapacitation	could	
cost-effectively	lower	the	crime	rate	relative	to	other	penal	policies.	In	addition,	I	conduct	an	analysis	
of	 two	 major	 Federal	 panels	 that	 were	 convened	 to	 consider	 the	 feasibility	 of	 implementing	 a	
sentencing	policy	of	incapacitation:	the	first	was	a	report	that	examined	the	scientific	evidence	on	the	
deterrence	and	incapacitation	effects	of	criminal	sanctions	on	crime	rates	(Blumstein	et	al,	1978);	and	
the	second	that	was	asked	to	consider	this	in	relation	to	selective	incapacitation,	although	it	was	asked	
to	 do	 this	within	 a	more	 circumscribed	 consideration	 of	 how	 criminal	 career	 research	 could	 both	
generate	 important	 knowledge	 about	 the	 offender	 population,	 and	 to	 evaluate	 the	 effects	 of	
prediction	 instruments	 in	reducing	the	crime	rate	(Blumstein	et	al,	1986a,	b).	Both	of	these	panels	
were	chaired	by	Alfred	Blumstein	who	was	a	strident	advocate	of	the	criminal	career	paradigm,	being	
a	leader	within	a	network	of	mathematical	criminologists	in	the	United	States,	who	forged	actuarial	
instrumentation	in	the	late	1970s	and	1980s.		
	
My	 intent	 in	 interrogating	 these	 documents,	 is	 threefold.	 Firstly,	 I	 intend	 to	 conduct	 a	 discourse	
analysis	of	these	documents.	My	method	is	informed	by	Foucault’s	(1972:	31-39)	conceptualisation	of	
a	discursive	 formation,	which	he	understands	as	 the	contingent	 rules	of	 formation	 that	produce	a	
system	 of	 relations	 between	 dispersed	 and	 heterogeneous	 statements	 that	 are	 connected	 to	
particular	 regimes	 of	 truth.	 I	 interrogate	 the	 disparate	 statements	 made	 that	 take	 selective	
incapacitation	as	their	object	of	concern,	that	limits	what	is	possible	to	say,	that	attempts	to	regularize	
it	(1972:	118-19),	and	that	subjugates	counter-discourses	to	a	minor	or	forgotten	position,	given	the	
rules	of	 scientific	 research	or	 techno-scientific	protocols	 that	are	 forged	 to	 interrogate	and	pilot	a	
regime	of	selective	incapacitation	in	the	criminal	justice.38	Secondly,	I	develop	a	method	for	decoding	
the	particular	technologies	of	probability	modelling	that	are	used	to	make	estimates	about	the	crime	
rate,	and	for	predicting	and	classifying	offenders	to	a	risk	classification.	This	is	necessary	to	counter	
the	 relative	 inattention	 to	 these	mathematical	modes	 of	 production.	 At	 best,	most	 criminological	
analysis	of	actuarial	statistical	 techniques	has	 interpreted	these	probabilistic	techniques	as	being	a	
general	technology	that	is	intelligible	at	the	discursive	level	(eg	the	technique	sorts	members	of	the	
offender	population	according	to	levels	of	dangerousness,	 it	 incapacitates	the	high-risk	offender,	 it	
audits	and	regulates	penal	authorities	etc).	It	is	not	really	possible	to	render	intelligible	a	statistical	
technique	 such	as	one	 that	estimates	an	 individual’s	 crime	 rate	within	a	distributed	population	of	
offenders	at	 the	discursive	 register;	 it	needs	 to	be	 considered	as	an	algorithmic	probabilistic	 code	
where	my	role	is	to	decode	or	“debug”	the	programming	and	development	of	that	code	at	both	its	
ontological	and	epistemic	levels	(rather	than	interpreting	or	representing	it)	(Thacker,	2004	xiii).		In	this	
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sense,	these	protocols	about	the	technical	particulars	–	their	materiality	–	are	understood	as	being	a	
collateral	field	that	combines	with	the	discursive	(eg	the	problematization	of	selective	incapacitation,	
constitutive	knowledge	about	criminal	careers,	the	discursive	framing	of	techno-scientific	protocols),	
and	 as	 a	 material	 space	 of	 enunciation	 where	 the	 “technical	 specs”	 are	 “political”	 becoming	
isomorphic	with	“info-tech	and	bio-tech,	info-politics	and	biopolitics”	(ibid).	
	
Finally,	I	weave	into	my	analysis	some	interrogation	of	the	affective	dimensions	of	this	archive	that	
reveal	some	of	the	more	disguised	or	discrete	and	reserved	statements	that	appear	in	official	reports	
about	 selective	 incapacitation.	 These	 interlocutory	 statements	 are	 infrequently	 made	 by	 criminal	
career	researchers	who	are	immersed	within	the	criminal	career	program	of	longitudinal	research	and	
its	ambitions.	In	this	way,	I	intermittently	pause	to	consider,	discursive	traces	of	the	sorts	of	inflated	
truth	claims	that	are	made	by	these	researchers,	the	forms	of	obfuscation	that	are	deployed	to	conceal	
the	 precarious	 nature	 of	 these	 claims,	 and	 the	 sorts	 of	 affective	 dimensions	 (eg	 abandonment,	
contempt,	 uncertainty,	 depression,	 control,	 	 optimism)	 that	 are	 occasionally	 revealed	 as	 traces	 in	
individual	 research	 reports,	 where	 authors	 express	 their	 frustration	 and	 ambitions	 for	 pursuing	
actuarial	methods	of	control.	
		
1.4	 Outline	of	thesis	chapters	
	
Chapter	one	introduces	the	concept	of	incapacitation	as	it	was	formulated	in	the	US	in	the	1970s.	The	
chapter	begins	by	describing	Wolfgang	et	al.’s	(1972)	seminal	longitudinal	research	that	prospectively	
tracked	 a	 birth	 cohort	 of	 males	 born	 in	 1945	 in	 Philadelphia,	 concentrating	 on	 the	 onset	 and	
participation	in	re-offending	in	the	years	that	the	young	men	were	10	to	18	years	of	age.	The	chapter	
then	 explores	 research	 conducted	 in	 the	 1970s	 that	 was	 focused	 upon	 demonstrating	 the	
incapacitative	effects	of	prison,	including	how	increases	in	the	length	of	sentencing	could	reduce	the	
crime	 rate.	My	method	here	 is	 to	decode	 the	Poisson	probability	models	 that	were	used	 in	 these	
projects.	These	models	made	ontological	assumptions	premised	upon	a	steady-state	understanding	
of	both	the	functioning	of	the	criminal	justice	system	and	the	nature	of	criminal	recidivism	(assuming	
that	the	individual	rate	of	offending	is	fixed,	that	offending	is	continuous	unless	it	is	interrupted	by	
social	control,	and	that	the	length	of	particular	careers	is	unevenly	distributed	within	the	population	
of	offenders).	The	final	part	of	the	chapter	considers	the	protocollary	efforts	of	the	federal	panel	on	
Deterrence	 and	 incapacitation	 (Blumstein	 et	 al.,	 1978)	 in	 assuming	 a	 central	 role	 in	 disarming	
objections	to	implementing	a	federal	sentencing	policy	of	incapacitation,	in	the	face	of	high	levels	of	
scientific	uncertainty	about	the	efficacy	of	such	a	policy.		
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Chapter	three	provides	a	detailed	mapping	of	the	criminal	career	protocol	that	gained	ascendency	in	
the	 1980s	 and	 that	 shaped	 the	 techno-scientific	 governmental	 program	 for	 reducing	 rates	 of	
recidivism,	using	an	evidence-based	program	that	could	modulate	a	network	of	relatively	autonomous	
researchers,	governmental	agents,	authorities	and	penal	institutions.	The	chapter	begins	by	outlining	
Greenwood	 and	 Abrahamse’s	 (1982)	 proposal	 for	 implementing	 a	 sentencing	 policy	 of	 selective	
incapacitation.	My	analysis	in	this	chapter	is	focused	on	a	second	federal	report	that	was	convened	to	
reconsider	the	implementation	of	this	policy	in	the	light	of	controversies	about	predicting	future	crime	
–	Criminal	careers	and	career	criminals,	vol.	1	&	2	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a,	b).	I	use	Galloway’s	(2004)	
conceptualization	 of	 protocol	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 way	 in	 which	 developing	 actuarial	 codes	 were	
defined	by	ontology	standards	within	the	criminal	career	research	program,	that	was	enacted	by	the	
federal	 panel	 in	 a	 quite	meticulous	 contestation	 of	 possible	 competing	 technical	 codes	 and	 their	
procedures	and	practices.		
	
The	chapter	demonstrates	that	protocollary	power	offers	new	insights	into	the	operations	of	actuarial	
justice	as	it	is	mapped	in	Feeley	and	Simon’s	two	papers	published	in	1992	and	1994.	The	diagram	that	
best	captures	the	complex	field	of	operations	is	that	of	an	evidence-based	environmental	program	of	
networked	 security	 as	 described	 by	 Foucault	 (2007)	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 biopolitics	 and	 security	
dispositifs.	If	security	is	to	be	narrowly	tied	with	combatting	the	chronic	high-rate	offender	and	the	
most	dangerous	offenders,	 incapacitation	becomes	an	extended	battle	 in	unfavourable	 conditions	
within	 a	 given	 milieu	 (Foucault,	 1977b:	 149).	 To	 develop	 better	 forms	 of	 actuarial	 control	 (the	
technology	 of	 prediction	 and	 its	 regime	 of	 targeted	 control	 at	multiple	 sites	 in	 the	 governmental	
milieu),	 I	demonstrate	that	the	protocollary	management	style	of	actuarial	 justice	 is	heavily	reliant	
upon	an	open-ended	form	of	data	capture	that	is	channelled	into	increasingly	networked	data-bases	
from	 funded	 research	 by	 criminal	 career	 researchers	 (who	operate	 at	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 criminal	
justice	 system	 and	 continue	 to	 experiment	 with	 the	 development	 of	 actuarial	 codes),	 and	 risk	
information	from	the	tracking	of	mobile	offenders	under	actuarial	forms	of	control	in	the	community.	
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Incapacitation	
	
2.1	 The	concept	of	incapacitation	
	
Writing	 in	 1995,	 Zimring	 and	 Hawkins,	 asserted	 that	 “incapacitation	 now	 serves	 as	 the	 principal	
justification	for	imprisonment	in	American	criminal	justice:	offenders	are	imprisoned	to	restrain	them	
physically	from	offending	again	while	they	are	confined”	(1995:	3).	It	was	in	the	interval	between	the	
1970s,	where	rehabilitation	was	the	dominant	rationality	of	imprisonment	in	the	US,	and	the	1990s	
that	 this	 transformation	 occurred.	 Incapacitation	 is	 a	 simplistic,	 non-theoretical,	 and	 technocratic	
solution	 to	 an	 amalgam	of	 governmental	 problems	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	as	 a	whole.	 The	
rationale	 is:	 “an	 offender	 cannot	 commit	 crimes	 in	 the	 general	 community	 while	 he	 or	 she	 is	
incarcerated”	(1995:	44).39	It	uses	probabilistic	statistical	models	that	capture	and	analyse	data	from	
longitudinal,	multi-factorial	risk	data	about	an	offender’s	prior	transactions	with	the	criminal	justice	
system	and	other	social	background	information	to	develop	estimates	of	an	individual’s	predicted	rate	
of	offending	in	the	future	relative	to	other	offenders	in	the	cohort	of	offenders.	It	then	seeks	to	target	
these	offenders	for	incapacitation	by	imposing	longer	sentences.	A	substantive	amount	of	the	early	
research	 into	 incapacitation	was	 concerned	with	 developing	 probability	models	 of	 criminal	 justice	
effects,	to	project	estimates	that	demonstrated	that	shifts	in	penal	policy	could	reduce	the	crime	rate.	
	
The	basic	arithmetic	model	of	incapacitation	and	its	rhetoric	about	efficacy	is	visually	represented	in	
Figure	1	below.	This	model	projects	an	actuarial	codification	of	the	“persistent	offender”	or	chronic	
recidivist	 who	 is	 profiled	 as	 having	 a	 lengthy	 criminal	 ‘career’.	 The	 incapacitative	 effect	 is	
demonstrated	 by	 the	 substantive	 interruption	 to	 the	 length	 of	 that	 career	 by	 incarceration.	
Incapacitation	relies	heavily	upon	three	pieces	of	risk	information:	the	frequency	or	mean	individual	
crime	rate,	the	age	of	the	offender	at	the	beginning	of	a	“criminal	career”,	and	the	duration	of	the	
criminal	career,	which	 is	assumed	 in	 the	model	as	being	a	constant	rate	of	offending	 (Zimring	and	
Hawkins,	1995:	44-45).	These	three	pieces	of	 information	are	combined	to	estimate	an	individual’s	
active	rate	of	offending	in	the	future	relative	to	the	aggregate	rates	of	all	other	active	offenders	for	
the	 interval	 of	 time	 under	 consideration,	 targeting	 the	 sub-group	 of	 high-rate	 offenders	 for	
incapacitation.	Research	at	that	time	attempted	to	project	“the	aggregate	savings	in	crime	prevented”	
or	the	“incapacitation	effect”	of	 imprisonment	by	multiplying	the	period	of	 incapacitation	of	those	
targeted	for	incapacitation	by	the	overall	rate	of	crime	that	would	have	been	committed	had	these	
individuals	not	be	incarcerated.	
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Figure	1.	Incapacitation,	rehabilitation	and	criminogenic	effects	in	an	individual	career		
	
The	questions	used	to	guide	my	analysis	in	this	chapter	is	a	genealogical	line	of	interrogation:	what	
were	the	conditions	of	possibility	that	focused	attention	upon	a	policy	of	incapacitation	at	the	federal	
level	in	the	United	States	in	the	1970s,	and	how	was	this	policy	given	legitimacy	for	implementation	
in	the	1980s	and	beyond?	I	map	the	protocollary	rules	of	formation	and	verification	used	in	criminal	
career	research	and	its	probability	models	for	estimating	the	crime	rate,	the	incapacitative	effect,	and	
the	predictors	of	recidivism.	In	conducting	my	analysis,	I	consider	the	concept	of	incapacitation	as	a	
penal	policy	“innovation”	that	was	afforded	considerable	attention	at	that	time	that	corresponds	with	
an	escalating	disenchantment	with	the	penal	policy	of	rehabilitation.	Its	emergence	occurred	within	
the	 interstices	 of	 scientific	 uncertainty	 and	 a	 paradoxical	 techno-scientific	 optimism	 at	 a	 time	 of	
elevated	concerns	about	domestic	security.	It	is	the	first	“risk	reduction	experiment”	in	the	demise	of	
rehabilitation	in	the	unfolding	of	evidence-based	penal	policy	and	practice	in	the	US.		
2.2	 Tracking	offending	behaviour	in	the	1970s	in	the	United	States	
	
The	research	conducted	 in	the	1970s	concerned	with	demonstrating	the	efficacy	of	 incapacitation,	
and	the	criminal	career	research	concerned	with	selective	incapacitation	described	in	the	next	chapter	
	 23	
were	founded	on	the	prototypical	research	conducted	by	Wolfgang	et	al.’s	(1972)	Delinquency	in	a	
cohort.	This	research	used	a	prospective	time	series	research	design	that	tracked	members	of	a	birth	
cohort	of	9,945	males	born	in	1945	who	lived	in	Philadelphia	for	eighteen	years	to	analyse	delinquency	
(that	 is,	 individual	criminal	offending)	rates.	 It	gathered	criminal	and	biographical	data	from	school	
records,	police	records,	and	dispositions	from	juvenile	and	criminal	court	records	between	their	10th	
and	 18th	 birthdays	 to	 determine	 the	 probability	 of	 becoming	 officially	 recorded	 as	 a	 delinquent	
(Wolfgang,	1973:	404).40	The	study	attempted	to	distinguish	offenders	from	non-offenders,	identifying	
the	key	correlates	of	a	criminal	career	and	the	kinds	of	trajectories	or	“pathways”	of	these	careers	by	
directing	analysis	to	the	sub-group	of	criminal	offenders.	
	
Wolfgang	and	his	colleagues	found	a	35%	participation	rate	of	criminal	offending	in	the	cohort	as	a	
whole	 (1972:	 54).	 	 However,	when	 the	 sub-group	 of	 offenders	were	 examined	more	 closely,	 46%	
committed	only	one	offence,	while	54%	committed	a	larger	number	of	offences	(1972:	65).	In	order	
to	learn	more	about	the	frequency	rate	of	re-offending	amongst	active	offenders,	the	data	was	cross-
tabulated	with	race	(using	a	white/non-white	binary	code),	socioeconomic	status,	the	type	of	school	
attended,	 residential	 and	 school	 moves,	 highest	 grades	 completed,	 IQ,	 and	 achievement	 level	 to	
identify	 the	 most	 significant	 relationships.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 the	 selection	 of	 these	 potential	
predictors	of	recidivism	was	not	explained	–	the	chapter	that	delineates	this	data	capture	does	not	
refer	 to	 any	 prior	 research	 that	 might	 lend	 support	 to	 their	 selection,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 more	
substantive	referencing	to	other	research	that	has	measured	socioeconomic	status	(1972:	39-52).	The	
researchers	 conducted	 a	 number	 of	 experimental	 rounds	 of	 data	 analysis	 to	 identify	 the	 “better	
candidates”	for	inclusion	in	the	development	of	their	probability	model	for	predicting	the	dynamics	of	
recidivism	through	subsequent	offences	over	time.	They	ran	comparisons	between	correlations	of	the	
selected	 variables	 contrasting	 the	 cohort	 as	 a	whole,	 offenders	 versus	 non-offenders,	 whites	 and	
nonwhites,	and	high	and	low	socioeconomic	membership.	In	this	round	of	analysis,	aggregated	data	
was	presented	“in	static	form	because	(it	describes	data)	as	an	aggregate	without	movement	through	
time”	(1972:	54).	
	
By	 filtering	 the	 data	 in	 this	 way,	 they	 identified	 the	 chief	 predictors	 for	 advancing	 their	 dynamic	
probability	model	of	recidivism.	Without	partitioning	the	cohort	using	these	binary	divisions	that	are	
markers	of	white	privilege	within	the	Fordist	economy,	the	correlations	were	relatively	weak.	Race	
and	socioeconomic	status	(to	a	lesser	degree)	were	the	best	predictors	of	whether	or	not	an	individual	
would	become	a	criminal;	the	remaining	variables	had	little	or	no	relationship	(1972:	245).	Just	over	
fifty	%	of	nonwhites	were	offenders;	while	 the	overall	 rate	 for	 the	cohort	was	calculated	as	being	
349.4	per	1,000,	the	“offender	rate”	was	1,983.5	per	1,000	for	nonwhites.	The	researchers	concluded	
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that	 there	 was	 a	 nexus	 of	 factors	 connected	 to	 criminality	 that	 they	 designated	 as	 being	 a	
“disadvantaged	position”.	They	comment:	“The	non-white	delinquent	boy	is	 likely	to	belong	to	the	
lower	socioeconomic	group,	experience	a	greater	number	of	school	and	residential	moves…and	have	
the	lowest	average	grade	completed,	the	lowest	achievement	level,	and	the	lowest	I.Q	score”	(1972:	
246).	When	the	researchers	tunnelled	in	on	the	offender	sub-group,	their	analysis	found	that	the	most	
striking	 differences	 were	 between	 one-time	 offenders	 and	 “recidivists”,	 the	 pattern	 of	 relations	
mirroring	the	risk	constellation	just	described	(1972:	65-87).	
	
The	researchers’	focus	on	developing	a	probability	matrix	that	estimates	an	individual’s	likelihood	of	
becoming	a	recidivist,	eclipses	other	ways	of	explaining	racial	differences	in	individual	rates	of	crime.	
These	researchers	do	consider	alternative	explanations	(1972:	218-43),	which	are	largely	ignored	by	
those	criminal	 career	 researchers	 that	 follow	 in	 the	 late	1970s	and	1980s.	Their	primary	 focus	 for	
considering	 a	 sociological	 rather	 than	 a	 naturalist	 explanation	 of	 criminal	 development	 in	 the	
individual,	is	to	consider	police	dispositions	of	cases.	It	is	with	little	surprise	that	they	found	that	police	
exercised	their	discretion,	where	some	offenders	taken	into	custody	had	the	offence	recorded	but	no	
further	action	was	taken;	however,	being	non-white	was	found	to	be	the	most	significant	factor	in	not	
exercising	this	discretion	and	using	the	full	extent	of	the	law	(1972:	252).	Concluding	that	“differential	
treatment	based	on	race”	does	occur,	they	immediately	dismiss	this,	commenting:	“it	appears	that	
the	 juvenile	 justice	 system	has	been	able	 to	 isolate	 the	hard-core	offender	 fairly	well”	 (nonwhites	
were	found	to	commit	more	serious	offences	and/or	to	be	recidivists)	(ibid).		
	
Continuing	in	a	kind	of	double-talk,	infused	with	denial,	they	suggest	that	the	juvenile	justice	system	
may	either	have	no	effect	on	subsequent	behaviour	or	 it	may	have	a	“deleterious	effect	on	future	
behaviour”.	Their	discussion	avoids	any	meaningful	consideration	of	how	the	juvenile	justice	system	
may	have	deleterious	effects	upon	the	offender.	 Instead	the	matter	 is	considered	to	be	resolvable	
empirically	 though	 further	 hypothesis	 testing:	 either	 the	 recruitment	 process	 into	 the	 system	 is	
random,	or	it	is	“selective”	(racially	discriminatory).	Ignoring	their	own	finding	that	this	recruitment	
process	 is	selective,	 they	suggest	that	tracking	offenders	 into	the	future	will	 resolve	the	matter	by	
comparing	the	sorts	of	offences	and	their	frequency	between	different	“treatments”:	those	who	were	
diverted	and	those	who	received	more	serious	sanctions.	This	ignores	the	arbitrary	use	of	sanctioning,	
as	subsequent	sanctions	are	understood	to	have	an	isomorphism	with	the	nature	of	the	offence.	
	
In	the	final	phase	of	their	analysis	the	researchers	concentrated	on	developing	a	probability	model	
that	could	identify	recidivists	in	the	future	by	considering	a	matrix	of	transitional	probabilities	over	
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time.	They	used	an	estimate	of	social	harm/seriousness	to	assign	cumulative	scores	to	the	biography	
of	 each	 offender,	 averaging	 “seriousness	 of	 the	 offence”	 in	 relation	 to	 race,	 SES,	 age	 and	 other	
variables.41	This	estimate	was	understood	as	being	a	“price”	or	“productivity”	index	that	could	be	used	
to	 identify	which	segment	of	 the	offender	population	 is	directly	accountable	 for	 those	effects	and	
could	be	targeted	for	incapacitation	(Wolfgang,	1973:	406).	This	was	an	early	attempt	to	provide	some	
estimate	of	the	incidence	of	crime	rather	than	use	prevalence	data	that	provides	information	about	
the	aggregate	number	of	offences	that	have	been	committed	over	a	particular	interval	of	time	such	
as	annual	Uniform	Crime	Reports	compiled	by	the	Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation	(FBI).	Within	public	
health	biopolitical	regimes	incidence	rates	are	used	to	identify	the	rate	of	new	cases	of	disease,	or	
more	ideally	as	an	estimate	of	the	fraction	of	the	population	at	risk	of	developing	the	disease	for	more	
effective	disease	control.	
	
The	 transportation	 of	 this	 biopolitical	mentality	 into	 the	 control	 of	 recidivism,	 strategizes	 chronic	
recidivism	 as	 being	 analogous	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 disease	 that	 has	 a	 low	 cure	 rate	 but	where	 there	 is	
sustained	survival	over	the	life-course,	thus	contributing	to	elevated	prevalence	of	the	disease	(rising	
crime	 rates	 and	 social	 harm).	 Rather	 than	 wait	 for	 recidivism	 to	 naturally	 recede	 as	 a	 result	 of	
biological	degeneration	and	eventual	death,	the	interpolation	of	this	biopolitical	strategy	asserts	that	
by	arresting	the	escalation	of	recidivism	in	its	earlier	stages	(that	is,	by	anticipating	and	intervening	in	
the	early	stages	of	an	escalation	in	“transition	probabilities”	linked	to	chronic	recidivism),	significant	
improvements	can	be	made	in	the	detrimental	effects	of	crime.	Wolfgang	(1973:	406)	concludes:	“we	
are	simply	faced	with	the	fact	that	more	social	harm	is	committed	by	nonwhites,	so	that	the	resources	
and	efforts	of	social	harm	reduction	should	be	employed	among	nonwhite	youth,	especially	the	very	
young”.	
	
The	researchers	adopted	a	stochastic	probability	model	of	a	“criminal	career”	that	assumes	a	random	
statistical	 probability	 distribution	 within	 the	 population	 of	 offenders,	 where	 criminal	 offending	 is	
understood	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 frequency	 of	 offending,	 and	 the	 individual’s	 social	 history	 of	
delinquency	(Wolfgang	et	al.,	1972:	151-58).	The	predictor	codes	used	in	the	probability	model	are:	a	
static	measure	of	officially	recorded	crime	frequency,	which	is	recoded	as	an	estimate	of	the	social	
harm	of	crime,	and	a	dynamic	enumeration	of	criminal	recidivism,	imagined	as	being	as	risks	linked	to	
an	adolescent’s	social	background	that	are	correlated	with	increasing	probabilities	of	re-offending	that	
can	be	traced	at	each	successive	offence	(“transition	probabilities”,	or	“movement	over	time”).Their	
model	 of	 a	 criminal	 career	 projects	 movement	 along	 a	 criminal	 career	 as	 being	 like	 a	 finite,	
homogenous	Markov	chain”	(1972:	153).	Markov	chain	analysis	had	been	used	in	the	social	sciences	
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in	the	1950s	and	1960s	with	limited	success42	primarily	in	relation	to	questions	about	mobility,	small	
groups’	decision-making	in	relation	to	conformity,	and	economic	analyses	of	brand	choice,	fertility,	
mental	health	and	the	distribution	and	size	of	firms.43	For	example,	Blumen	et	al.	tracked	workers’	
work	history	over	 time	to	 identify	patterns	of	movement	and	retention	within	and	across	 industry	
subsequent	 to	 a	 worker’s	 first	 employment	 placement	 (the	 probability	 chains	 of	 “mover-stayer	
transition”	over	time).	 In	these	sorts	of	models,	 inertia	 is	considered	as	being	dysfunctional,	and	is	
used	to	identify	those	sub-categories	of	discrete	populations	who	have	become	fixed	within	particular	
states	of	being	over	time.	
	
Using	probability	model	estimates	of	the	“type	of	crime”	and	the	frequency	of	offending	over	time,	a	
regression	 analysis	 was	 conducted	 to	 identify	 “shifts	 in	 offence	 distributions”	 in	 the	 cohort	 of	
offenders	as	offenders	proceed	from	their	first	offence	to	their	fifteenth	offence	(1972:	152).	Their	
model	 assumed	 that	 there	was	 offender	 diversity	 that	would	 cluster	 along	 six	 possible	 pathways:	
injury,	theft,	damage,	combination,	non-index	offences	such	as	truancy,	minor	violations,	disorderly	
conduct,	and	desistance.	 	Thus,	each	possible	criminal	 “pathway”	was	constructed	on	estimates	of	
crime	types	measured	as	the	kind	of	harm	the	offense	involved	(eg	injury,	theft,	damage,	combination)	
rather	than	the	legal	classification	of	the	offence,	and	the	projection	of	a	measure	of	“transitions”	in	
the	progression	of	offending	captured	at	each	static	moment	of	its	progressive	recording	(Event	1,	2,	
3…En).	
	
Mathematical	recursion	is	a	“nesting	of	things	within	things	and	its	variations”	(Hofstader,	1979,	cited	
in	Totaro	and	Ninno,	2014:	30).	In	this	“branching	probability	model	of	offensive	diversity”	(Wolfgang	
et	al.,	1972:	151-55),	probabilities	are	initially	coded	by	bracketing	the	first	round	of	calculations	as	a	
measurement	of	the	first	transition	in	the	criminal	career	as	an	empty	set	at	0	(Totaro	and	Ninno,2014:	
31),	the	recording	of	bodily	movement	as	the	movement	from	birth	that	realises	the	first	offence	or	
index	offence.	A	recursive	mathematical	procedure	is	established	that	repeats	this	projection	at	each	
successive	event	in	the	progression	of	the	career:	progression	to	the	second	offence,	to	the	third	and	
so	 on	 (Wolfgang	 et	 al.,	 1972:	 152-53).	 This	 successor	 functioning	 builds	 the	 process	 for	 statistical	
analysis	 “by	 yielding	 the	 ‘successive’	 occurrence	 of	 any	 given	 value”	 as	 if	 it	 had	 a	 one-to-one	
correspondence	between	the	numerical	computation	and	the	natural	phenomena	that	codification	
has	enacted	(Totaro	and	Ninno,	2014:	31).44	Any	evidence	for	offender	diversity	is	a	construct	of	the	
model	 itself	 that	draws	conclusions	about	crime	specialisation,	offence	switching,	and	shifts	 in	 the	
categorical	 classifications	 of	 offender	 diversity	 from	 those	 projected	 codes	 that	 are	 used	 to	 find	
evidence	of	each	successive	pathway	as	it	is	subjected	to	regression	analysis.	These	reductive	codes	
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were	selected	as	a	pragmatic	solution	for	managing	the	methodological	problems	linked	to	classifying	
offences	where	 the	enacted	protocol	 for	classifying	offences	 reduced	 the	potential	 size	of	offence	
categories	substantially	for	ease	of	analysis	and	that	enabled	a	practical	way	of	making	comparisons	
between	offences	and	between	transitions	over	time	(Wolfgang	et	al.	1972:	151-52).		
	
Using	this	recursive	process,	the	researchers	found	that	the	“static	probability”	of	committing	a	first	
offence	of	any	type	is	0.3511,	the	probability	of	a	second	is	0.5358,	if	a	second	offence	is	committed	
the	probability	of	the	third	is	0.6509,	and	beyond	the	third,	the	probability	of	re-offending	ranges	from	
0.70	to	0.80	(1972:	163).	In	exhausting	all	possible	configurations	given	the	six	imagined	pathways,	
the	researchers	present	their	findings:	a	“typical”	offender	is	most	likely	to	commit	a	truancy	offence	
or	a	minor	violation	offence	first	(0.47	probability),	he	is	then	most	likely	to	desist	(0.35),	if	a	further	
offence	 is	committed	 it	has	a	 low	probability	of	offence	specialization	making	 it	difficult	 to	predict	
what	sort	of	offence	will	be	committed	based	on	the	first	offence.	“Chronic	offenders”	were	coded	as	
having	committed	five	or	more	offenses	before	becoming	18:	they	were	6%	of	the	total	cohort	but	
18%	of	juvenile	offenders,	being	responsible	for	52%	of	all	offences	and	approximately	two	thirds	of	
violent	crimes;	nonwhites	committed	70%	of	all	offenses	in	the	group,	and	all	of	the	murders,	91%	of	
rapes,	93%	of	robberies	and	88%	of	aggravated	assaults	(1972:	248).	
	
Wolfgang	and	his	colleagues	formulated	the	following	penal	policy	rationale	based	on	their	findings,	
that	focused	in	the	timing	of	social	control	efforts	informed	by	the	critical	point	in	the	contingency	
tables	 about	 the	 transition	 probabilities	 of	 recidivism	 as	 it	 is	 tracked	 at	 each	 successive	 criminal	
offence	(Wolfgang	et	al.,	1972:	253-55).	They	comment:	
	
One	answer	would	be	that	the	best	time	(to	act)	is	that	point	beyond	which	the	natural	loss	
rate,	or	probability	of	desistence,	begins	 to	 level	off.	Because	46%	of	 the	delinquents	stop	
after	the	first	offense,	a	major	treatment	program	at	this	point	would	seem	to	be	wasteful.	
We	could	even	suggest	that	intervention	be	held	in	abeyance	until	the	commission	of	the	third	
offence,	 for	an	additional	35%	of	 the	second-time	offenders	desist	 from	then	on.	Thus	we	
could	reduce	the	number	of	boys	requiring	attention	in	this	cohort	from	3,475	after	the	first	
offence	 to	 1,862	 after	 the	 second	 offence,	 to	 1,212	 after	 the	 third	 offence,	 rather	 than	
concentrating	on	all	9,945	or	 some	other	 large	 subgroup…under	 some	blanket	community	
action	program.	Beyond	the	third	offense,	the	desistance	probabilities	level	off.	
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This	policy	recommendation	does	not	specify	anything	about	the	character	of	the	intervention	other	
than	it	should	prevent	recidivism.	It	introduces	an	economic	rationality	of	government	founded	upon	
the	most-cost	effective	and	optimal	point	of	intervention	informed	by	a	knowledge	of	the	distribution	
of	 probability	 transitions	 of	 future	 offending	 amongst	 the	 cohort	 of	 known	 offenders.	 In	 more	
continuously	tracking	bodily	movement	over	time,	it	becomes	strategically	possible	to	partition	this	
sub-population	into	at	least	two	probabilistic	categories:	natural	desisters,	and	recidivists	who	can	be	
prospectively	 identified	using	 the	Markov	 chain	probability	model	used	by	 the	 researchers	and	 its	
contingency	codes.	It	is	possible	to	distribute	members	of	the	offending	population	across	the	age-
crime	 curve	 to	 reveal	 static	 aggregate	 patterns:	 offenders	 are	 on	 average	 14.4	 years	 old	 at	 the	
commission	of	their	first	offence	and	16	years	old	at	the	fifteenth	(1972:	172);	54%	are	recidivists	and	
46%	one	timers;		72%	of	offenders	experienced	their	first	police	contact	between	the	ages	of	12	and	
16;	 there	 is	 a	 large	 influx	 of	 one-time	 offenders	 at	 age	 15-16;	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 first	 offence	
increases	from	age	7	to	age	14,	sharply	peaks	at	age	16,	and	decreases	to	age	18	irrespective	of	race	
or	socioeconomic	influences	(1972:	251-52).	
	
The	actuarial	protocol	 that	begins	 to	emerge	 from	this	 research	 is	 focused	on	a	 far	more	complex	
anticipatory	tracking	of	the	sub-group	of	recidivists	and	the	dynamics	of	offence	transition	matrices	
concerned	 with	 the	 contingencies	 of	 age,	 other	 background	 variables,	 crime	 seriousness,	 and	
transition	probabilities	in	order	to	predict	chronic	offenders.	The	new	discursive	frame	of	reference	
can	be	stated	as	follows:	using	a	probability	model	about	the	natural	history	of	a	criminal	career	over	
the	lifespan,	what	variables	or	predictors	are	related	to	higher	frequencies	or	rates	of	offending	that	
do	not	abate	over	time–	how	can	we	effectively	predict	and	prevent	those	offenders	before	they	have	
begun	to	commit	too	much	crime?	Wolfgang	et	al.	(1972:	255)	comment:	“we	have	generated	a	model	
for	the	prediction	of	future	delinquency	at	specific	points	in	time,	and	we	have	produced	findings	from	
which	 the	 efficient	 timing	 of	 intervention	 schemes	 could	 logically	 be	 inferred”.	 Given	 the	 limited	
knowledge	that	was	available	and	the	fact	that	the	researchers	had	only	tracked	their	cohort	to	18	
years	of	age,	 the	researchers	continued	to	 track	 their	cohort	 in	 the	 future	expanding	the	scope	of	
research	 to	 capture	 more	 extensive	 “background”	 risk	 data	 that	 could	 be	 analysed	 and	 filtered	
through	its	probability	model	to	refine	and	improve	its	predictive	powers	(see	Wolfgang	et	al,	1987).		
	
These	researchers	signalled	an	agenda	for	further	research	about	recidivism	that	directs	attention	to	
the	possible	transition	contingencies	between	an	offender’s	first	offence	and	the	patterning	of	crime	
over	time.	The	researchers	projected	the	idea	into	their	probability	model	that	the	history	of	criminal	
offending	would	reveal	that	offenders	would	specialise	in	crime	over	time	or	that	they	might	progress	
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to	more	serious	offending	(see	1972:	174-207).	This	conflates	the	figure	of	the	chronic	recidivist	with	
the	 statistical	 profiling	 of	 a	 serious	 or	 dangerous	 offender,	which	 is	 an	 enduring	 contagion	within	
criminal	career	research.	Wolfgang	et	al.	(1972:	254)	did	not	find	any	significant	evidence	of	offence	
specialisation.	At	best,	 their	 data	 could	only	 support	 the	 finding	 that,	 the	 accumulation	of	 a	 large	
number	of	offences	could	be	explained	by	“a	stationary	transition	process”	(ibid),	thus	contributing	to	
the	 idea	 that	 chronic	 recidivists	 have	 little	 hope	 of	 transformation.	 	 As	 offenders	 accumulated	 a	
greater	number	of	offences,	the	transition	data	about	offence	seriousness	revealed	evidence	of	crime	
switching	 and	 quite	 small	 increases	 in	 seriousness	 over	 time	 (1972:	 191-92).	 Nonetheless,	 they	
suggested	 that	 “in	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	occurrence	of	 serious	 crime	 in	 a	 delinquent	 boy’s	 future,	
efforts	should	be	made	to	prevent	all	 forms	of	recidivism”	(ibid).	This	 is	an	oblique	statement	that	
really	 suggests	 that	no	 limit	 should	be	placed	on	 the	 control	of	 recidivism	 in	 the	 face	of	 scientific	
uncertainty.	
	
The	 reframing	of	penal	objectives	 towards	 the	 identification	of	 the	optimal	 timing	of	 intervention	
premised	upon	a	prediction	about	 future	offending	 introduces	 the	 role	of	probabilistic	biopolitical	
knowledge	about	recidivism	into	the	criminal	justice	planning	milieu	as	Foucault	(2007:	21)	coined	it.	
O’Grady	(2014:	515)	describes	milieu	as	an	“epistemic	device”	or	“technical	(planning)	schema”	that	
marks	 out	 a	 milieu	 in	 advance	 in	 order	 to	 reflect	 upon	 it	 and	 modify	 it.	 Foucault	 comments:	
“(dispositifs	 of	 security)	work,	 fabricate,	 organize	 and	 plan	 a	milieu”	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 regulate	 its	
diverse	 elements	 “in	 which	 circulation	 is	 carried	 out”	 (Foucault,	 2007:	 21).	 The	 biopolitical	
problematization	that	is	articulated	in	Wolfgang	et	al.’s	research	protocol	is	centrally	concerned	with	
the	 optimising	 the	 “combined,	 overall	 effects	 bearing	 on	 all	 who	 live	 in	 (milieu)”	 by	 discerning	
between	good	and	bad	flows	of	bodily	movement,	which	implies	the	targeting	of	the	chronic	offender	
for	incapacitation	(Foucault,	2007:	21).	
	
We	 can	 understand	 the	 tracking	 of	 offenders	 in	 order	 to	 enumerate	 patterns	 of	 the	 offender	
population,	 to	 estimate	 rates	 of	 re-offending,	 and	 to	 predict,	 sort	 and	 regulate	 segments	 of	 the	
offender	population	as	forms	of	biopolitical	knowledge	that	are	used	to	secure	population	by	actuarial	
means.	These	forms	of	knowledge	are	pivotal	in	making	links	between	the	circulation	of	causes	and	
effects	that	are,	in	turn,	targeted	as	a	field	of	intervention	bound	to	the	materiality	of	where	offenders	
live	 (ibid).	 The	 tracking-predicting-control	 actuarial	 technology	 that	 is	 implied	 in	Wolgang	 et	 al.’s	
protocol	 renders	 the	 distinction	 between	 profiling,	 estimating,	 predicting	 recidivism,	 and	 risk	
management	 (the	 sorting	 and	 allocation	 to	 differential	 risk	 prevention	 interventions)	 obsolete.	
Tracking	 is	 indispensable	not	only	 to	probability	estimates	and	predictions	but	 it	 is	a	necessity	 for	
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ongoing	risk	prevention.	At	the	same	time,	there	is	an	enveloping	of	risk	information	that	feeds	back	
and	 forth	 across	 these	 mutually	 conditioning	 zones.	 Actuarial	 justice	 is	 an	 apparatus	 of	 capture	
defined	 by	 the	 technology	 of	 anticipatory	 tracking	 of	 offenders	 across	 the	 lifespan.45	 Foucault’s	
schema	of	milieu	 reveals	 this	 continuous	 interweaving	of	 risk	 knowledge	and	 risk	 intervention,	 its	
reach	being	a	conjunction	of	complex	events	–	a	series	of	events	and	possible	events	that	remain	open	
to	 new	 combinations	 -	 that	 are	 conditioned	 by	 processes	 occurring	within	 individual,	 groups	 and	
population	and	the	diverse	regulations	that	are	configured	and	reconfigured	“within	a	multivalent	and	
transformable	framework”	(2007:	20).	
	
2.3	 Calculating	futures:	Modelling	the	efficacy	of	incapacitation	
	
In	their	brief	history	of	incapacitation,	Zimring	and	Hawkins	(1995:	10-14)	situate	its	emergence	in	the	
problematization	of	imprisonment	in	the	1970s	at	a	time	when	most	interlocutors	acknowledged	that	
imprisonment	was	 failing	 in	 terms	of	 the	rehabilitation	of	offenders,	when	prisons	were	becoming	
overcrowded	and	there	was	a	rise	in	prison	riots,	and	where	the	crime	rate	was	rising	and	fears	about	
community	 safety	 were	 becoming	 increasingly	 politically	 salient.	 In	 their	 account,	 the	
problematization	of	prisons	swung	between	two	political	poles:	a	liberal	stance	that	generally	viewed	
prisons	in	unfavourable	terms,	and	wanted	to	see	the	vast	majority	of	prisoners	decarcerated	and	the	
prison	 afforded	 a	 special	 role	 in	 the	 containment	 of	 the	most	 dangerous	 offenders	 (in	 particular	
serious	violent	crime	linked	to	mental	illness	and	repeat	offending,	and	offenders	deeply	involved	in	
organised	 crime)	 (see	 National	 Council	 on	 Crime	 and	 Delinquency,	 1973);46	 and	 an	 escalating	
conservative	stance	that	wanted	to	see	criminal	laws	more	effectively	enforced,	that	advocated	for	
longer	and	more	consistent	sentences	for	imprisonment,	and	that	favoured	general	incapacitation	to	
achieve	significant	aggregate	crime	prevention	gains	irrespective	of	whether	this	would	result	in	rising	
rates	 of	 imprisonment.	 On	 both	 poles,	 incapacitation	 was	 accepted	 as	 a	 “residual	 rationale	 for	
imprisonment”,	albeit	for	differing	reasons	(Zimring	and	Hawkins,	1995:	11).		
	
The	 localisation	 of	 governmental	 problematization	 to	 the	 functioning	 of	 prisons,	 underscores	 the	
growing	public	and	academic	criticism	of	the	functioning	of	the	criminal	justice	system	as	a	whole	in	
the	1970s,	where	patterns	of	imprisonment	and	correctional	treatment	were	becoming	viewed	as	a	
symptom	of	a	much	larger	problem.	In	1973	J.Q.	Wilson	launched	a	critical	account	of	the	relationship	
between	public	 safety	and	 the	 judicial	 sentencing	 in	 the	New	York	Times.	He	argued	 that	criminal	
processing	was	primarily	about	sentencing	rather	than	a	criminal	hearing,	and	that	sentencing	needed	
to	 demonstrate	 a	moral	 concern	 about	 the	 offence	 and	 effectively	minimise	 the	 chance	 that	 the	
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offender	would	not	re-offend	again.		After	canvassing	a	number	of	problems	in	sentencing	practices	
(the	large	number	of	guilty	pleas	bargaining	cases	that	result	in	more	lenient	sentences,	the	lack	of	
any	coherent	goal	in	sentencing,	the	avoidance	of	sentences	to	prison	as	judges	felt	that	prisons	were	
not	rehabilitating	offenders,	inconsistent	or	arbitrary	sentences	to	prison	that	did	not	differentiate	on	
the	basis	of	the	seriousness	of	the	crime),	he	suggested	that	“we	entirely	abandon	the	rehabilitation	
theory	of	sentencing	ad	corrections”	(1973:8).		
	
In	this	way,	he	articulated	the	will-to-incapacitate:	the	function	of	the	prison	is	“to	isolate	and	punish”,	
as	while	offenders	are	in	prison	“they	cannot	harm	society”	(ibid).		He	advocates	that	the	system	itself	
needs	 to	be	 recalibrated	 so	 as	 to	 attain	 greater	 certainty	 and	 severity	 of	 punishment.	 “Certainty”	
would	be	measured	by	calculating	the	number	of	persons	sent	to	prison	and	dividing	it	by	the	number	
of	 crimes	 reported	 to	 the	 police,	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 or	 not	 there	 was	 a	 larger	 proportion	 of	
offenders	being	imprisoned	relative	to	the	crime	rate	a	prison	sentence	(1973:	9).	“Severity”	would	
be	measured	by	determining	whether	or	not	the	median	length	of	a	prison	sentence	had	increased	
over	time.	 In	his	view,	this	would	more	effectively	deter	offenders	 from	committing	crimes.	To	re-
modulate	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 in	 this	 way,	 the	 court	 would	 need	 to	 re-orient	 itself	 to	 the	
primary	task	of	sentencing,	“placed	under	central	management	with	uniform	standards”	that	were	
monitored	and	enforced,	and	where	every	conviction	for	a	“non-trivial	offence”	would	entail	a	penalty	
that	involved	a	deprivation	of	liberty	in	some	form	or	other	which	may	not	necessarily	involve	prison	
(1973:	12-13).	
	
The	 emergence	 of	 a	 fledgling	 and	 scattered	 techno-scientific	 interest	 in	 developing	 research	 that	
generated	“quantitative	estimates	of	what	alternative	policies	would	achieve	and	what	they	would	
cost”	in	the	1970s	(Shinnar	and	Shinnar,	1975:	581),	is	a	response	within	this	discursive	context	about	
the	problematization	of	the	overall	functioning	of	the	criminal	justice	system	itself,	where	there	was	
a	 lack	 of	 precise	 information	 about	 the	 operations	 of	 criminal	 justice	 parameters	 and	 their	
interrelations.	Within	the	debate	and	proposals	to	legislate	for	heavier	sentences,	these	researchers	
began	to	develop	ways	of	quantifying	criminal	justice	system	parameters	that	could	demonstrate	that	
shifts	in	the	length	of	imprisonment	could	have	crime	reduction	effects	by	developing	mathematical	
probability	models	 that	would	be	accessible	 to	 the	policy	maker	and	social	 scientist	 (ibid).47	These	
efforts	 operationalised	 their	 models	 as	 a	 “ground	 zero”	 condition	 for	 initializing	 penal	 policy	 by	
technocratic	means	in	the	absence	of	any	other	empirically	verified	foundational	penal	rationality	such	
as	 general	 deterrence	 or	 rehabilitation.	 Articulating	 this	 in	 quantitative	 terms	 Clarke	 (1975:	 525)	
writes:	 “It	 should	be	noted	 that	while	deterrent	and	 rehabilitative	effects	of	 imprisonment	can	be	
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positive,	negative	or	zero,	the	removal	effect	can	only	be	positive	or	zero…depending	on	whether	the	
inmate	would	have	committed	a	criminal	offense	but	for	his	imprisonment”.		
	
To	 illustrate	 the	 sort	 of	 research	 conducted,	 Clarke	 (1974)	 used	Wolfgang	 et	 al.’s	 (1972)	 data	 to	
estimate	 the	 proportion	 of	 FBI	 index	 crimes48	 averted	 by	 incapacitation.	He	 estimated	 the	 annual	
arrest	rate	for	a	smaller	subset	of	381	incarcerated	offenders	who	had	been	imprisoned	at	least	once	
before	turning	18.	He,	like	Greenberg	(1975),	found	the	incapacitative	effects	of	imprisonment	to	be	
quite	low	–	from	5	to15	%	of	juvenile	crimes,	and	from	1	to	4	%	of	all	crimes	(Clarke,	1974:	534).49	This	
contrasted	with	other	studies	where	estimates	of	crime	reduction	by	incapacitation	were	substantially	
higher	 (Marsh	 and	 Singer,	 1972;	 Ehrlich,	 1973;	 Shinnar	 and	 Shinnar,	 1975).	 Marsh	 and	 Singer	
estimated	that	35-48%	of	robberies	could	be	reduced	by	incapacitating	high-rate	offenders;	Shinnar	
and	Shinnar	(1975)	estimated	that	existing	imprisonment	policy	reduced	safety	crimes	by	20%.	This	
sort	of	scientific	uncertainty	about	forecasts	of	efficacy	was	a	driver	for	further	research	to	develop	
probability	models	that	could	make	more	accurate	estimates	about	criminal	 justice	“performance”	
(the	 relations	 or	 probabilities	 between	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 sentenced	 to	 prison	 if	 a	 crime	 is	
committed	which	is	contingent	upon	the	probabilities	of	arrest	given	a	crime,	the	probabilities	of	being	
given	a	prison	sentence)	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	67).	
	
Simulating	criminal	justice	effects	is	a	calculative	practice	that	seeks	to	gather	knowledge	about	the	
overall	operations	of	criminal	justice	system	along	a	number	of	inter-connected	parameters	or	system	
inputs	and	outputs,	 in	order	to	begin	generating	estimates	about	a	probable	future.	 It	 is	a	form	of	
futures	modelling	that	deploys	imaginative	practices	and	techniques	for	calculating	a	desired	future	
(Anderson,	 2010:	 783-87).	 The	 key	 criminal	 justice	 effects	 considered	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	
probability	 of	 an	 offender	 being	 arrested	 and	 convicted,	 the	 probability	 of	 an	 offender	 being	
sentenced	to	imprisonment	following	conviction,	and	the	average	time	spent	in	prison.	The	estimates	
or	forecasts	that	these	models	generated	are	calculated	within	a	strictly	functionalist	sense	based	on	
assumptions	of	system	equilibria.	This	modelling	is	pragmatic,	acknowledging	the	limits	that	its	current	
mode	of	operation	must	deal	with	(eg	prison	capacity,	the	crimogenic	effects	of	prison,	the	difficulties	
estimating	 general	 deterrence	 effects,	 poor	 evidence	 that	 rehabilitation	 works	 and	 so	 on)	 while	
bracketing	out	these	unstable	forces	and	their	 interactive	effects	 in	favour	of	effective	calculability	
within	a	bounded	system	of	estimates	that	are	projected	as	being	stable	for	the	interval	of	time	being	
considered.	
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These	models	typically	used	aggregated	annual	crime	data	derived	from	diverse	sources	(FBI	index,	
police	arrest	data,	self-report	data	about	offending)	to	estimate	the	crime	rate	per	year	per	criminal.	
This	estimate	was	incorporated	into	algorithmic	formulas	of	system	effects	using	complex	equations	
to	determine	 the	 future	probability	 that	 an	offender	 is	 “would	have	 remained	 criminally	 active	 in	
society	given	during	a	(specified)	period	of	incarceration	(specified	in	years)”	(Blumstein	et	al,	1978:	
65).	 The	 probability	 models	 for	 making	 these	 estimates	 were	 premised	 upon	 a	 primitive	 set	 of	
ontological	 assumptions	 about	 the	nature	 of	 a	 criminal	 career	 that	 is	 understood	 as	 being	 stable,	
continuous,	 and	 that	 can	 be	 quantified	 using	 a	 linear	model	 that	 captures	 information	 about	 the	
offenders	“active”	career.	In	this	model,	the	“active”	offender	commits	crimes	at	a	constant	rate.	This	
assumption	is	contradicted	if	the	offender	spends	significant	intervals	of	time	not	offending,	or	where	
there	are	 significant	 rises	 in	 the	 frequency	of	offending	 that	might	occur	around	 the	 time	 that	an	
offender	is	arrested	(Chan,	1995:	3).	It	is	also	assumed	that	most	crimes	are	committed	by	relatively	
few	offenders	as	was	demonstrated	by	Wolgang	et	al.	(1972).	
	
	An	individual’s	criminal	career	is	enumerated	using	the	model	depicted	in	Figure	2.		A	criminal	career	
is	 imagined	as	a	“sequence	of	events	during	the	criminal	career	of	an	active	offender”	that	can	be	
enumerated	as	follows:	it	begins	with	an	observed	first	offence:	X:	and	each	subsequent	offence	can	
be	recorded:	X,	X,…n;	while	identifying	whether	the	individual	was	arrested	Ä;	whether	the	offence	
resulted	in	conviction,	the	previous	symbol	is	enclosed	within	a	square:	 ;	the	shaded	area	represents	
whether	the	conviction	resulted	in	imprisonment	and	for	how	long;	after	release	from	prison,	further	
tracking	of	the	offender	will	be	able	to	continue	recording	any	further	offending,	including	how	much	
time	elapsed	until	the	next	arrest,	using	the	same	apparatus	of	capture	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1987a:	21-
22).	Figure	3	illustrates	this	data	capture	in	probabilistic	terms.	It	is	possible	that	self-report	data	can	
be	included	to	account	for	unobserved	crimes	that	are	not	detected,	prosecuted	and	adjudicated,	this	
data	being	recorded	as	an	X	which	is	not	circled.	The	vast	majority	of	this	research	in	the	US	in	the	
1970s	and	beyond	have	relied	upon	cross-sectional	data	captured	from	criminal	justice	databases;	it	
rarely	uses	multi-method	research	designs	to	triangulate	its	data.	The	research	published	by	Petersilia	
and	Greenwood	(1978)	using	self-report	data	from	the	Rand	Project’s	Habitual	Offenders	Project	is	
discussed	in	Chapter	3.	Measures	of	offending	such	as	arrest	data	are	understood	as	a	sampling	of	the	
crime	 process	 based	 on	 estimates	 of	 the	 aggregated	 annual	 crime	 rate,	where	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	
crimes	are	committed	at	a	constant	rate.	
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Figure	2.	Recording	a	criminal	career	
	
	
Figure	3.	A	probability	model	of	an	individual	criminal	career	
	
All	of	the	projects	conducted	in	the	1970s	about	the	incapacitative	effects	of	prison	shared	a	number	
of	 other	 similar	 assumptions.	 Firstly,	 they	 assume	 that	 all	 offenders	 have	 the	 same	 risk	 of	 being	
arrested	and	incarcerated	(Cohen,	1983).	As	briefly	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	this	assumption	
could	 not	 hold	 if	 police	 prosecution	 and	 criminal	 sentencing	 were	 influenced	 by	 racial	 or	 other	
discriminatory	practices	or	by	any	other	rationale	that	would	individualise	sentencing	as	would	have	
then	 occurred	 as	 a	 result	 of	 penal	 welfarism,	 or	 by	 other	 considerations	 suggested	 by	 Wilson.	
Secondly,	it	is	assumed	that	if	an	offender	is	incapacitated,	that	he	does	not	offend	while	in	prison	and	
that	 others	 living	 in	 the	 community	 do	 not	 replace	 the	 offender.	 This	 ignores	 those	 offences	
committed	 by	 offenders	 in	 prison	 and	 avoids	 any	 acknowledgment	 and	 subsequent	 research	 to	
investigate	 and	 offender’s	 patterns	 of	 co-offending	where	 others	 continue	 to	 commit	 crimes	 (see	
Zimmring	and	Hawkins,	1995:	53-54)	or	their	involvement	with	organised	crime	in	areas	such	as	drug	
trafficking	or	burglaries	organised	by	a	fence	where	new	recruits	will	be	enlisted	in	the	illegal	economy	
(Cohen,	 1983:	 9).	 Thirdly,	 these	 models	 assume	 that	 the	 crimogenic	 effects	 of	 prison	 and	 the	
rehabilitative	effects	of	imprisonment	are	negligible	(and	so	they	are	bracketed	out	of	the	probability	
equations	 used	 to	 make	 estimates).	 If	 prisons	 are	 acknowledged	 as	 being	 crimogenic,	 then	 the	
incapacitative	 effect	will	 not	 affected	 in	 the	 short-term	but	will	 influence	 longer-term	patterns	 of	
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offending	(Chan,	1995:	3).	Researchers	such	as	Cohen,	who	are	immersed	within	the	criminal	career	
research	 paradigm,	 argue	 that	 incapacitative	 effects	 will	 not	 be	 affected	 in	 this	 way	 as	 the	
(unmeasured)	crimogenic	and	rehabilitative	and	deterrent	effects	will	cancel	one	another	out!	(Cohen,	
1983:	10).	
	
Clarke	(1974:	530-31)	articulates	how	these	assumptions	translate	into	these	probability	models:	
	
Although	the	incarcerated	boys	undoubtedly	differ	among	themselves,	the	assumption	will	be	
made	 here	 that	 at	 any	 given	 year	 of	 age,	 they	 are	 a	 homogenous	 group	 with	 respect	 to	
offenses	committed…It	will	be	assumed	that,	in	any	given	year	of	age,	the	incarcerated	boys	
who	were	actually	confined	in	correctional	institutions	at	that	age	would	have	committed	the	
same	average	number	of	index	offenses	of	the	same	average	seriousness	as	the	incarcerated	
boys	who	were	not	 institutionalized	during	that	year	of	age.	The	term	of	commitment	to	a	
correctional	 institution	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 an	 average	 of	 nine	 months	 for	 all	 age	 groups.	
Obviously,	any	estimate	of	the	reduction	of	juvenile	offenses	due	to	confinement	is	a	linear	
function	 of	 the	mean	 length	 of	 confinement,	 and	 the	 conclusions	 reached	 here	 are	 quite	
sensitive	to	changes	in	that	mean.	
	
These	sorts	of	bracketing	decisions,	and	the	assumptions	that	informed	them	ignore	differences	in	the	
complex	forces	that	constitute	the	subject,	including	biopolitical	differences	in	patterns	of	arrest	and	
sentencing,	including	differences	in	their	spatial	distribution,	as	well	as	temporal	shifts	over	time	and	
place.	Simulations	of	criminal	justice	effects	cannot	account	for	political	and	grounded	criminal	justice	
authorities’	resistance	to	incapacitation	policies	that	might	seek	to	limit	the	discretions	of	judges	or	
other	correctional	authorities.	The	bracketing	out	of	these	contingencies	is	 ironically	a	condition	of	
possibility	for	advancing	probability	statements,	and,	a	source	of	tension,	rendering	a	permanent	state	
of	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	 aleatory	 conditions	 both	within	 the	offender	 population	 and	 the	
criminal	justice	milieu.	
	
In	 this	 context,	 I	 outline	 the	 stochastic	 model	 developed	 by	 Shinnar	 and	 Shinnar	 (1975),	 which	
develops	the	clearest	model	of	a	criminal	career	and	that	“explicitly	deals	with	the	difference	between	
the	individual	crime	rate	while	free	and	the	effective	rate	or	average	rate	given	time	served	(Cohen,	
1978:	196).		Its	probability	equation	attempts	to	demonstrate	the	incapacitative	effect	of	prison	by	
enumerating	the	relationship	between	the	expected	volume	of	crime	under	a	particular	imprisonment	
policy	and	the	expected	volume	of	crime	if	there	was	no	imprisonment.50	Their	model	estimates	the	
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career	of	an	offender,	assuming	a	discrete	probability	distribution	(a	Poisson	distribution)	where	the	
probability	of	re-offending	occurs	in	a	fixed	interval	of	time	and	the	average	rate	of	offending	is	known	
(the	lambda	rate,	λ).51		
	
The	 initial	 stage	 of	 the	 analysis	 was	 devoted	 to	 demonstrating	 that	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 correlation	
between	increased	crime	rates	in	New	York	and	recent	changes	in	the	criminal	justice	system	“which	
sharply	reduced	the	chances	of	a	criminal	going	to	prison	as	well	as	the	length	of	stay	there”	(1975:	
607).	Their	estimates	provided	a	quantitative	argument	that,	at	that	time	when	New	York	city	was	
experiencing	a	major	rise	in	the	crime	rate	(in	particular	robberies	and	mugging)	that	surpassed	levels	
in	the	rest	of	the	US,	that	its	main	effects	were	a	form	of	“temporary	incapacitation”	that	had	minimal	
impact	on	the	crime	rate.	They	attempted	to	demonstrate	that	any	criminal	justice	system	parameter	
that	reduces	the	likelihood	that	an	offender	being	convicted	directly	contributes	to	the	rising	crime	
rate	in	the	city	(by	185%).	Offenders	were	then	being	sent	to	prison	for	more	serious	offences,	and	
the	average	length	of	stay	in	prison	was	decreasing,	while	the	fraction	of	crimes	cleared	by	arrest	or	
conviction	were	decreasing,	and	the	probability	of	being	sentenced	to	prison	was	decreasing	(1975:	
602-05).	
	
They	then	attempted	to	answer	the	question:	“can	we	reduce	the	crime	rate	sufficiently	to	make	the	
streets	of	New	York	safe	again?	(1975:	605).	The	estimates	suggested	that	sending	every	mugger	or	
robber	to	prison	for	five	years,	would	reduce	safety	crimes	by	a	factor	of	4	to	5,	where	they	argued	
that	it	would	take	2	to	3	years	to	“convict	the	majority	of	recidivists”	(ibid).	If,	criminal	justice	effects	
were	 improved	 (eg	by	 increasing	 the	probability	 of	 a	mugger	 being	 convicted	by	 20%),	 consistent	
sentences	of	3	years	in	prison	would	generate	a	20%	reduction	in	the	crime	rate.	These	forecasts	about	
variance	 in	 criminal	 justice	 effects,	 potentially	widened	 the	 orbit	 of	 criminal	 justice	 reform	 to	 re-
modulate	criminal	justice	practices,	in	addition	to	changing	the	lengths	of	sentences	for	commitment	
to	prison.		At	the	same	time,	the	adoption	of	a	policy	of	incapacitation	obligated	the	system	to	commit	
to	an	application	of	 “uniform	application	of	penalties	 for	any	 recidivist	offender,	 regardless	of	 the	
severity	of	the	second	offence”,	this	being	premised	upon	the	probability	that	“he	is	still	pursuing	a	
criminal	career”	(1975:	606).	Their	estimates	suggested	that	prison	capacity	would	need	to	increase	
from	its	then	capacity	of	35,000	to	a	capacity	of	40,000-60,000	for	safety	crimes.	This	sort	of	policy	
advice	is	entirely	consistent	with	Wilson’s	conservative	stance	about	crime	control.	
	
Shinnar	and	Shinnar’s	 futures	model	was	 the	most	advanced	 in	 that	period	 in	 terms	of	an	explicit	
delineation	of	the	constitutive	elements	of	criminal	career.52	They	provided	estimates	that	establish	a	
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“lower	bound	on	the	effects	of	 incapacitation”	by	 interrupting	the	 length	of	a	criminal	career	for	a	
sufficient	amount	of	time	that	it	will	have	a	multiplicative	effect	on	the	crime	rate	over	a	relatively	
short	period	of	 time,	while	 ruling	out	 rehabilitative	or	deterrent	effects	 (1975:	591).	 	 Their	model	
provided	a	quite	detailed	account	of	the	recidivist	who	was	assumed	to	commit	the	largest	proportion	
of	crime	(estimated	to	be	as	high	as	90%)	over	the	course	of	their	criminal	career	which	they	estimated	
to	be	10	years	in	duration	(1975:	596-98).	Using	data	about	rearrests	of	recidivists	and	the	fraction	of	
crimes	solved	in	in	relation	to	safety	crimes	they	asserted	that	80%	of	unsolved	crimes	are	committed	
by	recidivists.		They	estimated	that	recidivists	commit	6-14	crimes	per	year,	getting	caught	for	1.	This	
modelling	clearly	sets	the	agenda	for	the	selective	incapacitation53	of	high-rate	offenders	to	intensify	
the	effects	of	incapacitation	in	reducing	the	crime	rate;54	however,	to	do	so	would	require	using	an	
actuarial	instrument	to	identify	these	offenders	and	target	them	for	incapacitation.55	Chapter	three	
interrogates	 selective	 incapacitation	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 was	 capitalised	 on	 by	 an	 emerging	
coalition	of	criminal	career	researchers	in	the	first	half	of	the	1980s	to	establish	research	protocols	
that	continue	to	modulate	criminal	 justice	 interventions	founded	upon	the	anticipatory	tracking	of	
recidivism	 and	 the	 employment	 of	 actuarial	 decision-making	 at	 multiple	 sites	 within	 the	 criminal	
justice	milieu.	
	
In	 summary,	 the	 development	 of	 futures	 models	 for	 estimating	 the	 incapacitative	 effects	 of	
hypothetical	changes	in	sentencing	policy	(for	example,	increasing	the	length	of	imprisonment	by	one	
year,	by	imposing	mandatory	sentences	upon	first	or	repeat	offenders)	establishes	both	a	new	form	
of	authority,	and	actuarial	techniques	that	can	be	interpolated	into	criminal	justice	networks	to	begin	
installing	managerialist	rationalities	and	techniques	of	government	identified	in	Feeley	and	Simon’s	
(1992:	 450,	 453-54)	 account	 of	 actuarial	 justice.	 These	 forecasting	 techniques	make	 the	 offender	
population	more	visible	to	agents	and	authorities	working	within	the	criminal	justice	milieu,	as	well	as	
the	public	more	generally.	By	the	late	1970s,	penal	policy	discourses	were	becoming	saturated	with	
statistical	representations	and	biopolitical	concerns	about	high-rate	offenders,	career	criminals,	and	
the	 identification	 of	 criminal	 careers.	 As	 research	 increasingly	 focused	 on	 this	 population	 using	
techniques	that	tracked	these	 individuals	over	time,	 the	management	of	 this	population	 inevitably	
started	 to	 become	more	 concerned	with	 the	 classification	 of	 offenders	who	were	 then	 becoming	
understood	to	be	members	of	a	distributed	population.	
	
This	 introduces	 a	 new	discursive	 register	 into	 the	mentalities	 of	 bureaucratic	management	 of	 the	
criminal	 justice	 milieu,	 which	 would	 over	 the	 next	 two	 decades	 would	 increasingly	 “define	 the	
correctional	enterprise	 itself”	 (1992:	454).	These	 forecasting	 techniques	provide	a	 strategic	grid	of	
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specification	that	can	be	used	to	establish	“objective”	benchmarks	about	expected	levels	of	recidivism	
or	the	crime	rate	that	provide	a	central	frame	of	reference	to	make	comparisons	between	estimates	
of	 the	 crime	 rate	 and	 the	 actual	 performance	 of	 any	 particular	 site	 of	 government	 (parole,	
probation…).	At	the	same	time,	this	actuarial	grid	can	be	used	at	the	unit	level	(as	a	guideline	in	parole	
decision-making)	to	modulate	and	evaluate	the	conduct	of	local	authorities	so	that	decisions	are	made	
in	greater	alignment	with	the	actuarial	codes	that	are	established	and	afforded	reigning	authority	(see	
Simon,	1993:	170-77;	Harcourt,	2007:	92-100;	Copas	and	Marshall,	1998).56	As	I	will	demonstrate	in	
the	 next	 chapter,	 it	 is	 a	 maxim	 that	 criminal	 career	 researchers	 are	 logistically	 engaged	 in	 the	
advancement	of	probability	models	that	are	devoted	to	the	ongoing	refinement	of	the	predictors	of	
recidivism	and	the	development	of	prediction	instrument	that	can	improve	the	risk	classification	and	
control	of	offenders.	
	
Feeley	 and	 Simon	 (1992:	 454)	 note	 that	 managerial	 mentalities	 and	 techniques	 were	 becoming	
evident	within	the	criminal	justice	system	in	the	1970s	(see	Jacobs,	1977);	however,	it	was	during	the	
1980s	that	this	gained	momentum	in	the	US	criminal	justice	system	more	pervasively.	In	their	account,	
this	was	enacted	using	a	telos	of	“effective	control”	where	penal	programs	were	reconfigured	as	a	self-
referential	 internal	 system	 of	 “aggregate”	 control	 of	 the	 offender	 population,	 and	 systems	
management	where	“institutions	began	to	measure	their	own	outputs	as	indicators	of	performance”	
(1992:	 456).	 In	 their	 view,	 this	 insulated	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 from	 external	 pressures	 and	
demands,	 lowering	 “expectations	 about	 the	 criminal	 sanction”	 (1992:	 455-56).	 The	 reverse	would	
seem	to	be	the	case	–	in	the	early	1960s,	Sellin	and	Wolfgang	(1964)	had	begun	developing	measures	
of	crime	that	inscribe	the	biopolitical	concern	with	public	safety	and	crime	victimisation	into	estimates	
of	 crime;	 and,	 research	 into	 incapacitative	 effects	 is	 only	 possible	 using	 longitudinal	methods	 for	
tracking	 offenders	 over	 the	 life-course,	 founded	 upon	 the	 imperative	 to	 identify	 and	 control	
recidivism,	 a	 quite	 singular	 will-to-power.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	managerial	mentalities	 deploy	 audit	
techniques	 of	 government,	 penal	 authorities	 (in	 particular	 penal	managers)	 become	 “accountable	
managers”	 who	 are	 obligated	 to	 establish	 targets	 that	 not	 only	 are	 driven	 by	 neo-liberal	
entrepreneurial	objectives	in	the	pursuit	of	efficiency,	effectiveness,	and	value	for	money,	but	also	an	
accountability	to	the	public	who	are	viewed	as	being	a	customer	(Jones,	1993:	187).	
	
	
	
	
	 39	
2.4	 The	affective	dimensions	of	incapacitation:	The	will-to-incapacitate	
	
I	would	 like	 to	make	 some	 tentative	 comments	about	 the	projected	 image	of	 the	offender	 in	 this	
emerging	 technocratic-scientific	discourse.	 It	 is	 surprising	 that	no	 specific	 image	of	 the	offender	 is	
evident.	Zimring	and	Hawkins	(1995:	30)	comment:	
	
Criminals	are	nonentities:	ciphers	who	are	all	assumed	to	commit	crimes	at	the	same	rate,	
and	to	be	subject	to	arrest,	conviction,	and	imprisonment,	given	conviction,	with	the	same	
probability.	For	all	criminals,	if	there	is	no	imprisonment,	the	expected	number	of	crimes	in	a	
criminal	 career	 is	 the	 same.	 If	 a	 criminal	 is	 arrested,	 convicted,	 and	 imprisoned,	 his	 total	
number	 of	 crimes	 will	 be	 reduced	 by	 the	 proportion	 that	 his	 free	 time	 is	 reduced.	 If	 an	
offender	is	incarcerated	for	50%	of	his	career,	the	number	of	crimes	he	commits	will	be	50%	
less	than	would	have	committed	if	he	had	never	been	incarcerated.	
	
This	pseudo-scientific	discourse	and	 its	probabilistic	 techniques	mask	 its	affective	 register	which	 is	
designed	to	punish,	to	trigger	an	expulsion	of	the	“worst”	or	the	“hard	core”	criminals.			Incapacitation	
is	focused	on	the	restraint	of	the	offender,	of	impeding	or	making	impossible	certain	actions	(Malsch	
and	Duker,	2012:	3-4).	Even	from	the	perspective	of	an	economic	model	of	a	rational	choice	actor,	the	
high-rate	 offender	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	 emerging	 neo-liberal	 economy,	 becoming	 a	 target	 for	
incapacitation	as	 the	offender	 is	 considered	unresponsive	 to	environmental	 regulations.	This	male	
subject	is	fully	dehumanized,	disaggregated	as	a	statistical	fragment	or	dividual	as	Deleuze	coins	it,	
and	is	relegated	to	an	abject	position	as	an	excluded	subject	who	can	be	contained	in	the	prison	for	
lengthy	or	perhaps	even	indefinite	periods	of	incarceration.	Incapacitation	embodies	a	“technology	of	
exile”	(Simon	2007:	172-74)	where	the	prison	functions	exclusively	as	“pure	custody”;	incapacitation	
is	“embedded	in	the	very	essence	of	the	prison	as	a	secured	space	isolated	from	society”	(Simon,	2012:	
22).	To	 the	extent	 that	prisons	are	 transformed	by	an	exclusive	 focus	on	 incapacitation,	 there	 is	a	
“rigorous	focus	on	risk	and	custody”	and	managing	these	risks	through	rigorous	external	controls	using	
prison	architecture	and	technological	capacities	to	control	prisoners	(2007:	153).	At	the	same	time,	
the	“waste	management	prison”	fuels	prison	expansion	(and	prison	overcrowding)	where	prisons	are	
built	as	quickly	and	inexpensively	as	possible,	including	by	privatising	prisons.	Moreover,	politically,	
the	waste	management	prison	secures	the	state	against	criticisms	about	failure	by	concentrating	on	
the	simple	task	of	containment	(ibid). 	Discourses	about	incapacitation	locate	the	recidivist	as	posing	
an	intolerable	danger	to	the	wider	community	who	must	be	protected	from	this	unacceptable	level	of	
risk.		
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Figure	4.	Prison	Cell	1	
	
	
Figure	5.	Prison	Cell	2	
	
The	 abandonment	 of	 these	 men	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 an	 affective	 amplification	 of	 overwhelmingly	
negative	political	affects,	a	contagion	evident	since	the	mid-1960s	in	the	US	that	are	irreducible	to	any	
single	force	but	that	activated	this	new	mode	of	control,	to	some	degree	masked	by	its	co-assembly	
with	the	“objective”	or	highly	distanced	stance	of	a	positivist	social	science	epistemology.	The	will-to-
incapacitate	 articulates	 a	 zero-tolerance	 of	 those	 offenders	 considered	 to	 pose	 a	 danger	 to	 the	
community	by	those	 in	a	synoptic	position	(Federal	policy	makers,	state	politicians,	those	 lobbying	
policy-makers	 and	 legislators	 for	 longer	 and	 more	 inflexible	 sentences,	 the	 new	 criminal	 career	
researchers)	 (Simon,	2007:	101-06;	164-68);	as	well	as	within	a	 rapidly	expanding	popularist	penal	
imaginary	that	rose	to	prominence	in	the	1970s,	that	viewed	offenders	as	violent	or	on	a	descent	into	
violence	 that	 required	 long	prison	sentences,	and	 the	abolishment	of	 release	mechanisms	 (Simon,	
2012:	23-29).	Those	supporting	incapacitation	literally	pull	away	from	the	subject,	maximizing	their	
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distance	 from	 the	 recidivist	 or	 the	 dangerous	 offender	 in	 a	 defensive	 response	 to	 an	 object	 of	
contempt-disgust	(Sedgwick	and	Frank,	1995:	135).	To	the	extent	that	this	affective	response	becomes	
dominant,	 it	 establishes	 a	 permanent	 renunciation	 of	 this	 subject,	 although	 its	 effects	 upon	 the	
subject	are	unpredictable,	and,	its	potentials	not	necessarily	predetermined	along	one	channel	(1995:	
139).		
	
Young	(1999:	124)	characterizes	the	cognitive	dimensions	of	zero-tolerance	as	including:	a	lowered	
tolerance	to	crime	and	deviance,	punitive	measures	to	eliminate	crime,	valorisation	of	past	norms	of	
order	and	civility,	connecting	incivilities	and	anti-social	minor	infractions	with	crime	reduction,	and,	a	
more	precautionary	stance	that	intervenes	into	these	incivilities	to	prevent	an	escalation	of	crime	in	
communities	where	which	are	considered	to	be	at	a	tipping	point	in	a	downward	spiral	of	decay	and	
social	 disorganization.	 The	 stance	 is	 popularized	 and	 its	 circuits	 of	 action	 triggered	by	Wilson	 and	
Kelling’s	(1982)	article	 in	the	Atlantic	Monthly,	entitled	“Broken	windows”,	however	 its	circuits	are	
evident	 in	 incapacitation,	 in	particular	 in	 the	attempts	 to	 identify	 the	 “transitional	probabilities”	of	
chronic	recidivism	in	the	early	stages	of	a	criminal	career.	Young	does	not	consider	the	regulation	of	
incivilities	and	nascent	criminal	behaviour	as	being	precautionary	measures;	however,	more	recent	
work	about	the	regulation	of	anti-social	behaviour	makes	this	connection	(Crawford,	2003;	Squires	
and	Steven,	2005;	McCulloch	and	Wilson,	2015:	6-7).	
	
I	propose	that	actuarial	justice	has	been	precautionary	since	its	inception	given	its	focal	concern	with	
anticipating	 recidivism	 as	 early	 as	 possible	 to	maximise	 crime	 safety.	 The	 precautionary	 principle	
emerged	 in	 the	 1970s	 within	 the	 context	 of	 potentially	 catastrophic	 environmental	 threats,	
characterized	by	a	determinate	 threat	under	conditions	of	 scientific	uncertainty,	 that	necessitated	
action	prior	to	a	point	of	irreversibility	(Ewald,	2002).	Precaution	seeks	to	act	on	“processes	that	have	
an	actual	or	possible	existence	before	it	reaches	a	point	of	irreversibility…on	the	basis	of	a	determinate	
empirically	apprehended	threat”	(Anderson,	2010:	790).		Precaution	was	evident	in	the	1970s	by	the	
willingness	to	 incapacitate	 individuals	 for	 longer	periods	of	 time	rather	than	risk	 investing	 in	other	
penal	objectives	in	the	face	of	scientific	uncertainty,	and	the	certainty	that	domestic	security	required	
new	measures	of	crime	control	given	elevated	levels	of	urban	unrest	and	white,	middle-class	fear	of	
crime	 and	white	 flight	 from	 these	 zones	 of	 tension	 and	proximity	 to	 concentrated	 zones	 of	 racial	
minorities.	
	
Incapacitation	is	a	security	technique	that	makes	some	form	of	probabilistic	calculation	about	elevated	
risks	of	future	crime,	and	incapacitates	individuals	or	a	category	of	offenders	considered	to	pose	too	
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great	a	risk	to	the	community	whether	it	is	by	general	or	specific	tactics.57	Moreover,	as	a	biopolitical	
strategy,	 it	aims	to	anticipate	future	dangers	at	the	earliest	and	most	optimal	point	of	 its	rising,	to	
achieve	 maximal	 effect.	 While	 the	 1970s	 concentrated	 on	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 more	 determinate	
sentencing	 policy	 involving	 longer	 and	 uniform	prison	 sentences	 (Feeley,	 1993:	 114-15;	 127-29),58	
incapacitation	can	be	understood	as	referring	to	“all	sanctions	and	interventions	that	aim	to	impede,	
restrict	or	make	impossible	certain	actions,	without	necessarily	being	accompanied	by	measures	that	
aim	at	other	goals	and	effects,	such	as	retribution,	rehabilitation,	(or)	restoration”	(Malsch	and	Duker,	
2010:	2).	 Incapacitation	 is	evident	 in	 the	death	penalty,	 chemical	 castration,	 life	 sentencing,	 three	
strike	legislation,	preventive	detention,	civil	commitment	of	sex	offenders,	electronic	monitoring	of	
offenders,	flash	incarceration	procedures	for	revoking	violations	of	probation	orders,	control	orders,	
protection	orders,	restraining	orders,	and	banning	orders.	These	more	contemporary	techniques	of	
incapacitation	 expand	 the	 scope	 of	 incapacitation	 from	 incarceration	 towards	 forms	 of	 “custodial	
control”	 in	 the	 community	 that	 remove	 possibilities	 for	 certain	 behaviours	 to	 occur	 and	 that	
significantly	curtail	freedom	of	movement	of	targeted	persons.	
	
In	spite	of	the	objectivist	stance	of	incapacitation	research,	traces	of	the	affective	dimensions	of	the	
will-to-incapacitate	are	evident	in	research	reports,	most	typically	when	there	is	a	discussion	of	the	
ethical	and	moral	aspects	of	predicting	future	crime	and	the	problem	of	predictive	errors	which	are	
handled	in	a	remarkably	similar	way	by	researchers	whether	it	be	in	the	1970s,	the	1980s,	the	1990s,	
or	the	first	two	decades	of	the	twenty	first	century.	In	characterizing	actuarialism,	Young	(1999:	66)	
describes	it	as	being	morally	neutral,	expressed	as	a	form	of	adiaphorization:	the	“stripping	of	human	
relations	of	their	moral	significance,	exempting	them	from	moral	evaluation,	rendering	them	“morally	
irrelevant”	(Bauman,	1995:	133	cited	in	Young:	ibid).	Writing	in	1978,	the	Federal	Panel	investigating	
the	efficacy	of	incapacitation	in	reducing	high	crime	rates,	founded	its	investigation	on	“the	scientific	
validity	of	the	technical	evidence”,	focusing	on	the	evidence	of	both	“the	existence	and	the	magnitude	
of	 any	 crime-reducing	 effects”,	 eclipsing	 its	 “ideological”	 dimensions	 (Blumstein	 et	 al.,	 1978:	 vii).	
Sustained	on	strictly	technocratic	frames	of	reference,	the	ethical	and	moral	dimensions	are	stripped	
to	 a	 concern	with	 prediction	 error,	 in	 particular	 the	 case	 of	 the	 false-positive	 problem	where	 an	
individual	may	 be	 targeted	 for	 incapacitation	 even	 though	 the	 individual	 does	 not	 re-offend.	 This	
ethical	 dilemma	 is	 uniformly	 considered	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 being	 a	 matter	 of	 establishing	 an	
acceptable	 threshold	 for	 tolerating	 a	 certain	 ratio	of	 false-positives	 and	 false-negatives	 relative	 to	
accurate	predictions	(1978:	77;	Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	171-74).	
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Writing	in	1975	about	the	selective	targeting	of	offenders	for	incapacitation,	Greenberg	handles	the	
problematization	of	predictive	errors	in	the	same	way	as	others	who	follow	in	his	footsteps	(see	3.4	
and	3.5).	He	asserts	that	whether	it	be	pre-trial	preventive	or	post-conviction	decision-making,	there	
is	a	 justifiable	operative	principle	of	precaution	that	“a	mistaken	 identification	of	one	actually	safe	
person	 who	 is	 predicted	 to	 be	 dangerous	 is	 much	 less	 serious	 than	 the	 release	 of	 one	 actually	
dangerous	person”	(1975:	545).	A	militaristic	logistics	is	openly	articulated	as	he	considers	selective	
incapacitation	as	being	“much	like	that	of	a	search-and-destroy	mission”	where	in	war,	the	killing	of	
the	enemy	combatant	may	very	well	involve	an	abandonment	of	human	right	protections	for	nearby	
civilians	 and	 children	 who	 become	 legitimate	 targets	 for	 lethal	 or	 disabling	 wounding	 (see	 Puar	
2015).59	By	arguing	that	the	problem	of	predictive	errors	can	be	handled	by	technocratic	strategies	
that	 can	determine	an	acceptable	or	 tolerable	 ratio	of	errors	 in	order	 to	guarantee	 that	 the	most	
dangerous	offenders	are	incapacitated	(1975:	545-47),	his	frame	of	reference	expresses	the	political	
affect	of	 contempt-disgust,	 as	he	effectively	dismisses	 any	ethical	 or	 juridical	 consideration	of	 the	
“suffering”	 of	 possible	 “long-term	 erroneous	 confinement	 and	 stigmatization”	 (Greenberg,	 1975:	
545).60		
	
In	spite	of	the	virtual	inability	of	predictive	instruments	to	discern	high-rate	or	dangerous	offenders	
for	 a	 more	 targeted	 use	 of	 incapacitation	 (Monahan,	 1978),	 senior	 policy	 administrators	 in	 the	
Department	of	Justice	supported	actuarial	prediction,	funding	the	Rand	Corporation	in	the	late	1970s	
to	develop	a	prediction	instrument	that	could	be	used	in	federal	sentencing.61		The	events	surrounding	
Martison’s	(1974)	infamous	paper	“What	works?”	fuelled	this.	In	1966	the	New	York	State	Governor’s	
Special	 Committee	 on	 Criminal	 Offenders	 commissioned	 Lipton	 and	Wilks	 to	 review	 the	 scientific	
evidence	to	guide	their	intention	to	transform	New	York’s	prisons	from	a	largely	custodial	institution	
into	a	rehabilitative	one.	The	two	researchers,	who	later	recruited	Martinson	to	assist	them,	reviewed	
231	evaluations	of	interventions	conducted	between	1945	and	1967	(see	Lipton	et	al.,	1975).	In	line	
with	 the	 dominant	 social	 science	 position	 of	 the	 time,	 the	 researchers	 used	 a	 positivist	 research	
protocol	 that	 established	 a	 rigorous	 set	 of	 selection	 criteria	 to	 include	 only	 studies	 that	 used	 a	
controlled	 experimental	 design	 and	 that	 included	 recidivism	 as	 a	 criterion	 for	 evaluating	 success.	
Although	the	research	has	more	recently	critiqued	for	its	failure	to	incorporate	a	more	extensive	set	
of	evaluation	criterion	that	developed	in	the	late	1980s	and	1990s	(Sarre,	1999:	3-5),	this	review	was	
one	of	the	first	meta-analyses	of	rehabilitation,	a	governmental	device	that	would	later	help	to	rescue	
the	credibility	of	rehabilitation	as	a	penal	rationality	within	the	evidence-based	policy	environment	
(Dowden	 and	Andrews,	 1990;	Gendreau,	 1996;	 Cullen	 and	Brandon,	 1997;	Dowden	 and	Andrews,	
1999).62	
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By	1970	news	circulating	about	 their	 findings	would	appear	 to	have	resulted	 in	an	attempt	by	 the	
Committee	to	suppress	its	findings	given	their	investment	in	rehabilitation	programs	(Martinson	1974:	
23).	Prior	to	the	publication	of	this	research	in	1975,	Martinson	felt	compelled	to	publish	some	of	its	
findings	about	the	ineffectiveness	of	prison	rehabilitation	in	reducing	recidivism.	He	wrote:	“with	few	
and	isolated	exceptions,	the	rehabilitative	efforts	that	have	been	reported	so	far	have	no	appreciable	
effect	 on	 rehabilitation”	 (1974:	 25).	 In	 fact,	 the	 finding	was	 somewhat	unsurprising,	 several	 other	
evaluations	had	reached	the	same	conclusion.63	In	Cullen’s	narration	(2005:	6),	what	was	remarkable	
at	that	time	was	the	“powerful	and	immediate…impact	on	corrections”	in	terms	of	the	intensity	of	
despair	about	rehabilitation’s	capacity	to	lower	rates	of	recidivism.	In	the	same	year	that	Lipton	et	
al.’s	 findings	were	published,	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	reviewed	the	research,	concluding	
that	their	findings	were	fair	and	accurate	(Sechrest	et	al.,	1979).	It	concluded:	“we	do	not	know	of	any	
program	 or	method	 of	 rehabilitation	 that	 could	 be	 guaranteed	 to	 reduce	 the	 criminal	 activity	 of	
released	offenders	(1979:	6).			
	
In	August	1975	Martinson	appeared	on	60	Minutes,	in	a	segment	entitled	“It	doesn’t	work”	to	lend	
support	for	his	stance	that	“nothing	works”	in	rehabilitating	offenders	(Cullen,	2005:	7-8).	Cullen	is	
critical	of	Martinson	for	his	excessiveness	of	affect	in	trying	to	solicit	public	appeal	by	assuming	a	far	
too	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 the	 research	 findings,	 as	 he	 suggested	 that	 rehabilitation	 was	
fundamentally	flawed;	however,	this	may	also	express	her	reticence	in	acknowledging	the	new	forms	
of	alliance	and	advocacy	that	are	implicated	in	the	emerging	“new	penology”,	in	particular	in	relation	
to	the	public	consumption	of	mediated	information	about	crime	and	crime	control.	In	her	own	account	
of	“the	twelve	people	who	saved	rehabilitation”	she	emphasizes	the	political	strategy	where	“skilled	
scientists”	initially	working	alone	or	in	dyads,	created	a	“loosely	coupled	network	that	was	responsible	
for	fighting	back	the	ideas	that	offenders	were	beyond	redemption	and	the	conclusion	that	corrections	
was	a	uniformly	bankrupt	enterprise”	(Cullen,	2005:	4-5).	
	
For	differing	but	nonetheless	polyvalent	reasons,	both	the	left	and	the	conservatives	in	America	were	
receptive	to	the	critique	of	rehabilitation,	opening	a	political	space	for	innovation	in	the	penal	sphere	
(see	Cullen,	2002;	Cullen	and	Gendreau,	1989,	2000;	Cullen,	2005).	Instrumental	in	this	re-modulation	
was	 the	 authority	 afforded	 to	 objective	 positivist	 social	 science	 research	 as	 an	 arbitrator	 and	
information	broker	in	the	emerging	audit	government	of	penal	effectiveness.	Martinson’s	use	of	the	
media	to	get	his	message	across	and	influence	public	policy,	signalled	the	coming	of	the	“information	
era”,	where	biopolitical	data	is	a	“commodity-cum-object	that	can	be	possessed	(indeed	purchased),	
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traded	and	legislated”	as	well	as	a	“‘process’	akin	to	signal-transmission,	feedback-	and/or	stimulus	
response	circuits	(‘information	transfer’	and	‘information	flow’)	(Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy,	2015:	
163).		
	
Mellamphy	 and	 Mellamphy	 (2015:	 164)	 have	 argued	 that	 techno-scientific	 appropriations	 and	
applications	 of	 information	 operate	 as	 a	 key	 regulatory	 force	 –	 “info-regulation”	 -	 where	we	 can	
understand	 the	 social	 scientist	 as	 being	 an	 “archon”	 64	within	 biopolitical	 government,	who	 often	
works	in	concert	with	another	political	or	economic	authority	to	disseminate	information	to	a	wider	
and	sometimes	distant	audience	or	network	of	actors.	This	achieved	as	an	alliance	where	parties	carry	
the	same	message	or,	sometimes	“only	part	of	the	total	message”	(that	in	ways	that	may	conceal	or	
obfuscate)	 (Rasmussen,	 1981:	 2,	 cited	 in	 Mellamphy	 and	 Mellamphy,	 2015:	 163).	 “Synarchic	
regulation”	 refers	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 actuarial	 information	 is	 combined	 together	 in	 a	 way	 that	
categorises	and	 regulates	 the	actuarial	dispositif	 by	 channelling	 the	 flows	of	 information.	 	 In	 their	
understanding	 of	 these	 information	 flows,	 they	 are	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 politico-military	 (the	
pathways	 of	 biopolitical	 government	 and	 security),	 of	 market-economic	 (pathways	 of	 market	
investment	 and	 exchange),	 and	 techno-scientific	 (pathways	 of	 research	 and	 development).	 They	
assert	 that	 in	 times	 of	 friction	 or	 uncertainty,	 this	 triad	 of	 control-mechanisms	 “work	 together	 to	
informatically	manage	and	govern	friction(s)	within	a	given	information-environment”	(2015:	165).	
	
The	New	Deal	political	order	 (that	was	beginning	to	be	recast	around	that	time)	had	established	a	
direct	 relationship	 between	 executive	 political	 authority	 and	 the	 population	 through	mass	media,	
providing	the	voter	with	information	about	social	problems	and	the	state’s	solutions	(Simon,	2007:	
148-49).	The	relaying	of	information	about	the	state’s	“social	problems,	the	state’s	solutions,	and	the	
political	 background	 to	 the	 doing	 of	 government”	 became	 increasingly	 important	 to	 political	
campaigns;	and,	it	elevated	meritocratic	competition	and	abstract	evaluation	methods	as	vital	in	the	
determining	the	distribution	of	government	benefits	(ibid).	The	seemingly	abrupt	disinvestment	in	a	
rehabilitative	ethos	occurred	at	a	time	of	de-legitimation	of	the	criminal	justice	system	more	generally,	
coupled	with	social	and	political	turmoil	that	continued	into	the	next	decade	in	the	wake	of	the	civil	
rights	movement,	including	prison	reform	protest,	and	the	political	mobilisation	of	prison	officers	who	
“identified	themselves	along	with	crime	victims	as	locked	in	an	implacable	war	with	the	criminal	class”	
(Simon,	2012:	23).	The	left	was	critical	of	rehabilitation	for	its	abuse	of	state	powers,	its	excessive	use	
of	 discretion	 and	 inhumanity,	 and	 its	 racist	 and	 class	 biased	 penal	 practices	 (Cullen	 2005:	 6).	
Conservatives	 waged	 polyvalent	 critique,	 advocating	 limits	 on	 the	 discretionary	 powers	 of	 penal	
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authorities,	claiming	that	rehabilitation	was	too	soft	on	crime,	while	also	waging	a	mounting	critique	
of	its	provision	of	services	as	part	of	its	problematization	of	the	welfare	state	(Garland,	2001).	
	
2.5	 The	war	on	crime	and	domestic	security	
	
There	is	an	irony	that	the	“war	on	crime”	in	the	US	began	at	the	height	of	the	civil	rights	revolution	
(Hinton,	 2016:	 1).	 In	 the	 year	 following	 the	passage	of	 the	Civil	 Rights	Act	 in	 1964	and	 its	 federal	
initiatives	for	the	war	on	poverty,	President	Johnson	launched	the	Law	Enforcement	Act	on	March	8	
1965.65	The	initiative	followed	urban	unrest	in	Harlem,	Brooklyn,	Rochester,	Chicago,	and	Philadelphia	
in	1964,	establishing	a	direct	role	for	the	Federal	government	in	local	police	operations,	court	systems,	
and	state	prisons	 (2016:	1-2).	The	 Johnson	administration	emphasized	the	 importance	of	scientific	
information	in	the	face	of	uncertainty	about	effective	crime	control:	“we	do	not	yet	have	the	answers.	
We	must	press	forward	for	greater	knowledge,	better	tools,	and	deeper	insights”	(Johnson,	March	9,	
1966).66	It	established	the	National	Crime	Commission	to	research	the	problem	and	“carry	the	attack	
forward”	under	the	 leadership	of	Nicholas	Katenbach	who	regularly	reported	on	the	Commission’s	
findings	to	the	president	before	tabling	its	full	report	in	1967	(Hinton,	2016:	96).	The	report	advocated	
for	the	provision	of	federal	funding	for	planning	and	innovation	in	law	enforcement,	corrections,	and	
courts	 (Simon,	 2007:	 90).	 This	 was	 enacted	 in	 1968	 under	 Safe	 Streets	 Act	 which	 authorized	 the	
Department	 of	 Justice	 and	 the	 Federal	 Attorney-General	 to	 co-ordinate	 the	 war	 on	 crime	 and	
distribute	funds	through	a	system	of	competitive	grants	to	state	and	local	agencies	willing	to	operate	
in	line	with	federal	policy.	
	
The	war	on	crime	began	as	a	merger	of	anti-poverty	and	anticrime	measures,	that	increasingly	tied	
crime	control	as	the	“primary	social	service	provided	to	segregated	communities	suffering	from	high	
rates	of	poverty	and	unemployment”,	within	a	landscape	of	ongoing	rioting	in	Watts	in	1966	and	in	
many	other	cities	in	the	next	few	years,	mounting	student	protest	against	the	Vietnam	war,	and	lurking	
fears	 about	 black	 militancy	 that	 were	 seen	 as	 fuelling	 civil	 unrest	 and	 undermining	 the	 federal	
strategies	for	the	war	on	poverty	(Hinton,	2016:	98-103;	106-15).	The	Safe	Street	Act	allocated	75%	of	
its	funding	to	police	departments	(2016:	113),	considering	the	police	officer	as	the	“front-line	soldier”	
in	 the	 war	 on	 crime	 (Johnson,	 1966).	 It	 also	 authorized	 federal	 and	 local	 police	 to	 engage	 in	
wiretapping	and	other	forms	of	electronic	surveillance	as	well	as	enacting	the	first	federal	gun	laws	in	
America	(Simon,	2007:	93).67	
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The	federal	response	to	urban	rioting	and	disorder	emphasized	security,	that	“preserving	civil	peace”	
was	 the	 first	 responsibility	 of	 government	 that	 over-rode	 the	 priorities	 of	 ensuring	 economic	
opportunity	 and	 social	 welfare	 (Hinton,	 2016:	 107).	 A	 militaristic	 logic	 was	 evidenced	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 The	 Challenge	 of	 crime	 in	 a	 free	 society	 (President’s	 Commission	 on	 Law	
Enforcement	and	the	Administration	of	Justice,	1967a),	which	operationalized	tactical	surveillance	in	
zones	 of	 disorder	 in	 American	 cities	 by	 saturating	 targeted	 neighbourhoods	 with	 special	 tactical	
patrols	and	surveillance	equipment	(Hinton,	2016:	102).	At	the	same	time	police	were	installed	into	
community-based	centres	designed	to	roll	out	social	welfare	programs,	re-configuring	social	welfare	
within	 rationalities	 of	 crime	 control.	 In	 those	 years	 federal	 policy-makers	 supported	 an	 increasing	
militarization	of	the	police	legitimating	the	use	of	excessive	and	often	deadly	force	(Hinton,	2016:	97).		
	
In	1969	federal	policy	implemented	tactical	policing	to	identify	and	target	potential	criminals	in	low-
income	 urban	 neighbourhoods,	 establishing	 a	 principle	 of	 pre-emptive	 tracking	 surveillance	 that	
transfigured	social	service	provision,68	 in	particular	to	young	people,	 into	this	policing	strategy	that	
“brought	residents	into	frequent	contact	with	the	punitive	arm	of	the	state,	increasing	the	likelihood	
of	 their	 eventual	 incarceration”	 (2016:	 113).	 The	 Crime	 Commission	 regarded	 “hard	 core”	
disadvantaged	youth	as	a	necessary	target	in	this	surveillance,	believing	that	social	welfare	provision	
was	then	not	reaching	this	group	of	the	most	incorrigible	and	most	susceptible	to	collective	violence	
(2016:	115-16).	 It	developed	a	pre-emptive	 logic	that	“we	have	to	capture	these	youngsters	at	the	
earliest	stage”	before	an	initial	arrest	was	made	(Parsons,	cited	in	Hinton,	2016:	117).	By	the	1970s	
Federally-funded	 Youth	 Service	 Bureaus	 had	 succeeded	 in	 reaching	 this	 target,	 the	 “potential	
delinquent”69	–	its	average	participant	was	a	black	young	person,	aged	15	years	of	age,	who	had	not	
had	contact	with	the	formal	criminal	justice	system	(2016:	118).	
	
Simon	(2007:	91,95)	considers	the	war	on	crime	as	having	an	affective	alliance	with	crime	victims,	this	
residing	“just	beneath	the	surface”	of	Johnson’s	war	on	crime	as	imagined	idealized	subject	of	law.	
(Potential)	crime	victims	were	“the	subject	intended	by	law	rather	than	those	directly	targeted	by	it”	
(ibid).	During	Johnson’s	term,	public	anxiety	about	riots	and	predatory	street	crime	was	amplified	in	
the	media.	Simon	argues	that	from	the	early	days	of	the	war	on	poverty,	the	Attorney-General	and	
the	 crime	 issue	 became	 highly	 politicized,	 establishing	 an	 enduring	 influence	 over	 the	 executive	
branch	 of	 federal	 government,	 anchored	 in	 an	 axis	 between	 the	 president	 and	 Attorney-General	
(2007:	45).	It	was	not	until	the	1960s	that	routine	national	crime	victimization	surveys	were	initiated,	
making	visible	the	“crime	rate”	as	an	object	of	public	discourse	as	well	as	a	key	component	 in	the	
assemblage	of	statistical	knowledge	about	 the	 functioning	of	 the	criminal	 justice	“system”	(Simon,	
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1996:	 38).	 The	 Federal	 Crime	 Commission	 advocated	 the	 regular	 use	 of	 victimization	 data	 to	
independently	measure	crime	levels	independently	of	police	data.	Simon	argues	that	since	the	1970s	
Federal	 legislative	 reform	 has	 been	 designed	 on	 a	 model	 where	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 is	
problematized	and	the	victim	figures	as	instrumental	in	reform	(2007:	101).	
	
At	that	time,	the	discretion	of	judges	and	correctional	authorities	were	considered	as	central	in	this	
problematization,	where	“zero-tolerance	rules”	have	been	favoured	to	limit	criminal	justice	decision-
making	(see	also	2007:	164-72).		He	regards	the	Safe	Street	Act	as	the	first	piece	of	legislation	that	
attempted	to	re-order	government	around	the	problem	of	crime,	enabling	government	to	use	more	
punitive	zero-tolerance	measures,	or	what	I	would	prefer	to	describe	as	security	measures	to	address	
problems	that	the	social	welfare	state	was	unable	to	solve	(2007:	159).70	Speaking	in	1966	about	the	
war	on	crime,	Johnson	explicitly	referred	to	the	figure	of	the	recidivist,	quoting	the	statistic	that	30%	
of	all	parolees	revert	to	crime.71	While	he	framed	“the	breaking	of	this	cycle”	as	being	central	to	the	
war	on	crime,	he	envisioned	this	as	being	realized	within	rehabilitative	programs.	As	we	have	seen,	
the	public	affects	triggered	by	mediated	information	flows	generated	by	technocratic	statistical	data,	
are	crucial	in	the	emerging	security	dispositif.		
	
When	Richard	Nixon	took	office	in	1969	a	trajectory	of	more	punitive	Federal	measures	began	that	
lasted	 into	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 twenty	 first	 century	 in	 the	United	 States.	Nixon	 supported	 the	
targeted	 deployment	 of	 aggressive	 local,	 state,	 and	 federal	 undercover	 police	 squads,	 including	
measures	 for	 “no-knock	entry”	 and	preventive	detention	 (Simon,	 2007:	 100;	Hinton,	 2016:	 3).	His	
program	on	crime	paralleled	Johnson’s	high	investment	in	law	enforcement;	however,	he	advocated	
criminal	code	reform	to	strengthen	prosecutorial	power	for	longer	prison	sentences	and	preventive	
detention	for	“dangerous”	offenders	(Simon,	2007:	53-54).	When	Gerald	Ford	took	office	in	1974,	he	
campaigned	for	a	speedy	process	for	confining	repeat	offenders	(Hinton,	2016:	4),	although	he	did	
little	to	advance	the	war	on	crime	in	the	wake	of	the	Watergate	scandal	(Simon	2007:	54-55).	Ford	
was	an	advocate	of	selective	incapacitation:	“The	core	of	the	problem	(was)…relatively	few	persistent	
criminals…a	very	small	percent	of	the	whole	population…The	crime	rate	will	go	down	if	persons	who	
habitually	commit	most	of	the	predatory	crimes	are	kept	in	prison…”	(Ford,	1975:	591-593,	cited	in	
Zimring	and	Hawkins,	1995:	18).	
	
When	Carter	came	into	office	in	1977,	he	placed	crime	control	measures	at	the	centre	of	Federal	urban	
policy,	 framing	 crime	 control	 as	 being	 a	 form	of	 security	 precaution	 (Hinton,	 2016:	 4).	 The	Carter	
administration	regarded	crime	as	a	cause,	rather	than	effect	of	social	inequality	and	urban	decay.	It	
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empowered	 the	Department	 of	Housing	 and	Urban	Development	 (rather	 than	 the	Department	 of	
Justice)	to	assume	a	key	role	in	Carter’s	anti-crime	measures	(2016:	279).	This	“urban	revitalisation”	
strategy	focused	on	identifying	the	most	segregated,	crimogenic	zones	of	the	urban	landscape	that	
were	identified	using	crime	statistics,	to	rationalise	and	channel	more	targeted	funds	into	these	zones	
that	used	environmental	target	hardening	measures	(eg	high-intensity	outdoor	lighting,	installation	of	
security	hardware,	gated	walkways),	housing	redevelopment	using	principles	of	defensible	space	that	
sought	to	facilitate	physical	and	social	integration	(Newman,	1972),	and	the	neo-liberal	fostering	of	
community	 self-policing	 and	 surveillance	 of	 local	 community	 space	 (O’Malley,	 1992).	 The	 Carter	
administration	 effectively	 widened	 the	 orbit	 of	 crime	 prevention	 by	 introducing	 a	 more	
heterogeneous	 environmental	 governmentality	 (Foucault,	 2007)	 that	 fused	 employment,	 housing,	
and	 law	 enforcement	 measures	 that	 reframed	 urban	 and	 crime	 policy	 as	 being	 isomorphic	 with	
domestic	security	(Hinton,	2016:	280;	286-91).	
	
By	tying	Federal	funding	of	local	crime	prevention	initiatives	to	demonstrated	zones	of	need,	and	by	
limiting	 funding	 to	 a	 period	 after	 which	 these	 initiatives	 needed	 to	 become	 self-sufficient,	 he	
introduced	neo-liberal	principles	 for	privatization,	economic	government,	and	an	escalation	of	 the	
state’s	disinvestment	in	social	welfare.	Carter	abandoned	Keynesian	policy	of	government	spending	
to	combat	recession	and	high	 inflation,	by	promoting	economic	restructuring	based	on	the	service	
economy,	and	scaling	back	social	welfare	programs	(2016:	303).	Hinton	(2016:	304)	comments:	“Carter	
positioned	 Reagan	 to	 continue	 the	 drive	 toward	 privatisation,	 the	 unprecedented	 growth	 of	 the	
military-industrial	complex,	and	the	rise	of	mass	incarceration”.	
	
2.6	Evaluating	incapacitation	as	a	penal	strategy	
	
The	Panel	on	Research	on	Deterrent	and	Incapacitative	Effects	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978)	was	established	
in	1975	under	 the	Ford	administration,	and	 its	 report	was	 tabled	under	 the	Carter	administration.	
Having	 begun	 at	 a	 time	 of	 soaring	 crime	 rates,	 the	 Carter	 administration	 had	 adopted	 a	 more	
suspicious	attitude	towards	the	accuracy	of	national	crime	data,	finding	contradictions	between	crime	
victimisation	surveys	and	the	annual	FBI	annual	reports	about	crime,	making	it	difficult	to	ascertain	
whether	 or	 not	 the	 crime	 rate	 was	 indeed	 rising	 (Hinton,	 2016:	 283-284).	 Law	 enforcement	
consultants	advised	administrators	that	effectively	measuring	the	crime	rate	was	critical	to	national	
law	enforcement	and	that	justice	administration	must	prioritise	improving	its	research	and	statistical	
capabilities	(Abers,	1978,	cited	in	Hinton,	2016:	419,	footnote	13).	
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In	1977	the	Carter	administration	began	to	reorganise	federal	crime	control	agencies,	requiring	the	
Department	of	Justice	to	reduce	its	staff	by	a	quarter.	1978	was	a	pivotal	year	in	the	reconfiguration	
of	 the	 federal	war	on	 crime	where	Carter	 announced	 that	 he	would	 introduce	 the	 Justice	 System	
Improvement	Act.	This	restructuring	recast	the	war	on	crime	as	“a	data-gathering	exercise”	where	the	
Bureau	 of	 Justice	 Assistance,	 Research,	 and	 Statistics	 would	 act	 as	 a	 clearinghouse	 for	 all	 data	
collected	 by	 the	 Law	 Enforcement	 Assistance	 Administration	 (LEAA)	 and	 the	 FBI.	 The	 LEAA	 was	
responsible	 for	 funding	 state	 and	 local	 enforcement	 agencies	 using	 the	 revised	 urban	 renewal	
strategies;	and,	the	National	Institute	of	Justice,	co-ordinated	federal	crime	control	research	(2016:	
283).	 All	 three	 of	 these	 agencies	were	 to	 report	 to	 the	Office	 of	 Justice	Assistance,	 Research	 and	
Statistics,	 established	 in	 1977.	 As	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 section,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 Panel’s	
recommendations	for	organising	and	managing	a	research	program	across	the	diverse	apparatuses	of	
networked	crime	control	were	regarded	favourably	before	the	final	report	was	tabled	(Blumstein	et	
al.,	1978:	81-84).	
Protocollary	power	
	
	
In	 Foucault’s	 conceptualization,	 problematization	 refers	 to	 the	 “ensemble	 of	 discursive	 and	
nondiscursive	practices	that	make	something	enter	into	the	play	of	true	and	false	and	constitute	it	as	
an	object	of	thought	(Foucault,	cited	in	Rabinow,	2005:	43).		Moreover,	“how	problems	are	grasped	
has	material	effects,	since	the	process	anticipates	and	circumscribes	the	range	and	scope	of	possible	
responses”	 (Race,	 in	press:	 6).	 The	Panel	 on	Research	on	Deterrent	and	 Incapacitative	 Effects	was	
convened	to	“provide	an	objective	assessment	of	the	scientific	validity	of	the	technical	evidence”	of	
the	deterrent	and	incapacitive	effects	of	criminal	sanctions,	with	a	focus	on	the	“magnitude	of	any	
crime-reducing	 effects”	 (Blumstein,	 1978:	 vii).72	 It	 was	 also	 asked	 to	 identify	 directions	 for	 further	
research.	The	panel	 focused	on	crime	 reduction	benefits;	 it	did	not	 consider	 the	 costs	of	 these	of	
implementing	longer	prison	terms	if	a	policy	of	incapacitation	was	to	be	implemented	(Blumstein	et	
al.,	1978:	3).	This	framing	of	what	should	set	the	direction	for	sentencing	policy	and	reform	ignored	
ideological	 and	 ethical	 concerns	 about	 the	 purposes	 of	 punishment,	 privileging	 a	 techno-scientific	
discursive	 mode	 of	 enunciation.	 It	 effectively	 de-politicized	 any	 contestation	 about	 a	 policy	 of	
incapacitation,	and	propelled	forward	the	fledgling	futures	modelling	used	in	earlier	research	about	
incapacitative	effects.	
	
The	governmental	directive	 to	map	out	an	agenda	 for	 future	 research,	was	an	opportunity	 to	use	
protocollary	power	to	prescribe	the	rules	of	practice	for	how	that	research	would	be	conducted.	The	
Panel’s	report	was	an	attempt	to	regulate	information	within	this	environment,	effectively	“taking	the	
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lead”	to	produce	complimentary	and	enhanced	environmental	response	that	could	be	implemented	
in	federal	penal	reform	(Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy,	2015:	165).	The	panel’s	protocol	articulated	a	
will-to-power	that	sought	to	establish	a	consensus	within	the	networks	of	criminal	justice	about	the	
“technocratic	 rules	 and	 standards”	 for	 conducting	 evidence-based	 policy	 research	 about	
governmental	 performance	 that	 could	 evaluate	 the	 effects	 of	 particular	 penal	 sanctions	 such	 as	
incapacitation	(Galloway	and	Thacker,	2007:	28).		
	
The	report	organised	its	findings	under	two	broad	categories	of	scientific	evaluation:	an	evaluation	of	
the	prediction	that	the	severity	of	penalties	and	its	certainty	will	reduce	crime	by	deterring	individual’s	
other	than	the	sanctioned	offender	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	4-9,19-63);	and,	whether	incapacitation	
reduces	 the	 crime	 rate	 (1978:	 9-14;	 64-80).	 The	 panel’s	 position	was	 ultimately	 that	 of	 “scientific	
caution”	in	relation	to	deterrent	effects,	its	disposition	far	more	favourable	to	incapacitative	effects	
in	spite	of	the	relatively	weak	scientific	evidence	demonstrating	that	it	significantly	reduces	the	crime	
rate	(see	Cohen,	1978:	189-200;	Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	10,	13,	66).	The	panel	commented:	“While	the	
currently	 limited	 models	 and	 parameter	 estimates	 cannot	 be	 relied	 upon	 for	 exact	 numerical	
calculation	of	incapacitative	effects,	they	are	useful	for	relative	comparisons”	of	the	effects	of	changes	
in	sentencing	policy	(1978:	10).	
	
In	spite	of	 the	wide	variance	 in	estimates	about	 incapacitative	effects	 (Cohen,	1978:	189-200),	 the	
panel	was	convinced	that	better	estimates	could	be	made	by	linking	measures	of	the	individual	rate	
of	 offending	 (lambda)	 to	 parametric	 variables	 linked	 to	 an	 emerging	 understanding	 of	 what	
constitutes	a	criminal	career	at	that	time	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	65-69;	Cohen,	1978:	228-231).	The	
panel	 felt	 that	 the	basic	assumptions	used	 in	existing	probability	models	 to	 forecast	 incapacitative	
effects	were	agreed	upon,	with	the	exception	of	how	to	estimate	the	individual	crime	rate	(Blumstein	
et	al,	1978:	66).	“The	principal	disagreement	is	over	the	value	of	the	individual	crime	rate,	an	issue	
that	can	only	be	resolved	empirically.	This	 is	a	task	that	should	be	given	a	high	priority”	 (ibid).	The	
panel	insisted	that	estimates	of	lambda	should	be	calculated	on	an	ontological	image	of	the	recidivist	
as	someone	whose	career	has	a	beginning	and	end,	and	where	the	intensity	or	rate	of	offending	will	
vary	 as	 it	 is	 distributed	 within	 any	 particular	 cohort	 of	 active	 offenders.	 Subsequently,	 future	
researchers	were	directed	to	include	variables	or	“predictors”	linked	to	the	dimensions	of	a	criminal	
career	 to	 estimate	 of	 the	 individual	 crime	 rate,	 in	 particular	 the	 age-related	 considerations	 of	 a	
criminal	career	(eg	age	at	the	onset	of	a	criminal	career),	calculations	about	the	length	of	a	criminal	
career,	 and	 of	 trends	 in	 individual	 offending	 over	 time	 (calculations	 of	 increases	 or	 decreases	 in	
individual	offending	throughout	a	career)	(Blumstein	and	Cohen,	1979:	567).	In	this	way,	the	estimates	
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of	 lambda	 or	 the	 individual	 rate	 of	 offending	 become	 more	 amenable	 to	 developing	 actuarial	
instruments	and	refining	incapacitation	as	a	policy	of	selective	incapacitation	(see	Blumstein,	1983).	
	
In	her	 critical	 review	about	how	other	 researchers	had	calculated	 the	 individual	 rate	of	offending,	
Cohen	 (1978:	 228)	 identified	 the	 research	 gap:	 there	 “have	 been	 no	 empirical	 estimates	 of	 the	
distribution	of	λ”,	and	 then	attempts	 to	 regulate	 the	development	of	 this	actuarial	 codification	by	
obligating	other	researchers	and	justice	statisticians	to	“discriminate	between	different	individual’s	
(λ’s)	and	a	characterisation	by	crime	type”	as	this	would	improve	forecasts	about	the	crime	rate	so	
that	more	effective	plans	and	decisions	about	resource	allocation	could	be	made.	Setting	the	standard	
or	the	baseline	for	measurement,	she	invited	others	to	develop	the	“best”	estimates	that	account	for	
variations	in	lambda	by	crime	type,	variations	in	lambda	across	the	criminal	population,	and	variations	
in	lambda	during	a	criminal	career.	73	The	panel	acknowledged	that	these	parameters	were	“largely	
unknown”,	and	not	directly	observable;	however,	protocol	dictates	that	estimates	are	linked	to	the	
dimensions	of	a	criminal	career	(which	earlier	research	had	not	used	as	 it	calculated	the	individual	
rate	of	offending	on	a	projection	that	all	offenders	commit	crimes	at	a	uniform	rate)	(1978:	9-10).		
	
In	addition,	this	valorised	protocol	obligated	researchers	to	develop	estimates	of	the	incapacitative	
effects	 of	 prison	 by	 including	 probabilities	 linked	 to	 criminal	 justice	 system	 parameters	 and	 the	
“elasticities”	 between	 these	 variables	 (Blumstein	 et	 al.,	 1978:	 67-75).	 Elasticity	 measures	 the	
percentage	change	in	the	annual	prison	population	required	to	achieve	a	one	%	change	in	the	volume	
of	crime	(Chan,	1995:	4).	This	requires	the	development	of	probabilities	that	consider	the	relative	and	
multiple	 interactions	 and	 effects	 of	 individual	 crime	 rates,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 prison	 population,	 and	
variations	 in	 the	 sanction	 level	while	 also	 considering	 the	 types	 of	 crime.	When	 these	 probability	
estimates	are	incorporated	into	estimates	of	relative	effects,	it	is	possible	to	specify	the	cost-benefit	
ratio	that	more	accurately	forecasts	the	percentage	increase	in	the	prison	population	that	is	required	
to	achieve	a	particular	percentage	reduction	in	the	crime	rate	at	specified	levels	of	sentencing	as	was	
attempted	in	Shinnar	and	Shinnar’s	probability	modelling	(see	Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	70-71).		
	
The	 desire,	 then,	 is	 for	 control	 in	 real	 time,	 to	 be	 able	 to	 capture	 and	 intercept	 networked	 data	
simultaneously	 in	 order	 to	 anticipate	 and	 govern	 the	 future.	 The	 cost-benefit	 probability	 model	
promised	 to	 provide	 evidence-based	 information	 about	 how	 “criminal	 justice	 system	
behaviours…affected	the	level	of	work	load”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	11).	Given	this	imperative,	the	
panel	regarded	the	establishment	of	a	central	data-linkage	infrastructure	–	a	data	clearinghouse	–	be	
established	within	the	Department	of	Justice	(1978:	11,	81-84).	This	clearinghouse	would	need	to	be	
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staffed	by	 an	electronic	 elite,	who	possessed	 the	operational	 and	 technical	 expertise,	 to	 establish	
meta-codes	for	intercepting	networked	data	about	simultaneous	criminal	justice	parameters	that	are	
linked	to	changes	in	both	penal	sanctioning	and	the	crime	rate.	A	permanent	monitoring	apparatus	
would	 calibrate	 change	 in	 these	 variables	 to	 relay	 information	about	 criminal	 justice	performance	
using	time-series	analyses	(1978:	10-11).	This	data	capture	would	discern	“the	ways	the	different	parts	
of	the	criminal	justice	system	respond	to	changes	in	their	environments”	(1978:	13).	
	
This	 audit	 technique	 embodies	 the	 rationale	 of	 evidence-based	 penal	 policy	 and	 practice.	 In	 the	
broadest	 sense,	 the	 clearinghouse	 envisioned	 by	 the	 Panel	 was	 a	 linked	 data	 infrastructure	 of	
interoperability	that	could	be	used	to	influence	behaviour	in	line	with	a	present	criminal	justice	policy,	
and	 to	 influence	behaviour	 for	 transformation,	 to	 render	 system	actors	more	 flexible	and	open	 to	
variation	 in	practice.	The	statisticians	 immersed	 in	this	apparatus	were	regarded	as	possessing	the	
best	line	of	vision	for	anticipating	“changes	before	they	occur”;	they	could	then	seize	opportunities	to	
develop	 pilot	 projects	 (“experiments”	 about	 penal	 innovation),	 and	 develop	 research	 designs	 to	
evaluate	 their	 effects	 (1978:	11).	 In	 this	way,	 the	 recently	established	Office	of	 Justice	Assistance,	
Research,	and	Statistics	would	set	the	national	research	agenda	for	future	research.	The	clearinghouse	
would	have	the	capabilities	to	capture	and	guide	data	from	prior,	current,	and	future	research	about	
crime	 reduction	 interventions	 such	 as	 incapacitation	 by	 establishing	 “baseline	 observations”	 and	
estimates	 of	 the	 crime	 rate,	 operationalised	measures	 of	 criminal	 justice	 system	parameters,	 and	
criminal	 recidivism	that	are	derived	 from	two	major	 research	data	sources	–	cross-sectional,	 time-
series	information	on	crimes	and	the	processing	of	suspects,	defendants	and	offenders	by	the	criminal	
justice	 system,	 and	 longitudinal	 information	 on	 criminal	 career	 histories	 –	which	when	 combined	
together	would	promise	effective	data	about	criminal	justice	effects	(1978:	81-83).	
	
The	installation	of	this	apparatus	established	a	protocol	of	hierarchical	control	for	federal	auditing	of	
its	budgetary	investment	in	crime	reduction.	The	implementation	of	this	data	infrastructure	in	1977	
established	 the	 institutional,	 physical,	 and	 digital	 means	 for	 storing,	 sharing	 and	 consuming	 data	
across	networked	technologies	at	the	synoptic	level	for	the	federal	co-ordination	of	evidence-based	
criminal	justice	policy.	The	Panel	envisioned	that	this	clearinghouse	would	have	a	long-term	archiving	
function,	 so	 that	 any	 federally	 funded	 research	 would	 be	 obligated	 to	 deposit	 their	 data	 in	 the	
repository	after	project	completion	(1978:	13).	Archiving	deploys	protocollary	power	to	regulate	the	
flows	of	information	that	are	centrally	intercepted,	archived	for	ongoing	and	future	re-use	(Kitchen,	
2014:	30).	By	establishing	the	rules	for	data	collection	within	the	system’s	networks,	as	well	as	the	
meta	rules	for	coding	and	integrating	data	captured	from	heterogeneous	sites	in	the	criminal	justice	
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environment	 (that	may	be	have	contrary	or	 conflicting	objectives	 to	 those	desired	 in	 relation	 to	a	
particular	 policy	 such	 as	 selective	 incapacitation),	 this	 archiving	 assumes	 a	 curatorial	 role	 where	
control	 is	exercised	over	other	spheres	of	 influence	emanating	within	the	“system”.	 Information	 is	
extracted	from	the	environment,	reconfigured	and	recalculated	using	criminal	career	actuarial	codes,	
and	then	re-directed	or	fed-back	into	the	environment	in	order	to	influence	or	modulate	behaviour	
along	 a	 more	 standardized	 channel	 that	 limits	 the	 discursive	 frames	 of	 reference	 for	 action	 and	
evaluation	on	the	basis	of	these	feedback	signals.	
	
At	the	level	of	imagination,	the	Panel’s	recommendations	presage	what	we	would	now	recognise	as	a	
linked	 open-ended	 digitalized	 infrastructure	 of	 continuous	 machine-readability	 governed	 by	 the	
principles	of	accountability	as	well	as	principles	that	strive	for	a	greater	exhaustiveness	of	data	capture	
and	data	mining	of	new	frontiers	in	an	infinite	search	for	relationality	as	well	as	a	spirit	of	invention.	
While	the	data	is	not	envisioned	as	being	freely	available	for	end-user	(it	remains	locked	in	a	national	
database	under	strict	rules	for	release	and	use	largely	within	the	criminal	justice	system	by	means	of	
propriety	 software	 for	 export	 and	 use	 given	 strict	 ethical	 rules	 for	 consumption	 or	 research	
evaluation),74	it	becomes	a	central	tool	for	adopting	a	spirit	of	experimentation	which	is	foundational	
to	the	continuous	evolution	of	an	evidence-based	policy	environment.	It	assumes	the	existence	of	a	
rational	 agent	 who	 will	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 objectivity	 of	 algorithimic	 probabilities	 and	 other	
enumerated	realities,	who	will	re-modulate	behaviour	in	the	light	of	new	information.	Furthermore,	
it	opens	up	the	possibilities	 for	 regulating	 the	 flows	of	 information	that	are	 fed	back	to	 the	public	
about	the	criminal	justice	system’s	performance	that	form	a	vector	of	biopolitics	described	by	Foucault	
(2007)	in	terms	of	environmental	governmentality	described	in	the	Introduction.	
	
The	proposed	evidence-based	network	of	criminal	justice	is	a	motley	assemblage	of	affects:	contempt	
for	the	offender,	 identification	with	the	victim,	despair	or	suspicion	about	the	effectiveness	of	any	
particular	 criminal	 justice	 intervention,	 the	 anticipation	 of	 new	 discoveries	 that	 might	 stimulate	
interest	and	bolster	hope	and	morale	in	the	war	on	crime.	In	spite	of	the	uncertainty	that	the	panel	is	
all	too	aware	of,	the	anticipation	that	there	is	a	solution	proffers	some	excess	of	affect,	a	wonderment	
and	faith	in	the	scientific	method,	a	sense	of	hope	that	is	sustained	along	the	vector	of	anticipation,	
all	of	which	enables	the	war	on	crime	to	continue	–	to	sustain	momentum	-	in	the	face	of	scientific	
indeterminacy	and	its	threat	to	scientific	and	political	morale	(Anderson,	2010:	168,	171).	The	Panel’s	
imagining	of	a	total	program	of	research	for	waging	the	war	on	crime	is	self-propelling	as	it	relies	upon	
anticipation	about	an	uncertain	future	to	inform	its	every	movement,	whether	that	be	to	modulate	
security	networks	within	the	system	to	optimize	the	overall	effects	of	selective	incapacitation	or	other	
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criminal	sanctions,	or	to	re-modulate	or	redirect	movements	 in	the	light	of	new	information	about	
dangerousness	given	the	successes	and	failings	of	various	interventions.	
	
This	new	evidence-based	justice	environment,	as	imagined	by	the	Panel,	promoted	a	criminal	career	
paradigm	for	future	research,	which	would	gain	momentum	in	the	1980s.	The	early	research	in	the	
1970s	 into	 this	 problem	 assumed	 that	 re-offending	was	 a	 continuous	 variable	 –	 offenders	 would	
always	 commit	 crimes	 unless	 in	 prison75.	 However,	 the	 protocol	 for	 criminal	 career	 research	
advocated	by	the	panel	asks:	‘if	some	offenders	desist	from	crime,	how	are	they	different	from	high-
rate	 offenders?’,	 ‘under	what	 conditions	 do	 they	 desist?’,	 and,	 ‘are	 there	 differing	 trajectories	 of	
criminal	 career?’	 Certainly,	 the	 criminal	 research	 agenda	 established	 by	 the	 Panel	 contested	 the	
fatalist	position	that	offenders	do	not	desist	from	crime	were	it	not	for	the	degenerative	effects	of	old	
age.	 What	 is	 remarkable	 is	 the	 uncertainty	 introduced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 new	 evidence-based	
environment.	 Attempts	 to	 estimate	 the	 length	 of	 a	 criminal	 career	 or	 to	 establish	 the	 transition	
probabilities	of	escalation	or	desistance	in	a	criminal	career	introduce	a	permanent	suspicion	about	
the	capacity	of	any	particular	probability	model	to	effectively	partition	categories	of	offender	across	
the	total	stretch	of	the	age-crime	curve:	How	certain	can	we	be	that	an	individual’s	crime	rate	has	
been	effectively	calculated?	What	are	the	tolerable	levels	of	probability	for	sorting	members	of	the	
population?	Should	we	partition	different	categories	of	offender	across	the	age-crime	curve	according	
to	constructed	differences	in	the	nature	of	their	criminal	career?	What	are	the	consequences	of	doing	
so	in	terms	of	an	appropriate	intervention	in	order	to	“prevent”	re-offending?	
	
The	 allotment	 of	 an	 individual	 to	 a	 probability	 classification	 as	 a	 high-rate	 offender	 is	 a	 proxy	 of	
criminal	 identification	 that	 is	 made	 in	 advance	 of	 that	 identity	 becoming	 realized	 (if	 indeed	 it	
eventuates	or	not).	Anticipatory	tracking	deploys	a	mode	of	surveillance	that	gathers	risk	intelligence	
data	 and	 codes	 it	 for	 actuarial	 prediction	 and	 incapacitation.	 	 The	 knowledge-power	 relation	 that	
seeks	to	optimise	incapacitation	in	the	early	stages	of	its	development	(as	evidenced	in	Wolgang	et	
al.’s	attempt	to	anticipate	transition	probabilities	of	an	escalation	in	re-offending	in	order	to	prevent	
it)	is	a	militarized	biopolitical	strategy	that	establishes	a	necessary	and	timely	relation	between	bodily	
movement	 and	 tracking	 (Crandall	 2005:	 19).	 Actuarial	 codes	 predict	 a	 trajectory	 of	 risky	 conduct,	
visualised	 as	 a	 dangerous	 movement-flow.	 Multi-factorial	 risk	 fragments	 gathered	 from	 diverse	
governmental	sites	about	individuals	must	be	made	to	freely	circulate	(within	a	calculable	system	of	
equivalency	for	a	transversal	exchange	of	risk	information)	in	what	can	be	described	as	a	“tracking-
gaze”	within	 “a	 social	matrix	 of	 anticipatory	 seeing”	 (Crandall,	 2005,	 219).	 The	 central	 purpose	of	
tracking	is	to	identify	risky	movements	to	either	influence	its	trajectory	or	to	intercept	it	in	some	way.	
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Multi-dimensional	risk	information	about	the	lives	of	individuals	is	rendered	“machine-readable”	as	it	
is	transformed	into	a	series	of	interconnected	visual	or	numeric	codes	which	are	units	of	“capta”	that	
render	 continuous	 opaque	 information	 about	 human	 lives	 intelligible	 and	 distinguishable	 as	 an	
identifiable	piece	of	risk	information	within	the	total	sum	of	all	potential	risk	data	constructed	within	
a	database	(Dodge	and	Kitchin,	2005:	854).76		
	
Given	 this	 problematization,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 Panel	 recommended	 that	 longitudinal	
information	 on	 criminal-career	 histories	 of	 individuals	 is	 “essential	 in	 making	 estimates	 for	
incapacitation”	 (Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	14).	This	would	require	further	birth	cohort	research	of	the	
sort	conducted	by	Wolfgang	and	his	colleagues;	it	would	not	be	sufficient	to	rely	solely	upon	cross-
sectional	data	captured	from	transactional	criminal	 justice	data.	Longitudinal	data	captured	from	a	
‘total’	dataset	will	help	to	ensure	that	new	insights	about	criminality	and	its	risk	factors	could	be	used	
to	rework	model	estimates.	Not	only	would	this	reduce	the	technical	problem	of	false-positives	but	it	
would	offer	new	game	openings	for	more	precautionary	interventions	(these	were	articulated	in	the	
report	as	‘earlier	interventions’).	While	criminal	justice	data	about	recidivism	would	be	sufficient	and	
cost-effective	in	evaluating	any	particular	criminal	justice	sanction	along	a	relatively	short-	or	medium-
term	interval,	a	principle	of	permanent	vigilance	using	the	military	tactic	of	anticipatory	tracking	 is	
required	to	intercept	and	prevent	future	movements	that	would	otherwise	not	be	anticipated	without	
the	benefits	of	 the	 intelligence	gathered	by	a	more	permanent	surveillance	of	the	population.	The	
evidence-based	environment	that	is	envisioned	is	necessarily	searching	for	new	risk	information,	on	
the	lookout	for	new	territories	that	cast	its	net	out	of	the	boundaries	of	the	traditional	criminal	justice	
system.	The	primary	criteria	for	adjudicating	whether	or	not	this	out-of-domain	data	should	be	made	
machine-readable	 within	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 is	 its	 value	 in	 predicting	 recidivism	 and	 the	
interrelated	goal	of	more	effective	preventive	interventions	as	early	as	possible.	
	
2.7	 Conclusion	
	
Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	(1982:	30-31)	 identified	three	 interwoven	elements	 in	 implementing	a	
penal	 policy	 of	 selective	 incapacitation:	 the	 use	 of	 an	 actuarial	 tool	 for	 classifying	 offenders	 into	
categories	 with	 “substantially	 different	 average	 offence	 rates”;	 a	 criminal	 justice	 perception	 of	
sentencing	as	being	a	“device…for	allocating	the	available	incarceration…capacity;	and,	a	procedure	
for	 optimizing	 incapacitation	 effects	 (1982:	 30-31).	 These	 elements	 are	 irreducible	 to	 any	 one	
component	(the	actuarial	instrument,	a	modulation	of	criminal	justice	authorities	such	as	magistrates	
to	 make	 decisions	 that	 are	 informed	 by	 an	 offender’s	 actuarial	 classification,	 and	 the	 diverse	
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guidelines	and	procedures	 for	 implementing	an	actuarial	 system	and	monitoring	 its	effectiveness),	
however	their	co-assembly	provide	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	implementing	actuarial	justice.	The	
error	 made	 in	 genealogies	 of	 actuarialism	 has	 been	 to	 emphasize	 the	 power	 of	 the	 actuarial	
instrument,	 thus	 neglecting	 the	 complex	 machinery	 and	 logistical	 practices	 that	 propel	 actuarial	
justice	forward.	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	demonstrated	that	actuarial	justice	begins	its	journey	by	imagining	a	future	and	
then	initiates	a	mission	to	gather	the	necessary	knowledge	to	know	a	possible	future	by	means	of	an	
anticipatory	and	militaristic	tracking	of	offenders	designed	to	incapacitate	(Anderson,	2010:	783).	In	
the	 logistics	 of	 incapacitation	 there	 resides	 two	 mutually	 conditioning	 calculative	 practices:	 the	
futures	modelling	of	criminal	justice	system	parameters	for	projecting	the	cost-benefits	and	effects	of	
shifts	in	system	drivers	such	as	sentencing	policy,	and	the	calculative	practices	of	actuarial	prediction	
that	were	then	unrealised.	Neither	set	of	calculative	actions	are	possible	without	a	data	infrastructure	
that	renders	risk	data	captured	from	diverse	sites	machine-readable	and	interoperable.	It	is	necessary	
to	 identify	both	 the	ontological	 assumptions	 that	 configure	actuarial	 codes	about	 the	high	 rate	or	
chronic	offender,	as	well	as	to	identify	the	sorts	of	epistemic	devices	and	epistemological	decisions	
that	are	made	 in	developing	and	testing	out	 the	model.	These	probability	 futures	models	are	only	
made	 possible	 by	 a	 longitudinal	 tracking	 of	 offenders	 using	 both	 retrospective	 and	 prospective	
research	designs.	Without	this	it	is	not	possible	to	either	construct	the	probability	model,	nor	verify	
its	utility	for	interpolation	in	other	jurisdictions	or	future	time-space	configurations.	As	Massumi	has	
argued,	 making	 a	 particular	 future	 present	 is	 a	 paradoxical	 operation,	 as	 it	 involves	 “a	 passage	
between	 ontological	 modes…(actuarial	 futures	 are)	 suspended	 between	 a	 here	 and	 now	 and	 an	
elsewhen	or	elsewhere”	(2005a,	b,	cited	in	Anderson,	2010:	783).		
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Selective	incapacitation	
	
3.1	 Introduction	
	
In	the	previous	chapter,	I	have	demonstrated	that	efforts	to	establish	a	criminal	career	protocol	were	
initially	 focused	on	 forecasting	 the	 incapacitative	effects	of	 sending	offenders	 to	prison	 for	 longer	
periods	in	the	war	on	crime.	The	modelling	assumptions	incorporated	the	finding	of	Wolfgang	et	al.	
that	a	small	proportion	of	the	offender	population	committed	a	high	volume	of	crimes	(1972:	248)	–	
this	 simple	 statistical	 “truth”	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 impetus	 to	 reconfigure	 the	 general	 strategy	 of	
incapacitation	 as	 a	 more	 targeted	 incapacitation	 of	 these	 offenders.	 In	 order	 to	 realise	 such	 a	
sentencing	policy,	the	probability	models	used	in	incapacitative	research	needed	to	be	re-configured	
using	the	“transition	probabilities”	of	offensive	diversity	that	were	developed	by	Wolfgang	and	his	
colleagues	to	optimise	the	timing	of	incapacitation	at	the	earliest	signs	of	contingencies	linked	to	an	
individual’s	biosocial	history	that	were	predictive	of	and	escalating	probability	of	becoming	a	chronic	
high-rate	offender	(see	2.2,	and	2.6).	This	explicitly	predictive	work	to	develop	actuarial	instruments	
for	use	in	sentencing	had	not	yet	occurred.	
	
This	chapter	takes	up	the	story,	focusing	on	those	efforts.	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	(1982)	were	
the	first	to	present	such	an	instrument,	having	been	funded	by	the	National	Institute	of	Justice	in	the	
late	1970s	to	do	so,	and	to	recommend	how	a	policy	of	selective	incapacitation	could	be	implemented.	
The	chapter	begins	by	mapping	the	protocol	used	to	develop	this	instrument,	which	was	responded	
to	with	considerable	critical	attention.	My	focus	in	this	chapter	is	on	the	protocollary	efforts	of	the	
Panel	on	Research	on	Criminal	Careers	 (Blumstein	et	al.,	1986	a,	b)	 that	was	convened	 in	1983,	 to	
review	 “the	effects	of	 prediction	 instruments	 in	 reducing	 crime	 though	 incapacitation”	 (1986a,	 x).	
Given	 the	 poor	 predictive	 accuracy	 of	 Greenwood	 and	 Abrahamse’s	 instrument	 and	 alternative	
instruments	that	were	being	developed	at	that	time,	the	panel	seized	the	moment	to	install	a	protocol	
that	was	explicitly	located	within	the	ontological	and	epistemic	protocol	outlined	in	section	2.6	of	the	
last	chapter.	In	doing	so	the	panel	established	an	authoritative	protocol	for	modulating	participation	
in	 the	continuous	development	and	 improvement	of	actuarial	 instruments	 in	a	global	marketplace	
that	could	be	transported	to	diverse	sites	of	implementation	and	implemented	with	relative	ease.	
	
Before	beginning,	I	situate	the	vector	concerned	with	incapacitation	that	I	am	mapping	within	penal	
reform	efforts	within	the	US	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	In	the	broadest	sense,	selective	incapacitation	is	
located	within	a	far	longer	trajectory	concerned	with	reforming	the	indeterminate	sentencing	regime	
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of	penal	welfarism	in	favour	of	a	regime	of	determinate	sentencing	(Harcourt,	2003,	2007;	Lynch	and	
Bertenthal,	2016;	Tonry,	1996,	2014;	von	Hirsch,	1985).	In	the	1970s	every	state	in	the	US	had	a	system	
of	 indeterminate	 sentences;	 by	 the	 close	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 most	 states	 had	 repudiated	
indeterminate	sentencing	and	imposed	significant	constraints	on	the	discretion	of	judges	and	parole	
boards	(Harcourt,	2003:	99,	105-07).	In	the	1970s	Minnesota	and	Pennsylvania	led	this	trend,	turning	
to	sentencing	guidelines,	and	then	the	federal	government	turned	to	this	in	1984,77	establishing	the	
Sentencing	Reform	Act	that	culminated	in	the	establishment	of	the	US	Sentencing	Commission,	who	
developed	the	first	of	 its	annual	Sentencing	Guidelines	between	1985	and	1987,	publishing	its	first	
guidelines	the	year	after	the	Panel	on	Research	on	Criminal	Careers	published	it	report	(Wilkins	et	al.,	
1987	a,	b).	
	
The	Sentencing	Reform	Act	directed	the	Commission	to	develop	guidelines	and	policy	statements	that	
provided	 “certainty	 and	 fairness”,	 to	 reduce	 “unwarranted	 sentencing	 disparities”,	 to	 “maintain	
sufficient	 flexibility	 to	 permit	 individualized	 sentences”,	 and	 to	 “reflect,	 to	 the	 extent	 practicable,	
advancement	in	knowledge	of	human	behaviour	as	it	relates	to	the	criminal	justice	process”	(Baron-
Evans	et	al.,	2010:	44).	The	guidelines	were	designed	as	modulating	force	deploying	an	actuarial	form	
of	 determinate	 sentencing,	 however	 they	 were	 enacted	 to	 regulate	 this	 elite	 sector	 of	 juridical	
authority,	 by	 acknowledging	 its	 autonomy.	 	 The	 Commission	 was	 provided	 considerable	 research	
powers	 to	 develop	 a	 way	 of	 measuring	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 “sentencing,	 penal	 and	 correctional	
practices…	in	meeting	the	purposes	of	sentencing”	(2010:	44-45;	see	Wilkins	et	al.,	1987b:	21-40;	53-
75).	 So,	 in	 addition	 to	 developing	 a	 sentencing	 grid	 for	 modulating	 sentencing	 decisions,	 the	
Commission	was	obligated	to	track	a	cohort	of	offenders	 in	the	period	between	1983	and	1985	to	
establish	 “as	 a	 benchmark	 a	 projection	 of	 future	 prison	 demand	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 change	 in	
current	sentencing	practices”	 (1987b:	56).	 It	then	estimated	the	future	prison	demand	based	upon	
anticipated	prosecution	 trends	using	 the	probabilistic	 statistical	 techniques	described	 in	Chapter	2	
that	 were	 prescribed	 by	 Blumstein	 et	 al.	 (1978).	 The	 Commission	 was	 also	 required	 to	 conduct	
research	to	periodically	review	and	revise	its	guidelines,	to	test	the	“predictive	power	of	the	criminal	
history	score”,	and	to	conduct	ongoing	research	to	“assess	the	efficacy	and	desirability	of	modification”	
of	the	scoring	system	and	its	relative	weightings	(Wilkins	et	al.,	1987b:	44).78	
	
My	mapping	 of	 selective	 incapacitation	 does	 not	 consider	 its	 interpolation	 into	 these	 sentencing	
guidelines	in	any	significant	detail.	This	research	has	been	conducted	by	others	(Tonry,	1996;	Harcourt,	
2003;	2007:	88-99;	Lynch	and	Bertenthal,	2016).	My	focus	is	on	the	protocollary	efforts	of	the	Panel	
on	 research	 criminal	 careers,	 that	 operated	 alongside,	 if	 not	 in	 concert	 with,	 the	 Commission	 by	
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establishing	 the	 research	 protocol	 that,	 in	 part,	 influenced	 the	 Commission’s	 development	 of	 its	
“criminal	history	and	criminal	 livelihood”	axis	 for	calculating	 the	 length	of	a	commitment	 to	prison	
(Wilkins	et	al.,	1987a:	Chapter	Four;	1987b:	41-44).	In	conducting	my	mapping	of	this	protocol,	I	briefly	
reference	 its	 interpolation	 along	 the	 actuarial	 codes	 used	 in	 drafting	 the	 guidelines.	My	 research	
interest	 is	 more	 broadly	 concerned	 with	 identifying	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 research	
development	in	advancing	actuarial	codes	established	at	that	time,	and	that	continue	to	modulate	the	
advancement	of	actuarial	prediction	and	 its	 strategies	 for	anticipating	and	 incapacitating	high-rate	
offenders.	
	
To	assist	 in	making	 the	connection	between	selective	 incapacitation	and	 these	guidelines,	 I	briefly	
describe	their	first	 incantation	in	1987.	These	guidelines	use	a	two-dimensional	grid	that	measures	
the	seriousness	of	federal	offences	along	its	vertical	axis	using	estimates	that	classify	43	categories	of	
offence	seriousness,	and	a	measure	of	the	defendant’s	criminal	history	on	the	horizontal	axis	of	the	
grid,	 using	 six	 actuarial	 categories	 that	 estimate	 the	 level	 of	 risk	 of	 re-offending.	 The	 guideline’s	
decision-making	grid	contains	258	cells	that	integrates	these	two	axes	(see	page	5.2	of	the	Guidelines,	
1987a,	in	Appendix	One),	requiring	the	judge	to	impose	a	sentence	of	determinate	length	to	prison	
(specified	in	months),	unless	legitimate,	specific	reasons	for	departing	from	the	guideline	range	are	
specified	(Breyer,	1988:	7;	Hoffman	and	Beck,	1997:	192).	The	judge	begins	by	identifying	the	index	
that	 categorises	 the	 crime	 (eg	 robbery),	 determines	 its	 base	 offense	 level	 sentencing	 range	–	 the	
sentencing	range	for	a	first	time	convicted	offender	-	(eg	level	18);	adds	scores	for	specific	offence	
characteristics	 (eg	 money	 taken,	 a	 gun	 was	 used);	 determines	 ‘adjustments’	 for	 mitigating	 and	
aggravating	factors	(eg	acceptance	of	responsibility,	legal	rules	for	multiple	counts,	abduction	of	victim	
etc);	and,	then	using	the	categorical	estimate	of	offense	seriousness,	combines	this	with	an	estimate	
of	predicted	risk	of	recidivism	that	locates	the	offender	within	six	ranked	categories	of	elevated	risk,	
and	looks	at	the	grid	to	determine	the	sentence	(eg	an	offence	of	level	23,	with	three	points	for	prior	
conviction,	yields	a	range	of	51-63	months	in	prison	for	an	armed	robbery	by	a	previously	convicted	
felon)	(Breyer,	1988:	6-7).	
	
The	grid	is	an	assemblage	of	two	competing	penal	rationales	that	are	woven	together	as	an	actuarial	
instrument	 to	 calculate	 and	 determine	 the	 time	 served	 in	 prison.	 The	 vertical	 axis	 imbricates	 the	
traditional	penal	rationale	of	proportionality	while	considering	the	actual	circumstances	of	an	offence,	
without	 being	 unwieldy	 or	 procedurally	 unfair	 (1988:	 11-12).	 It	 limited	 the	 number	 of	 offence	
categories	used	in	the	guidelines	for	greater	ease	of	use	so	that	there	is	a	uniformity	in	sentencing	for	
particular	categories	of	offence	(1988:	13-14),	and	 it	proscribed	techno-scientific	baseline	 levels	of	
	 61	
sentencing	 determined	 on	 the	 “typical,	 or	 average,	 actual	 past	 practice”	 (1998:	 17;	 see	 Harcourt,	
2003:123-24),79	with	notable	exceptions	in	relation	to	repeat	violent	offences,	“career	offenders”,80	
offenders	 who	 derived	 a	 substantial	 portion	 of	 their	 income	 from	 a	 pattern	 of	 criminal	 conduct,	
including	white	collar	offenders,	and	drug	trafficking	and	drug	offences	where	the	length	of	sentences	
were	substantially	raised	above	these	average	estimates	(2003:	125;	Baron-Evans	et	al.,	2010).81	On	
the	horizontal	axis,	a	criminal	history	score	is	calculated	using	a	scoring	system	about	the	frequency,	
seriousness,	and	time	elapsed	between	offences.	This	score	predicts	the	future	probability	of	crime	
and	 subsequently	 increases	 the	 length	 of	 the	 sentence,	 which	 embodies	 the	 rationale	 of	
incapacitation	and	crime	control.	The	Commission	articulated	this	stance	in	relation	to	the	prediction	
of	future	crime:	
	
The	criminal	history	component	of	the	guidelines	addresses	the	statutory	sentencing	of	just	
punishment	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 public	 from	 further	 crimes	 by	 the	
defendant…Enhancing	 a	 defendant’s	 sentence	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 criminal	 history	 furthers	
crime	control	goals	of	general	and	special	deterrence,	and	incapacitation.	It	is	also	consistent	
with	public	perceptions	of	just	punishment.	The	use	of	criminal	history	to	adjust	a	defendant’s	
sentence	is	similarly	consistent	with	historical	sentencing	process.	Analyses	of	past	practices	
in	different	jurisdictions	have	consistently	shown	the	defendant’s	prior	criminal	record	to	be	
one	of	the	key	determinants	of	sentences	(Wilkins	et	al.,	1987b:	41).	
	
Predicting	future	crime	on	the	basis	of	prior	criminal	history	was	considered	by	the	Commission	as	
having	 a	 complementarity	 between	 a	 just	 deserts	 rationale	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 culpability	
ascribed	 to	 the	 offender,	 and	 a	 crime	 control	 rationale	 founded	 on	 the	 prediction	 of	 recidivism	
informed	by	empirical	evidence	that	has	been	demonstrated	to	“be	related	to	the	likelihood	of	further	
criminal	behaviour” (1987b:	42).	The	installation	of	this	predictive	axis	reconfigures	sentencing	in	the	
direction	of	selective	incapacitation	as	its	probabilistic	calculations	help	to	distinguish	high-risk	from	
low-risk	offenders,	which	directly	 impacts	on	 time	 served	 in	prison.	 Furthermore,	 the	decisions	 to	
make	calculations	about	the	length	of	sentence	that	deploy	sentencing	ranges	at	the	higher	levels	of	
the	vertical	axis	for	repeat	violent	offenders,	repeat	drug	offenders,	and	career	offenders,	use	quasi-
actuarial	 proxies	 for	 incapacitating	 certain	 categories	 of	 repeat	 offender	 based	 on	 categorical	
aggregates	for	longer	prison	terms.	For	example,	the	career	offender	guidelines	automatically	place	
the	defendant	 in	 the	highest	criminal	history	category	 (6),	 regardless	of	whether	or	not	 the	actual	
criminal	history	score	was	lower;	this	imposes	a	guideline	range	of	20	years	or	more	(Baron-Evans	et	
al.,	2010:	47).	
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This	sentencing	strategy	is	situated	within	an	escalation	of	the	war	on	crime,	which	under	the	neo-
conservative	politics	 of	 the	Reagan	 administration,	 escalated	 into	 “the	war	on	drugs”	 (see	Hinton,	
2016:	307-14).82	In	his	first	year	of	office	Reagan	passed	legislation	that	fostered	connections	between	
the	military	and	the	Department	of	Justice	that	enabled	the	Defence	agencies	to	provide	local	police	
access	 to	 weapons,	 intelligence,	 research,	 and	military	 bases	 to	 improve	 drug	 interdiction	 (2016:	
311).83	 Domestic	 security	 became	 linked	 to	 transnational	 border	 control	 of	 international	 drug	
networks.	The	Comprehensive	Crime	Control	Act,	1984	marked	the	official	start	of	the	war	on	drugs,	
and	the	first	major	revision	of	the	federal	criminal	code	since	the	start	of	the	twentieth	century	(2016:	
312).	 Under	 this	 legislation	 the	 federal	 death	 penalty	 was	 re-instated,	 the	 parole	 system	 was	
dismantled,	pre-trial	detention	provisions	authorised	judges	to	detain	defendants	indefinitely	if	they	
were	considered	to	be	potential	“dangers	to	the	community”;	mandatory	minimum	sentences	of	5	
years	imprisonment	were	instituted	for	offenders	who	used	a	firearm	in	connection	to	violent	crimes;	
sentences	of	15	years	to	life	were	instituted	for	third-time	offenders;	forfeiture	provisions	permitted	
police	to	seize	and	keep	the	cash	and	property	of	accused	drug	dealers,	which	was	used	to	help	finance	
law	enforcement;	a	national	clearinghouse	was	established	in	the	Department	of	Justice	to	fund	states	
in	expanding	prisons;	and,	the	privatisation	of	prisons	began	with	the	first	prison	facility	being	in	Texas	
(2016:	312-13).84	
	
3.2	 Advancing	actual	prediction:		The	Rand	project	on	selective	incapacitation	
	
In	1975	the	Rand	Corporation	was	funded	by	the	National	Institute	of	Justice	to	learn	more	about	the	
criminal	career	of	“habitual	criminals”.	This	project	initially	traced	the	basic	parameters	of	a	criminal	
career	 (see	Pertsilia	et	al.,	 1977)	and,	 in	 later	 funding	 rounds,	 focused	on	developing	an	objective	
actuarial	technique	could	be	used	in	sentencing	for	selective	incapacitation	(Marquis,	1981;	Chaiken	
and	Chaiken,	1982;	Peterson	et	al.,	1982;	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse,	1982).	Its	research	design	was	
an	advancement	on	earlier	probability	models	about	incapacitation	as	it	conducted	research	based	on	
empirical	 observation	 (self-reporting	 by	 offenders),	 providing	 an	 emerging	 profile	 of	 the	 high-rate	
offender’s	criminal	career	and	how	to	predict	the	risk	of	re-offending	based	on	aggregated	data	of	a	
sample	of	offenders.85	 	Rather	 than	estimate	an	 individual’s	 rate	of	offending	 from	cross-sectional	
data	of	recorded	arrests	over	time,	the	Rand	Corporation	used	self-report	data	captured	from	inmate	
surveys	 that	 sampled	 from	 the	 prisoner	 population,	 initially	 in	 California	 and	 later	 in	 California,	
Michigan	and	Texas.	
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What	is	remarkable	about	the	public	reception	of	the	Rand	Report	about	selective	incapacitation	was	
the	level	of	criticism	that	it	received.86	Much	of	the	debate	about	the	use	of	prediction	was	favourable	
to	 the	 position	 advanced	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 in	 the	 Floud	 Report	 that	 examined	 the	 powers	
available	to	courts	to	protect	the	public	from	exceptional,	dangerous	offenders	(Floud,	1982;	Floud	
and	Young,	1981).	The	solution	to	the	injustice	of	sentencing	someone	to	a	lengthy	period	in	prison	
who	will	not	do	serious	harm,87	was	justified	on	the	concept	of	“anticipated	harm”	that	was	sufficiently	
grave	to	pose	too	greater	 level	of	hardship	 (pain	and	suffering,	shock	and	 fear,	 injury	 to	health	or	
beggary)	(Floud,	1982:	221).	The	Floud	Report	justified	preventive	detention	in	those	individual	cases	
of	substantial	risk	on	the	justification	that	“we	are	justly	redistributing	a	burden	of	risk	that	we	cannot	
immediately	reduce”	(1982:	218).	This	anticipation	of	serious	risk	was	conceived	as	being	a	collective	
risk	which	“must	vary	inversely	with	the	size	of	the	population	at	risk	from	the	offender	concerned	
(1982:	219).	
	
While	the	Floud	report	rejected	both	a	justification	of	such	a	practice	on	utilitarian	grounds,	as	well	as	
an	 actuarial	 solution,	 the	 justification	 of	 selective	 incapacitation	 in	 the	 US	 resonated	 with	 this	
anticipatory	principle;	however,	it	was	justified	on	utilitarian	grounds.	In	the	US,	actuarial	prediction	
was	 legitimated	 on	 the	 promise	 of	 improvements	 in	 prediction	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 security	
(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	3-14;	Blumstein,	1983).88	The	bulk	of	the	debate	about	selective	incapacitation	
was	conducted	on	techno-scientific	grounds	focused	on	what	sorts	of	predictor	codes	should	be	used	
that	could	be	justified	on	principles	of	blameworthiness	and	economy	(Moore,	1986),	or	about	the	
efficacy	 and	 accuracy	 of	 its	 prediction	 instrument	 and	 about	 how	 to	 establish	 socially	 defensible	
technical	criteria	for	statistical	decision-making	about	the	classification	rules	used	to	predict	levels	of	
risk.89	
	
Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	actuarial	protocol	and	its	reception	
	
Penal	 accounts	 about	 selective	 incapacitation	 frequently	 link	 it	with	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	
(1982)	 report,	 conducted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Rand	 Corporation’s	 research	 about	 habitual	 offenders	
(Harcourt,	 2007:	 898-91;	O’Malley,	 1998:	 xx).	 Greenwood	 and	Abrahamse	 (1982)	 claimed	 that	 the	
actuarial	 instrument	 they	 developed	 could	 identify	 high-rate	 offenders	 and	 target	 them	 for	
incapacitation,	effectively	reducing	the	crime	rate	by	15%.	In	describing	their	method	for	developing	
an	actuarial	instrument,	they	present	an	ideal	protocol:	randomly	select	a	large	sample	of	offenders,	
gather	and	code	information	about	a	range	of	predictor	variables	(leave	out	“controversial”	variables	
such	as	race,	income,	or	mental	attitudes),	establish	a	sufficient	interval	of	time	(at	least	two	years)	
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that	can	be	used	to	estimate	an	 individual’s	rate	of	offending	(using	both	self-report	and	recorded	
arrests)	given	the	“opportunity	to	accumulate	a	significant	amount	of	street	crime”,	apply	multivariate	
statistical	procedures	to	estimate	the	relationships	between	possible	predictive	factors	and	offense	
rates,	and	test	the	final	predictor	model	against	an	independent	sample	of	offenders	for	validation	
purposes.	In	practice,	their	own	model	building	fell	short	of	this	(1982:	48-49).	Retrospective	data	was	
used	 to	 estimate	 individual	 offense	 rates	 and	predictors	 during	 a	 two-year	 period	preceding	 their	
current	arrest	and	incarceration;	and	seven	predictor	variables	were	selected	from	a	much	larger	field	
of	 12	 potential	 predictors	 based	 on	 unexplained	 decisions	 of	 the	 two	 researchers	 (premised	 on	
“possible”	 legal,	 theoretical,	 and	 prior	 research	 significance).	 The	microphysics	 of	 power	 remains	
oblique,	as	 the	decision-making	about	how	the	set	of	predictor	 items	were	 initially	prioritized	and	
ordered	is	not	clear.	
	
Because	the	sample	of	offenders	surveyed	did	not	demonstrate	criminal	career	specialization,90		a	sub-
set	of	781	offenders	across	three	criminal	justice	jurisdictions	(those	convicted	of	robbery	or	burglary	
in	California,	Michigan	and	Texas)	were	used	to	construct	their	prediction	instrument	(1982:	49).	Using	
an	 initial	 set	 of	 12	 predictors	 derived	 from	 self-report	 data	 (1982:	 95-118),	 	 they	 estimated	 the	
individual	rates	of	offending	based	on	a	classification	rule	that	divided	the	sample	into	low-	and	high-
rate	groups,	cross-tabulating	the	larger	set	of	potential	predictors	against	two	risk	groups	to	select	the	
seven	best	predictors	to	be	used	in	the	actuarial	instrument.91	The	actuarial	instrument	provided	an	
algorithmic	code	that	prioritized:	prior	conviction	for	the	same	charge,92	incarcerated	for	more	than	
50%	of	2	years	preceding	the	most	recent	arrest,	convicted	before	age	16,93	served	time	in	a	juvenile	
facility,	 drug	 use	 in	 preceding	 2	 years,	 drug	 use	 as	 a	 juvenile,	 and	 employed	 less	 than	 50%	 of	
proceeding	two	years	(1982:	xv-xvi;	47-69).	Each	of	these	variables	was	then	scored	either	0	or	1	to	
form	an	additive	scale	that	results	in	a	prediction	score	between	0	and	7	for	an	individual.	In	a	second	
round	 of	 data	 analysis,	 offenders	 were	 then	 classified	 into	 low-risk	 (scoring	 0	 or	 1),	 medium-risk	
(scoring	2	or	3),	or	high-risk	 (scoring	4	or	more).	The	researchers	 tested	their	actuarial	 instrument	
experimenting	 with	 its	 efficacy	 premised	 on	 these	 two	 different	 classification	 rules	 (that	 is,	 a	
comparison	of	the	predictive	accuracy	based	on	classifying	the	construction	sample	divided	into	two-	
and	three-risk	categories).94	
	
In	 order	 to	 sway	 senior	 justice	 administrators	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 sentencing	 policy	 of	 selective	
incapacitation,	 Greenwood	 and	 Abrahamse	 (1982:	 72-78)	 were	 obliged	 to	 construct	 an	 actuarial	
definition	of	sentencing	that	can	be	articulated	outside	of	“the	specific	 language	of	the	sentencing	
statutes”	but	that	nonetheless	can	be	interpolated	into	sentencing	policy	and	decision-making	(1982:	
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72).	In	mathematical	discourse,	in	order	to	selectively	incapacitate	high-rate	offenders,	“the	primary	
figures”	 of	 any	 particular	 futures	 probability	 model	 that	 estimates	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 selective	
incapacitation	 is	 dependent	 upon	 estimates	 of	 the	 probability	 of	 conviction	 given	 arrest,	 the	
probability	of	incarceration	given	conviction,	and	the	average	time	served	by	those	incarcerated	(ibid).		
If	this	system	of	criminal	justice	system	modelling	is	accepted,	it	introduces	a	monitoring	system	for	
governance	founded	upon	an	 idealized	actuarial	 future	of	rational	accountability	–	a	benchmarked	
futures	estimate	of	effective	functioning	-	that	could	be	used	not	only	to	modulate	decision-making	in	
sentencing,	 but	 that	 could	 also	 be	 used	 to	 perfect	 the	 implementation	 of	 such	 a	 policy	 at	 critical	
thresholds.			
	
Greenwood	 and	 Abrahamse	 (1982:	 74-78)	 modified	 Shinnar	 and	 Shinnar’s	 (1975)	 probability	
estimates	of	criminal	 justice	system	parameter	estimates	to	 incorporate	their	own	classification	of	
offenders	 into	 three	 risk	categories.95	They	comment:	“each	curve	 represents	a	specific	policy	and	
shows	the	expected	robbery	rate	(in	California)	that	will	result	for	a	range	of	incarceration	levels.	Both	
crime	 rates	 and	 incarcerated	 population	 levels	 are	 expressed	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 their	 current	
estimated	value.	For	each	curve,	the	incarceration	level	increases	and	the	crime	rate	decreases	as	the	
variable	 sentencing	 parameter	 increases”	 (1982:	 78-79).	 They	 concluded	 that	 “all	 of	 the	 selective	
policies…do	considerably	better	 than	a	general	 incapacitation	approach”	and	that	“it	 is	possible	 to	
achieve	a	20%	reduction	in	crime	with	only	a	10%	increase	in	incarceration”,	or	even	better,	achieve	
the	 same	 result	 without	 increasing	 the	 prison	 population	 if	 the	 “sentence	 lengths	 for	 high-rate	
offenders	increased	by…a	factor	of	2”.96		
	
Here	we	can	see	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	innovation	in	advancing	a	protocol	for	“how	selective	
incapacitation	 policies	 might	 be	 designed	 and	 tested	 in	 the	 future”	 that	 appears	 to	 meet	 the	
protocollary	rules	for	criminal	career	research	established	by	the	panel	chaired	by	Blumstein	in	1978.		
An	 actuarial	 system	 of	 data	 capture	would	 need	 to	 be	 established	 that	 estimates	 and	 distributes	
individual	rates	of	offending	amongst	the	offender	population	that	correlates	criminal	history	with	
“other	behavioural	characteristics”	(that	is	reliant	upon	open-ended,	data-integration	infrastructures)	
to	 distinguish	 between	 high-rate	 and	 low-rate	 offenders,	 and,	 the	 sentencing	 rules	 need	 to	 be	
modified	 to	provide	 longer	 terms	 to	 the	predicted	high-rate	offenders	and	shorter	 terms	 to	 those	
predicted	as	being	low-rate	offenders	(1982:	85,	88).	To	demonstrate	the	effectiveness	of	sentencing,	
it	would	also	be	necessary	 to	“estimate	 the	current	sentencing	patterns	 for	each	different	 type	of	
offender	in	order	to	estimate	the	total	number	of	offenders	and	to	provide	a	base	case	for	comparing	
alternative	policies”	(1982:	86).		
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This	protocol	which	supported	a	policy	of	selective	incapacitation,	would	sit	alongside	retributive	and	
deterrent	objectives	in	sentencing	as	they	operated	in	the	US	in	the	1980s.	By	combining	this	pattern	
of	minimum	sentences	and	the	expected	crime	rate,	it	would	become	possible	to	generate	a	futures	
probability	model	that	can	estimate	the	incarcerated	population	that	would	be	generated,	effectively	
forecasting	 prison	 capacity	 and	 crime	 reduction	 effects	 based	 on	 alterations	 in	 sentencing	 policy	
(1982:	87).	In	this	model,	it	is	“the	difference	between	the	population	to	be	generated	by	the	minimum	
terms	and	the	predicted	capacity	(of	the	incarcerated	population)”	that	becomes	the	networked	penal	
field	 in	 which	 selective	 incapacitation	 would	 operate	 as	 it	 targeted	 the	 high-rate	 offender	 while	
generating	cost	savings	for	deployment	elsewhere	in	the	system	to	reduce	crime	rates.97	
	
Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	 report	was	published	 in	August	1982,	 five	months	after	Greenwood	
presented	the	research	findings	to	a	national	conference	 in	Sacramento,	California	 (see	Blackmore	
and	Welsh,	 1983:	 504-505;	 Zimring	 and	 Hawkins,	 1995:	 32-38).98	 At	 the	 conference,	 Greenwood	
claimed	that	their	actuarial	instrument	could	reliably	identify	the	high-rate	offender	and	successfully	
reduce	the	crime	rate	by	15%,	by	doubling	the	sentence	length	of	those	offenders,	while	cutting	it	in	
half	for	the	low-rate	group,	this	reducing	the	prison	population	by	5%.	In	the	next	year,	Greenwood	
and	Abrahamse’s	selective	incapacitation	scheme	was	the	subject	of	considerable	attention	both	in	
the	media,	at	professional	conferences,	at	crime	commissions,	state	legislatures,	as	well	as	a	source	
of	scholarly	research	and	policy	critique,	including	a	number	of	research	projects	that	re-analysed	the	
Rand	 data	 to	 re-evaluate	 its	 truth	 claims.	 Within	 the	 next	 few	 years	 virtually	 every	 element	 of	
Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	method,	findings,	and	proposal	was	subjected	to	close	scrutiny	(Cohen:	
1983,	1984;	Spelman:	1984;	von	Hirsch	and	Gottfredson,1984).	These	reviews	all	considered	that	the	
method	 for	 estimating	 selective	 incapacitation	 effects	 was	 invalid	 and	 that	 Greenwood	 and	
Abrahamse	had	over-estimated	 the	effects	of	 selective	 incapacitation.99	 In	Blackmore	and	Welsh’s	
appraisal,	 it	 was	 not	 the	 idea	 of	 selective	 incapacitation	 that	was	 really	 in	 question,	 but	 rather	 a	
dispute	about	whether	 the	 findings	were	 sound,	of	whether	Greenwood’s	method	could	 “actually	
accomplish	its	aims,	and	whether	selective	incapacitation	can	be	fairly	and	lawfully	and	implemented”	
(1983:	506).	 The	will-to-incapacitate	by	predicting	and	controlling	 future	 risk	 remained	 intact,	 and	
perhaps	 was	 fortified	 by	 Greenwood	 and	 Abrahamse’s	 efforts,	 even	 though	 their	 method	 was	
contested.	
	
The	technique	of	selective	incapacitation	emerged	along	a	fledgling	criminal	career	protocol	that	was	
advanced	 in	 the	 late	 1970s;	 this	 protocol	 is	 committed	 to	 advancing	 and	 validating	 actuarial	
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prediction,	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 uncertainty.	 The	 moment	 of	 arrival	 of	 the	 promise	 of	 selective	
incapacitation	 was	 a	 fragile	 moment,	 that	 was	 promptly	 responded	 to	 in	 1983	 as	 the	 federal	
Committee	on	Research	on	 Law	Enforcement	and	 the	Administration	of	 Justice	 commissioned	 the	
Panel	on	Research	on	Criminal	Careers	to		“evaluate	the	effects	of	prediction	instruments	in	reducing	
crime	through	incapacitation”,	and	to	review	the	contribution	of	research	on	criminal	careers	to	the	
development	of	fundamental	knowledge	about	crime	and	criminals”	(Blumstein	et	al,	1986:	x).	As	I	
shall	demonstrate,	the	panel	used	protocollary	power	to	ensure	that	the	procedures	established	by	
Blumstein	et	 al.	 (1978)	 could	be	 realised,	by	articulating	and	policing	 the	 standards	 governing	 the	
development	of	actuarial	codes	for	predicting	and	classifying	risk	within	the	offender	population.	The	
objective	was	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 criminal	 career	 protocol	 and	 its	 ontological	 and	 epistemic	 codes	
would	continue,	premised	on	the	promise	that	research	would	 improve	the	probability	models	 for	
anticipating	 recidivism	 and	 inventing	 new	 techniques	 for	 managing	 and	 incapacitating	 high-risk	
offenders.	
	
Protocol	always	“operates	at	the	level	of	desire,	at	the	level	of	‘what	we	want’”	(Galloway,	2004:	241,	
cited	in	Helmond	(2006:	3).	We	can	begin	to	see	the	ways	in	which	a	protocol	for	actuarial	justice	was	
established	in	this	period	that	was	paradoxically	inclusive	and	open,	in	that	it	attempted	to	establish	
a	distributed	network	that	was	horizontal	in	character,	and	at	the	same	time	that	was	highly	regulated	
along	the	verticality	of	the	standardization	of	protocols	that	establishes	“a	process	of	agreement”	that	
allows	particular	nodes	of	government	within	the	actuarial	milieu	to	connect	and	participate	in	this	
network,	“which	automatically	means	abiding	by	the	protocol”	(Helmond,	2006:	4).	By	participating	
in	the	protocol,	existing	actuarial	codes	could	be	implemented	and	advanced	in	a	series	of	incremental	
and	standardized	steps	using	increasingly	complex	micro-techniques	taken	from	software	programs	
designed	to	conduct	complex	regression	analyses	of	multi-factorial	risk	intelligence	data.	This	quest	
for	 improvement	 is	 premised	 upon	 an	 experimental	 spirit	 for	 quasi-machine	 learning	 based	 upon	
obfuscating	and	opaque	decision-making	by	criminal	career	researchers	that	continued	to	cluster	and	
partition	the	offender	population,	premised	upon	marking	out	relationships	between	entities,	that	are	
prioritized	 and	 reprioritized,	 searching	 for	 statistical	 associations	 in	 order	 to	 compile	 a	 relevant	
“composite	 profile”	 of	 the	 chronic	 or	 high	 rate	 offender,	 that	 could	 improve	 networked	 decision-
making.		
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3.3	 Protocolloray	power	in	action	
	
The	Panel	on	Research	on	Criminal	Careers	regarded	its	work	as	a	“follow-up”	to	the	earlier	work	of	
the	Panel	on	Research	on	Deterrent	and	Incapacitative	Effects	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978).100	Because	re-
analyses	of	the	Rand	data	had	questioned	the	validity	and	accuracy	of	its	probability	estimates	about	
selective	 incapacitation,	 the	 Panel	 commissioned	 a	 re-analysis	 of	 the	 original	 survey	 data	 and	 re-
computation	of	the	incapacitative	effects	estimated	by	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	(Visher,	1986).101	
The	Rand	actuarial	instrument	was	criticized	for	using	retrospective	data	on	past	offending	to	validate	
its	modelling	 parameters,	 thus	 failing	 to	 test	 its	 predictive	 capacity	 using	 an	 effective	measure	 of	
predictive	accuracy	–	to	do	this	a	prospective	research	design	would	be	necessary	to	track	offenders	
after	release	from	prison.	Its	retrospective	accuracy	was	found	to	be	no	better	than	other	actuarial	
instruments	 in	use	at	the	time	(Cohen,	1983;	Visher,	1986).	Of	the	predicted	high-rate	group,	55%	
were	false-positives	as	they	did	not	commit	crime	at	high-rates,	while	50-60%	of	these	errors	did	not	
result	in	new	offences	when	the	Panel	tracked	them	prospectively.		
	
The	Panel	felt	that	the	predictive	accuracy	would	be	further	reduced	if	 it	were	to	be	used	in	other	
state	 justice	 jurisdictions.102	 It	was	 suspicious	 that	 its	 reliance	upon	estimates	of	 the	 frequency	of	
offending	rather	than	an	estimate	that	incorporates	probabilities	linked	to	the	length	of	career,	would	
further	diminish	its	predictive	capacity	as	their	estimate	did	not	consider	the	termination	of	careers.	
The	instrument’s	inclusion	of	juvenile	record,	drug	use,	and	recent	employment	were	challenged	on	
ethical	 grounds	 as	 the	 Panel	 considered	 them	 to	 be	 “controversial”,	 ultimately	 introducing	 a	
blameworthiness	into	the	scale.	These	concerns	were	articulated	with	a	degree	of	obfuscation,	when	
considered	in	relation	to	the	general	rules	of	protocol	delineated	in	other	parts	of	its	report.	Officially,	
the	Panel	said	that	it	preferred	to	rely	upon	static	factors	drawn	from	an	adult’s	prior	criminal	record	
and	 to	 minimise	 the	 number	 of	 predictors	 used	 in	 actuarial	 instruments	 to	 improve	 predictive	
accuracy.	Officially,	it	was	reticent	to	include	recorded	offences	from	the	juvenile	court,	however	it	
endorsed	actuarial	instruments	that	included	the	history	of	juvenile	offending.103	It	also	questioned	
the	classification	rules	of	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	instrument	and	its	cut	off	scoring	system	for	
classifying	high-rate	offenders	at	4	points	as	Visher’s	re-analysis	of	the	data	demonstrated	that	this	
baseline	rule	for	classifying	the	high-rate	offenders	from	other	offenders	was	too	low,	contributing	to	
a	high	rate	of	false-positives	(1986a:	171-	73).	Finally,	it	criticized	the	reliance	upon	self-report	data,	
recommending	that	 if	 this	kind	of	 instrument	were	to	be	used	 in	sentencing,	 it	would	need	to	use	
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official	criminal	records,	and	that	in	its	current	format	“those	relating	to	juvenile	record,	drug	use,	and	
employment,	this	requirement	may	be	more	than	record	systems	can	routinely	deliver”	(ibid).104		
	
It	wasn’t	just	that	the	Rand	protocol	had	not	complied	to	protocollary	standards	for	demonstrating	
portability	across	jurisdictions,	its	software	development	was	too	reliant	upon	self-report	data,	that	
hindered	 its	marketability	 in	 the	new	actuarial	environment.	The	Panel	 imposed	protocollary	 rules	
that	 obligated	 the	 developers	 of	 actuarial	 instruments	 to	 deploy	 the	 probability	 estimates	 of	 the	
individual	rate	of	crime	based	on	estimates	of	recidivism	as	the	criterion	variable	rather	than	offending	
frequency	as	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	had	used	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	171).	At	the	ontological	
level,	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	had	not	sufficiently	linked	their	estimates	of	the	individual	crime	
rate	to	the	criminal	career	dimensions	delineated	in	the	protocol	of	the	first	panel	recommended	by	
Cohen	(1978:	228-31).	
	
The	panel	reviewed	a	number	of	pilot	projects	that	had	developed	prediction	instruments	for	use	in	
parole,	and	career	criminal	prosecution	units	in	addition	to	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse’s	instrument	
(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	152-207;	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson,	1986).	In	general	terms,	the	panel	
reported	that	these	instruments	demonstrated	greater	predictive	accuracy	than	the	Rand	instrument,	
this	being	attributed	to	factors	such	as	methodical	decisions	that	incorporated	longer	time	intervals	
for	tracking	recidivism	and	the	inclusion	of	broader	criterion	variables	about	recidivism	(arrests	rather	
than	recommitment	to	prison,	and	the	use	of	cross-sectional	longitudinal	design	within	a	particular	
justice	 jurisdiction	 (the	 construction	 sample),	 and	 validation	 prospectively	 using	 another	 cross-
sectional	time	interval	(the	validation	sample)	that	used	a	validity	measure	that	measured	the	relative	
improvement	 in	predictive	accuracy	of	the	 instrument	over	chance,	 thus	demonstrating	portability	
across	jurisdictions	(1986a:	181,	188).	
	
3.4	 Constitutive	elements	of	the	criminal	career	actuarial	protocol	
	
What	were	the	core	elements	of	the	criminal	career	protocol	that	were	endorsed	by	the	panel	in	1986,	
and	 that	were	used	 to	modulate	 the	actions	of	others?	As	 is	evident	 in	 the	mapping	below,	 these	
elements	are	mutually	conditioning,	irreducible	to	any	particular	regime	of	practice;	rationalities	and	
techniques	of	actuarial	justice	condition	and	re-configure	the	networks	of	security	over	time.	
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How	to	develop	predictive	codes	and	an	instrument	to	predict	the	risks	of	recidivism	
	
Protocollary	 power	 is	 strategical	 in	 the	 face	 of	 scientific	 uncertainty,	 using	 the	 two	 broad	 tactics	
described	below,	designed	to	regulate	the	ongoing	development	of	actuarial	prediction	instruments.	
	
Firstly,	 establish	a	 consensus	about	how	 to	develop	actuarial	 instruments	 that	 includes	a	 standard	
protocol	 for	 developing	 the	 instrument	 that	 validates	 it	 for	 portability,	 and	 that	 concentrates	 on	
criminal	history;	however,	develop	research	practices	in	a	way	that	opens	it	up	to	the	possibilities	of	
developing	actuarial	codes	that	project	and	operationalise	criminal	career	concepts	into	the	prediction	
of	recidivism.	
	
The	panel	prescribed	the	minimum	conditions	for	inclusion	of	predictor	codes	for	developing	actuarial	
instruments	 founded	upon	a	 criminal	 career	ontological	prototype	at	 that	moment	 in	 time.	 These	
were:	seriousness	of	the	current	charge,	prior	adult	criminal	history,	and	drug	use	(Blumstein	et	al.,	
1986a:	 166).	 These	predictors	were	 endorsed	on	 the	basis	 of	 empirical	 evidence,	 including	 claims	
about	the	predictive	power	of	existing	actuarial	instruments	used	in	criminal	justice	decision-making;	
a	consensus	within	the	criminal	justice	milieu	that	these	codes	were	acceptable	in	the	light	of	existing	
practices	and	political	agendas;	and,	a	reluctance	to	endorse	other	potential	predictors	in	the	light	of	
prevailing	ethical,	competing	penal	rationales,	or	social	concerns	that	at	that	moment	in	time,	which	
were	used	to	support	concerns	about	sentencing	offenders	on	the	basis	of	a	prediction	about	future	
crimes	(1986a:	163,	165-67).	The	panel’s	review	of	the	risks	linked	to	estimates	of	the	individual	rate	
of	offending	revealed	fifteen	other	competing	predictor	items	that	could	be	have	been	included	in	the	
development	of	actuarial	instruments	at	that	time	(1986a:	35-54).105	The	prevailing	political	climate	
ruled	out	race,	sex,	employment,	and	the	 inclusion	of	a	 juvenile	offender’s	criminal	record	(1986a:	
166-67).	
	
This	 rule	 for	 inclusion	was	 subject	 to	 further	 qualification,	 which	 reveals	 it	 as	 being	 open-ended,	
subject	to	collateral	rules	for	development	and	verification	of	new	items	before	including	them	in	new	
instruments.	 Six	 rules	 can	 be	 discerned	 for	 selecting	 new	 risk	 items	 for	 inclusion	 in	 actuarial	
instruments	 and	 developing	 prediction	 instruments	 over	 time,	 five	 of	 which	 are	 techno-scientific	
(1986a:	163-78):	
	
First,	 any	 potential	 new	 items	 need	 to	 have	 strong	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 relations	 with	 the	
biopolitical	 objective	 to	 reduce	 crime	 by	 incapacitation.	More	 specifically,	 there	 should	 be	 strong	
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correlations	with	estimates	of	the	individual	rate	of	offending	as	it	is	distributed	within	the	population	
of	offenders.	This	obligates	the	developer	to	demonstrate	the	link	between	the	risk	factor/predictor	
item	and	estimates	of	recidivism,	ideally	as	it	is	distributed	within	the	population	of	offenders.	
	
Second,	the	selection	of	predictor	codes	will	be	limited	by	the	prevailing	ethico-political	environment;	
these	considerations	need	to	be	weighed	in	relation	to	utilitarian	concerns	with	public	safety;	with	
reluctance,	protocol	concedes	that	“the	choices	of	admissible	predictor	variables	(will)	be	different	
across	 jurisdictions	 using	 prediction-based	 classification	 rules”	 as	 a	 result	 of	 concerns	 about	
blameworthiness	and	equity	(1986a:	167).	
	
Third,	broad	criterion	that	estimate	recidivism	need	to	be	used	if	incapacitation	is	to	achieve	maximal	
effects	in	terms	of	public	safety.	This	requires	measures	of	criteria	such	as	arrest	rather	than	just	re-
incarceration,	captured	over	lengthy	periods	of	time	(the	longer	the	better,	as	you	can	never	be	sure	
if	an	offender	has	desisted	from	crime).		This	criterion	measure	of	recidivism	is	best	calculated	on	the	
basis	of	a	continuous	measure	rather	than	a	dichotomous	measure	(1986a:	167).	Rather	than	using	a	
dichotomous	measure	of	reconviction,	parole	revocation,	or	even	arrest	(yes	=	1,	no=	0),	the	measure	
should	 use	 “continuous	 criterion	 variables	 that	 more	 reliably	 capture	 criminal	 activity	 over	 time”	
(1986a:	168).	The	time	elapsed	between	release	from	prison	and	the	next	re-offence	is	an	imprecise	
(but	better)	measure	of	the	“failure-rate”	of	an	active	offender,	which	can	be	used	to	distinguish	and	
partition	 the	 high-rate	 offender	 from	 those	 who	 may	 have	 desisted	 from	 a	 life	 of	 crime.	 If	 the	
developer	 cannot	distinguish	 those	offenders	who	desist	 from	crime,	 then	 the	probability	model’s	
actuarial	codes,	will	underestimate	the	rate	of	offending	amongst	the	sub-group	of	active	offenders.	
This	 requires	 that	 the	developer	 incorporates	an	ontological	 stance	 that	understands	 the	offender	
population	as	being	heterogeneous,	which	 in	 turn	 requires	 that	 the	construction	of	 the	prediction	
model	 tracks	a	cohort	of	offenders	over	a	 longer	 interval	of	 time	 to	more	accurately	measure	 the	
failure	 rate.	 This	 poses	 a	 challenge	 to	 any	 boundaries	 that	 limit	 estimates	 to	 histories	 of	 adult	
offending,	as	juvenile	histories	provide	greater	insights	into	the	chronicity	of	recidivism.	
	
Fourth,	the	developer	needs	to	select	and	weight	the	risk	predictor	items	to	finalise	the	prediction	
instrument,	which	 in	 turn	 involves	a	series	of	steps	 (1986a:	168).	Some	of	 these	predictors	will	be	
rejected	on	 the	basis	of	empirical	evidence;	others	will	be	eliminated	using	 “exploratory	 statistical	
analyses	that	reveal	them	to	have	little	predictive	power”	using	the	construction	sample	of	offenders	
that	provides	the	empirical	basis	for	the	instrument	(1986a:	169).	Next,	each	predictor	is	assigned	a	
weight	that	is	used	to	score	the	item	in	the	prediction	instrument.	Two	competing	scoring	systems	
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could	be	used:	either	use	the	Burgess	method	established	in	1928,	that	scored	each	predictor	item	
using	 a	 linear,	 additive	way	where	 all	 predictor	 codes	 are	 scored	 dichotomously	 (eg,	 present	 =	 1,	
absent	 =0),	 that	 places	 equal	 weight	 on	 each	 predictor	 item	 that	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 to	
discriminate	 high-risk	 from	 low-risk	 offenders	 in	 the	 construction	 sample;	 or,	 use	 least-square	
methods	 that	 weights	 predictor	 items	 using	multivariate	 statistical	methods	 to	 score	 the	 relative	
power	 of	 each	 item’s	 contribution	 to	 estimating	 the	 probability	 of	 re-offending	 (ironically,	 the	
improvements	in	predictive	power	are	minimal)	(ibid).				
	
Fifth,	after	the	prediction	scale	has	been	developed,	it	can	be	used	to	“compute	a	(risk)	score	for	every	
offender”	 (1986a:	 171);	 however,	 the	 instrument	 needs	 to	 establish	 a	 cut-off	 point	 that	 can	
differentiate	the	high-risk	from	the	low-risk	offender,	that	subsequently	determines	incapacitation	for	
the	high-risk	offender,	or	“less	 intensive	treatment”	 for	the	 low-risk	offender.	This	necessitates	the	
establishment	 of	 a	 classification	 rule	 to	 make	 this	 risk	 classification.	 To	 determine	 this	 rule,	 the	
developer	needs	to	demonstrate	that	the	cut-off	score	has	predictive	accuracy,	and	a	“relative	concern	
for	the	different	kinds	(of	predictive)	errors”	at	that	cut-off	point	compared	to	other	classification	rules	
that	 might	 distinguish	 risk	 categories	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 higher	 or	 lower	 scores	 (1986a:	 172).	 If,	 for	
example,	an	instrument	decided	that	anyone	who	scored	4	or	above	should	be	classified	as	a	high-
rate	offender,	what	is	the	error	rate	of	false-positives	(those	offenders	classified	as	high-rate	offenders	
but	who	doesn’t	commit	any	further	crimes),	relative	to	those	offenders	in	the	construction	sample	
who	are	classified	as	a	low-risk	offender	but	are	later	found	to	be	chronic	recidivists	(false-negative	
errors)?	 Measures	 of	 predictive	 accuracy,	 attempt	 to	 establish	 a	 classification	 rule	 in	 favour	 of	
classification	 decisions	 that	 improve	 the	 odds	 that	 fewer	 false-negative	 errors	 occur,	 as	 this	 error	
directly	impacts	on	community	safety	(1986a:	171).	These	tests	of	predictive	accuracy,	are	a	utilitarian	
measure	of	the	social	costs	of	failing	to	incapacitate	enough	recidivists.	As	a	general	rule,	the	lower	
the	cut-off	point,	the	better	the	instrument	is	in	identifying	more	high-rate	offenders;	however,	this	
achieved	by	making	a	larger	number	of	errors	that	incapacitate	offenders	who	are	really	at	low-risk	of	
committing	further	crimes	in	the	future	(see	1986a:	171-74).		
	
Finally,	 the	 instrument’s	 predictive	 accuracy	 needs	 to	 be	 validated,	 by	 demonstrating	 that	 it	 is	
consistent	in	predicting	the	same	ratio	of	relative	errors	on	another	sample	of	offenders	(1986a:	174-
78).	The	validation	sample	should	not	track	any	of	the	offenders	that	were	included	in	the	construction	
sample	to	validate	the	instrument	in	order	to	reduce	errors	associated	with	sampling	bias.	In	making	
comparisons	about	the	measures	of	predictive	accuracy	in	the	two	samples,	the	tracking	of	recidivism	
must	be	of	sufficient	duration	to	adequately	capture	sufficient	data	about	re-offending	(1986a:	174).	
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This	legitimates	the	instrument’s	truth-claim	about	its	predictive	accuracy,	which	is	articulated	as	a	
“relative	 improvement	over	 chance”	 that	demonstrates	 that	when	 the	 instrument	 is	used	 in	other	
jurisdictions,	it	consistently	demonstrates	a	certain	level	of	improvement	in	accuracy	given	its	current	
selection	ratio	 (the	utilitarian	decision	to	establish	a	cut-off	point	 in	 favour	of	errors	 that	optimise	
incapacitation	effects)	and	the	“‘base	rate’,	the	fraction	of	offenders	who	are	truly	high-risk	in	terms	
of	 the	 criterion	 variable”	 (1986a:	 172-73).	 The	 closer	 the	 classification	 rule	 is	 to	 the	base	 rate	 (an	
estimate	of	recidivism	in	the	different	offender	cohorts),	it	is	argued	that	fewer	errors	will	occur.	The	
validation	 of	 these	 instruments	 uses	 these	 validity	 techniques	 to	 make	 two	 oscillating	 (and	
obfuscating)	truth	claims	about	the	predictive	power	of	these	instruments:	the	instrument	is	accurate	
at	some	percentage	level	(eg	55%);	and,	it	improves	accuracy	over	chance	by	a	calculated	percentage	
(eg	40%).		
	
Using	 these	 rules,	 the	panel	 invested	 in	extensive	 research	 to	endorse	 three	“promising”	actuarial	
instruments	 that	 could	be	used	 in	 sentencing,	but	 that	had	been	developed	 in	parole	 (the	 federal	
Salient	Factor	Score	(Hoffman,	1983),	the	state-based	Iowa	Risk	Assessment	Instrument	(Chi,	1983),	
and,	the	Inslaw	Scale	(Rhodes	et	al.,	1982)	that	had	been	developed	to	be	used	in	federal	attorney’s	
offices	to	assign	cases	to	criminal	career	units	for	special	attention)	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	178-90;	
Gottfredson	 and	 Gottfredson,	 1986).	 Gottfredson	 and	 Gottfredson	 were	 contracted	 to	 “review	
research	 findings	 on	 existing	 prediction-based	 rules	 for	 structuring	 criminal	 justice	 decisions,	with	
special	attention	to	their	adequacy	in	terms	of	predictive	accuracy,	efficiency,	and	validity,	and	to	the	
relative	 contribution	 of	 individual	 predictor	 variables	 to	 adequacy”	 (1986:	 248).	 Moreover,	 in	
conducting	their	analysis	they	were	asked	to	consider	this	brief	along	the	new	guiding	telos	of	actuarial	
justice:	is	the	risk	classification	rule	that	targets	an	offender	for	incapacitation	effective	in	reducing	
recidivism?	In	obligating	the	analysis	of	the	available	research	in	this	way,	the	privileging	of	this	penal	
outcome,	the	stage	was	set	for	the	unfolding	of	evidence-based	penal	policy	and	practice.		
	
Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson’s	review	of	the	available	research	was	quite	exhaustive	(1986:	212-90).	
Their	conclusions	did	not	really	support	the	Panel’s	faith	in	the	predictive	power	of	these	instruments:	
at	best,	they	had	“low-to-moderate	predictive	accuracy”,	they	were	“not	very	efficient	(in	a	predictive	
sense)”,	and	they	were	“at	best	modestly	valid”	(1986:	248).	In	spite	of	their	technocratic	rigor,	their	
own	conclusions	are	quite	imprecise	in	terms	of	the	predictive	power	of	the	endorsed	instruments.	
For	example,	of	all	of	the	instruments	evaluated,	the	panel	favoured	the	Salient	Factor	Score	(SFS)	as	
it	was	re-validated	a	number	of	times	using	the	measure	of	measure	of	relative	improvement	over	
chance	 (RIOC),	 where	 results	 demonstrated	 improvements	 in	 predictive	 accuracy	 of	 up	 to	 28%	
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(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	183).	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson	avoid	reporting	the	predictive	accuracy	
altogether,	preferring	to	say	that	“the	predictive	accuracy	of	the	scale	(is)…firmly	established”	(1986:	
262).	They	continue:	“the	device	was	constructed	in	a	very	simple	manner,	makes	use	of	few	items,	
and	has	rather	low	predictive	power”	(1986:	270).	In	the	panel’s	report,	the	SFS’s	predictive	accuracy	
is	 described	 as	 being	 “at	 the	 high	 end	 of	 the	 accuracy	 range	 reported	 in	 other	 parole	 recidivism	
studies”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	182).	
	
Figure	 6	presents	 the	 SFS	 in	 the	 format	 that	 it	 was	 being	 used	 in	 1983.	 The	 instrument	 used	 six	
predictor	variables:	prior	convictions	(adult	and	juvenile),	prior	commitments	to	custody	(adult	and	
juvenile),	 age	 at	 current	 offense/prior	 commitments,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 offender	 had	 been	
committed	into	custody	(adult	or	juvenile)	in	the	last	three	years,	whether	or	not	the	current	offence	
was	committed	on	probation,	parole,	confinement,	escape	from	prison,	whether	or	not	there	was	a	
history	of	heroin/opiate	dependence.		The	panel	endorsed	this	instrument	in	spite	of	concerns	about	
including	juvenile	offending	history.	It	was	endorsed	as	it	met	many	of	the	protocollary	standards	for	
developing	and	validating	a	prediction	instrument,	tracking	re-incarceration	for	at	least	three	years	
into	the	future	(Hoffman,	1983;	Hoffman	and	Beck,	1976,	1980;	Hoffman	et	al.,	1978).	When	other	
research	 (Janus,	 1985)	 used	 broader	 criterion	 to	measure	 recidivism	 (eg	 re-arrest	 rather	 than	 re-
incarceration),	as	well	as	establishing	a	higher	base-rate	estimate	of	recidivism	(44%	rather	than	the	
instrument’s	baseline	of	30%),	the	SFS	appeared	to	have	even	better	predictive	power	(Blumstein	et	
al.,	 1986a:	 183).	 Janus’s	 analysis	 was	 commended	 as	 it	 “appears	 to	 discriminate	most	 effectively	
between	persisters	 and	 those	who	have	 terminated	 their	 criminal	 career”;	 it	 showed	 “promise”	 in	
pursuing	future	research	about	whether	or	not	there	are	differences	in	the	“frequency	rates	of	active	
offenders”,	and	quest	to	“find	adequate	predictors”	of	differences	between	active	offenders	(ibid).		
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Figure	6.	Salient	Factor	Score,	1983	
	
In	developing	 their	 criminal	history	 scoring	system	for	predicting	 levels	of	 risk	of	 re-offending,	 the	
Sentencing	Commission	was	clearly	influenced	by	the	panel’s	endorsement	of	the	SFS,106	as	its	grid	
used	5	actuarial	codes	connected	to	criminal	history,107	four	of	these	being	derived	from	the	SFS	(see	
Wilkins	et	al,	1987a:	Chapter	4,	page	4.1;	1987b:	43).	The	fifth	item,	time	to	re-arrest	within	2	years	
of	the	current	offence,	was	derived	from	the	Inslaw	scale	(Rhodes	et	al.,	1982),	also	endorsed	by	the	
panel.	 Both	 of	 these	 instruments	 were	 constructed	 on	 samples	 using	 federal	 offenders.	 The	
Commission	asserted	that	“the	criminal	history	score	will	demonstrate	predictive	power	comparable	
to	 that	 of	 prediction	 instruments	 currently	 in	 use”,	 claiming	 that	 its	 instrument	 and	 its	 predictive	
power	was	equivalent	to	the	SFS.	This	claim	was	validated	by	making	reference	to	the	protocollary	
standards	for	validation	and	portability	described	above	by	the	panel	as	demonstrated	by	15	years	of	
research	validating	the	SFS	(Wilkinson	et	al.,	1987b:	43;	see	Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	182).108	
	
The	Inslaw	Scale	was	developed	by	a	computer	software	company,	who	had	been	contracted	by	the	
Department	of	Justice	in	1982	to	pilot	an	automated	software	program	called	PROMIS.109	This	was	a	
case-management	software	program	for	federal	prosecutors,	that	had	the	capacity	combine	disparate	
databases	to	track	people’s	involvement	with	the	legal	system	(Fricker,	1993).	PROMIS	used	570,000	
lines	of	computer	code,	that	could	integrate	data	from	diverse	databases	without	any	reprogramming,	
“turning	 blind	 data	 into	 information”	 (ibid).110	 This	meant	 that	 the	 program	 could	 identify	 federal	
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cases,	 who	 was	 representing	 the	 defendant,	 whether	 that	 lawyer	 had	 represented	 white-collar	
criminals,	at	which	stage	in	each	of	the	cases	the	lawyers	agreed	to	a	plea	bargain,	and	so	on.	The	
prosecutor	is	then	able	to	anticipate	whether	or	not	a	plea	bargain	is	likely	to	be	taken	in	particular	
types	of	cases.	The	scale	was	developed	within	this	context	to	circumvent	plea-bargaining	 in	cases	
where	the	defendant	was	predicted	to	be	a	“career	criminal”,	to	pursue	their	incapacitation.		
	
The	panel	endorsed	the	scale	as	it	had	“strong	empirical	underpinnings”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	186-
88)	that	advanced	the	criminal	career	actuarial	protocol.	It	used	a	large	construction	sample	of	1,708	
offenders	that	were	tracked	for	5	years	after	their	release	from	federal	custody.	This	sample	size	was	
a	little	over	twice	the	size	of	the	SFS,	improving	predictive	accuracy	by	“74%”	due	to	the	size	of	the	
construction	 sample,	 and	 lowering	 the	 rates	 of	 false-positives	 and	 false-negatives	 which	 was	
attributed	to	the	use	of	a	longer	follow-up	period	for	tracking	recidivism	(1986a:	188).	The	instrument	
was	commended	as	it	used	a	classification	rule	for	identifying	high-rate	offenders,	that	used	a	“high	
base	rate	and	low	selection	criteria…(that	resulted)	in	a	low	false-positive	rate	(15	percent)	but	a	high	
false-negative	rate	(36	percent)”	(ibid).	Improvement	in	predictive	power	were	also	attributed	to	the	
use	of	its	use	of	a	broad	criterion	–	time	to	re-arrest	–	as	the	measure	of	recidivism,	which	“may	yield	
a	more	sensitive	measure	of	releasees’	offending	behaviour”	(ibid).	
	
The	 scale	 is	 the	most	 advanced	actuarial	 instrument	of	 those	 reviewed	by	 the	panel	 for	 including	
predictors	connected	to	the	criminal	career	protocol.	The	“time	to	re-arrest”	within	the	last	5	years	
was	scored	on	a	scale	that	 incorporated	a	measure	of	age	at	the	time	of	current	offence	based	on	
transition	probabilities	–	the	younger	the	defendant	was	at	that	time	of	arrest	resulted	in	the	highest	
predictive	 score	 (age	 as	 an	 “aggravating	 factor”	 based	 on	 the	 laws	 of	 escalating	 transitional	
probabilities);	the	contribution	of	age	diminished	after	age	22	year,	reaching	a	threshold	at	ages	33-
37	where	it	had	no	predictive	power	(scored	as	0),	after	which	scoring	subtracted	points	as	the	older	
offender	was	considered	at	little	risk	of	re-offending	in	the	future	(age	as	a	mitigating	factor	based	on	
the	laws	of	diminishing	capacity)	(see	Figure	7).	The	scale	also	explicitly	scores	the	length	of	a	criminal	
career	where	the	greater	the	length,	the	higher	the	risk	of	re-offending.	Moreover,	other	measures	
about	crime	seriousness	that	estimate	risk	in	terms	of	the	type	of	offence	(crimes	of	violence,	crimes	
against	property,	sale	of	drugs)	are	correlated	with	the	other	predictors	of	elevated	risk	that	estimate	
the	individual’s	crime	rate	(λ),	to	distribute	the	sample	of	offenders	according	to	a	risk	classification	
for	each	type	of	offence.	This	meant	that	“sharp	differences	in	estimated	individual	offence	rates	were	
calculated.	Individuals	identified	by	the	scale	as	career	criminals	were	each	estimated	to	commit	an	
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average	of	38	crimes	per	year,	compared	with	estimates	of	only	4	nondrug	crimes	per	year	for	other	
offenders’	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1987a:	187).111	
	
	
Figure	7.	Inslaw	scale,	1982	
	
Secondly,	develop	predictors	of	the	unknown	dimensions	of	a	criminal	career,	that	are	connected	to	
the	 development	 of	 criminality	 along	 a	 trajectory	 of	 (pseudo-scientific	 and	 neo-conservative	
perspectives	 of)	 bio-social	 forces	 connected	 to	 a	 child’s	 ‘deviant’	 development	 –	 identify	 strong,	
reliable,	and	validated	predictors	of	recidivism	that	can	be	included	in	the	established	actuarial	codes	
about	criminal	history	as	they	are	reconfigured	over	time.	
	
In	spite	of	two	lengthy	chapters	in	the	Panel’s	first	volume	about	an	individual	offender’s	participation	
in	criminal	careers	 (Blumstein	et	al,	1986a:	31-54),	and	about	the	dimensions	of	an	active	criminal	
career	(1986a:	55-95),	the	reality	was	that	“the	basic	facts	of	criminal	careers	are	either	unknown	or	
unclear”	(Weis,	1986:	2).	Weiss	considered	that	in	order	to	establish	a	basic	knowledge	there	were	
two	primary	tasks	that	needed	to	be	undertaken:	establish	rigorous	research	protocols	for	measuring	
an	offender’s	involvement	with	crime	over	time,	and,	establish	the	best	correlates	of	those	criminal	
career	 parameters.	 The	 fundamental	 problem	was	 (and	 remains)	 probability	 estimates	 about	 the	
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nature	of	a	criminal	career	are	“only	indirect	indicators	of	actual	crime	committed”	(Blumstein	et	al,	
1986a:	107).	
	
Weis	(1986:	2-3)	considered	that	there	were	only	two	reliable	ways	of	measuring	the	dimensions	of	a	
criminal	career,	to	either	use	official	records	and/or	use	self-report	data.112	As	we	have	seen	this	issue	
was	 quite	 a	 battlefield,	 where	 Greenwood	 was	 insistent	 that	 self-report	 data	 was	 “essential”	
(Greenwood	et	al,	1979:	430-44,	cited	in	Weis,	1986:	3),	and	where	criminal	career		researchers	on	
the	Panel,	were	quite	suspicious	about	the	reliability	and	accuracy	of	these	measures	claiming	that	it	
compromised	the	integrity	of	estimates	of	offending	as	well	as	over-inflating	them	(Blumstein	et	al.,	
1986a:	96-98).	Weis	considered	that	official-record	data	were	“adequate”	for	estimates	of	“official	
prevalence	and	individual	offending	rates,	patterns,	and	duration”;	they	may	actually	be	more	useful	
as	they	are	 likely	to	be	more	accurate	time	markers	of	the	“official	onset	and	termination	and	the	
sequence	of	changes”	compared	to	distortions	that	might	arise	as	a	result	of	poor	memory	recall	or	
distortions	and	fabrications	 in	self-report	 (Weis,	1986:	3).	The	fundamental	problem	is	 that	official	
data	 is	 inadequate	 in	 measuring	 the	 correlates	 and	 determinants	 of	 criminal	 career	 parameters,	
“simply	because	many	of	the	important	pieces	of	information	on	the	social,	demographic,	economic,	
and	psychological	characteristics	of	offenders	are	not	routinely,	systematically	or	accurately	collected”	
(ibid).	 Self-report	 etiological	 data	 is	 necessary	 to	 advance	 the	 understanding	 of	 criminal	 careers,	
providing	 better	measures	 of	 prevalence	 and	 individual	 offending	 rates,	 but	 is	 weak	 for	 studying	
patterns	of	involvement	and	duration	(where	Weiss	admits	that	measuring	the	termination	of	a	career	
is	by	definition	impossible).	
	
The	Panel,	adopted	the	pragmatic	view	that	these	two	methods	of	measurement	–	self-report	and	
official	administrative	data	-	were	“complementary…and	mutually	beneficial”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	
101).	Protocollary	power	was	exercised	in	two	ways	to	invite	research	alliances	that	implanted	a	code	
of	research	design	and	reflexivity	that	evaluated	the	performance	of	selected	measures.	Along	one	
pole,	this	involved	establishing	a	code	of	conduct	where	the	two	methods	could	be	used	to	in	concert	
to	standardize	and	improve	the	“precision	of	measurement”	(1986a:	107)	by	installing	methods	for	
“maximizing	 the	 reciprocal	 validity	 and	 reliability	 and,	 hence,	 the	 prospect	 for	 even	 more	
convergence”	 between	 the	 sources	 of	 data	 (Weis,	 1986:	 36).	Methods	 needed	 to	 be	 installed	 for	
comparing	 the	 relative	 effectiveness	 of	 differing	 measures	 to	 improve	 the	 sources	 of	 error,	 and	
introduce	more	 rigorous	micro-techniques	 for	 establishing	 the	 “convergent	 validity”	 of	 estimates	
using	official	data	and	self-report	data.		The	self-report	data	could	be	used	to	probe	for	differences	
between	active	offenders	as	dictated	by	criminal	career	protocol,	as	official	records	are	less	useful	for	
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this	purpose,	presenting	a	picture	of	the	offender	as	being	homogenous	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	101).	
At	the	same	time,	if	there	were	discrepancies	in	the	significance	of	identified	predictors	or	etiological	
correlates	 of	 crime	 as	 identified	 by	 the	 different	 methods,	 these	 could	 be	 clarified	 by	 installing	
statistical	methods	to	control	for	confounding	factors	that	were	considered	as	having	the	capability	
of	 deciding	 if	 the	 two	 data	 sources	 are	 comparable	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 sample	 composition	 and	 the	
seriousness	or	sorts	of	crime	committed	in	the	differing	sample	populations	(ibid).113		
	
Installing	a	scientific	spirit	of	invention	
	
Protocollary	power	issues	the	dictum	that	it	is	necessary	for	the	criminal	career	research	community	
to	work	together	to	“develop	estimates	(of)	the	underlying,	but	unobserved	crime	process”	(Blumstein	
et	 al.,	 1986a:	 107).	 The	 will-to-truth	 creates	 a	 need	 for	 co-operation	 across	 disciplinary	 and	
methodological	boundaries.	This	obligates	researchers	to	participate	in	the	quest	to	develop	explicit	
actuarial	models	that	“link	the	unobserved	crime	process	with	the	observed	data”	using	criminal	career	
parametrics	(ibid).	Predictor	models	cannot	be	adequately	developed	without	some	necessary	data-
linkage	across	the	sorts	of	longitudinal	datasets	that	exist	in	the	official	records	about	crime	and	the	
birth	cohort	and	cross-sectional	longitudinal	datasets	that	retrospectively	and	prospectively	track	the	
evolution	of	a	criminal	career	focusing	on	criminal	behaviour	(Weis,	1986:	43). 	
	
The	panel	attempted	to	install	a	spirit	of	research	reflexivity	and	experimentation	into	the	criminal	
career	 research	 community.	 It	 invited	 criminal	 career	 researchers	 (and	 those	 criminal	 justice	
statisticians	who	were	transfigured	into	criminal	career	researchers	as	they	participated	within	the	
protocol)	to	re-route	data	that	was	accumulating	in	the	statistical	archive	and	join-up	different	kinds	
of	datasets	in	order	to	improve	the	overall	functioning	and	technical	efficacy	of	estimating	rates	of	
recidivism,	evaluating	system	performance,	and	advancing	criminal	career	knowledge.	In	particular,	
this	involved	establishing	a	code	of	research	conduct	that	would	enable	alliances	to	be	made	between	
researchers	who	were	conducting	different	kinds	of	research,	using	differing	methodologies	to	both	
retrospectively	 and	 prospectively	 track	 individuals	 longitudinally	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 a	 credible	
scientific	knowledge	about	what	constitutes	a	criminal	career,	how	to	estimate	it,	and	to	engage	in	an	
open-ended	 inquiry	 about	 what	 predictors	 really	 are	 the	 best	 and	 most	 technically	 efficient	 in	
targeting	the	high-rate	offender	at	the	earliest	point	in	time	to	arrest	a	criminal	career	in-the-making.	
	
Within	the	criminal	career	protocol,	this	is	a	double-movement	of	open-ended	experimentation	and	
research,	 and	 the	modulation	of	 actuarial	 code	development	within	 criminal	 career	 protocol.	 This	
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protocol	valorises	longitudinal	research	using	different	methods	of	data	capture	requiring	researchers	
to	standardize	their	measures	and	apply	meta-codes	so	that	data-linkage	is	capable	of	overcoming	the	
discrepancy	 between	 criminal	 behaviour	 and	 legal	 classification.	 Researchers	were	 encouraged	 to	
develop	new	multidimensional	probability	models	that	are	capable	of	assimilating	divergent	sources	
of	data	using	mapping	procedures	for	configuring	a	constellation	of	potential	predictors,	testing	out,	
and	refining	the	best	mix	of	predictors	(Weiss,	1986:	44).	Complex	statistical	procedures	are	used	that	
are	capable	exploring	and	mapping	the	mathematical	associations	between	potential	predictors	or	
correlates	 of	 the	 various	 developmental	 changes	 and	 the	 changes	 in	 a	 criminal	 career	 for	 a	
population/sample	of	 offenders,	 and	 then	establishing	procedures	 for	 confirming	or	disconfirming	
whether	the	multi-factorial	predictors	are	equal,	converging	or	shaping	together,	as	isomorphic	and	
mutually	 conditioning	 relations.	 If	 there	 is	 no	 isomorphism	 between	 the	 differing	 sources	 of	 risk	
intelligence	data,	then	the	decisions	that	were	made	about	what	to	include	in	new	probability	models	
are	arbitrary.	
	
This	attempt	to	establish	interoperability	uses	techniques	such	as	factor	analysis	and	cluster	analysis	
to	make	association	decisions	between	entities	that	demonstrate	“clusters	in	a	sort	of	association	en	
masse”	(P2P	Foundation,	n.d.:	6).	This	sort	of	entity	analysis,	enables	associations	to	be	prioritized,	
“leading	to	a	composite	decision	known	as	 relevance”	 (ibid).	 In	 this	way,	multifactorial	association	
algorithms	about	the	probability	of	re-offending,	are	used	to	establish	at	what	combination	of	values,	
an	effective	classification	rule	can	be	implemented	that	makes	recommendations	about	intervening	
as	 a	 function	of	 the	decisions	 and	 verification	procedures	 for	 feeding	 association	metrics	 into	 the	
prediction	 instrument	 founded	 on	 functional	 similarity.	 “When	 the	 similarity	 reaches	 a	 certain	
threshold	 value,	 the	 two	 things	 are	 said	 to	 have	 (an)	 association	 (that	 justifies	 classification	 as	 a	
chronic	offender)	(even	though)	association	decisions…can	also	suffer	the	same	kinds	of	false-positive	
and	false-negative	mistakes”	(ibid).	
	
The	rules	of	portability	across	jurisdictions	
	
The	panel	prescribed	the	rules	of	interoperability	for	transporting	any	particular	actuarial	instrument	
across	criminal	justice	jurisdictions,	as	well	as	for	its	deployment	at	different	stages	of	decision-making	
where	 it	 may	 be	 used	 for	 purposes	 other	 than	 the	 original	 objective	 for	 which	 it	 was	 designed	
(Blumstein	 et	 al.,	 1986a:	 196-197).	 The	 protocol	 regulates	 not	 only	 end-users	 within	 the	 criminal	
justice	system,	but	also	those	academics	allied	with	the	system	invested	in	criminal	career	research.	
This	established	the	conditions	of	possibility	 for	 the	standardization	and	marketization	of	actuarial	
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instruments	 and	 other	 risk	 intervention	 products	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 “good	 science”	 and	 its	
procedures	for	establishing	reliability,	validity,	and	adaptation	to	other	places	and	moments,	within	
not	 only	 the	 nation	 but	 also	 across	 the	 global	 market	 (as	 evidenced	 earlier	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
development	of	the	Inslaw	scale).	The	strategy	is	one	of	self-referential	re-enactment	–	redeploy	the	
micro-techniques	 of	 statistical	 validation	 used	 to	 verify	 the	 probability	 statements	 of	 particular	
prediction	models	in	the	new	security	milieu	in	order	to	increase	confidence	levels.	
	
Hypothetically,	if	a	potential	justice	administrator	was	considering	using	one	of	the	panel’s	endorsed	
instruments,	 portability	 requires	 that	 a	 team	 of	 correctional	 researchers	 or	 consultants	 test	 the	
instrument	within	 its	 new	milieu,	making	 the	necessary	 recalibrations	 of	 the	probability	model	 to	
demonstrate	its	validity	given	the	contingencies	of	that	jurisdiction.	In	this	way,	the	existing	actuarial	
codes	may	need	to	be	reconfigured	in	some	way	given	the	contingencies	of	the	offender	population	
that	is	being	tracked	over	time.	Transportability	requires	that	this	procedure	is	repeated	each	time	
the	instrument	is	introduced	into	a	new	jurisdiction,	and	each	time	it	is	introduced	into	a	particular	
site	of	criminal	justice	decision-making	within	that	jurisdiction.	The	aleatory	nature	of	the	offender	
population	and	demographic	and	other	changes	over	time,	necessitate	that	the	predictive	accuracy	
be	 re-validated	 at	 regular	 intervals,	 ideally	 every	 4	 or	 5	 years.	 Finally,	 if	 new	predictors	 are	 to	 be	
included	in	the	recalibration	process,	they	must	have	“theoretical	import	and	validity…bear	a	strong	
predictive	 relationship	 to	 a	 criminal	 career”,	 as	well	 as	 take	 into	 account	 other	 social	 and	 ethical	
concerns.	This	last	command-control,	is	open-ended	and	allows	criminal	career	research	to	continue	
to	 probe	 for	 new	 or	 better	 predictors,	 that	 can	 be	 re-worked	 into	 probability	 models	 under	
(apparently)	strict	codes	of	conduct	that	use	the	anticipatory	codes	of	criminal	career	research.	
	
Establish	techniques	for	reviewing	the	performance	of	criminal	justice	effectiveness	over	time	
	
In	addition	to	the	futures	modelling	and	monitoring	of	criminal	justice	effects	over	time	described	in	
the	previous	chapter,	the	panel	valorised	the	technique	of	meta-analysis	that	could	be	used	in	the	
developing	evidence-based	penal	environment	to	modulate	and	improve	criminal	career	research,	the	
development	of	 actuarial	 prediction,	 and	governmental	decision-making	about	 shifts	 in	policy	 and	
practice.	Given	the	rudimentary	nature	of	criminal	career	knowledge,	some	sort	of	meta-analysis	of	
the	methodological	characteristics	of	any	particular	individual	criminal	career	research	project	should	
be	routinely	aggregated	together	and	synthesized	as	data	that	could	then	apply	evaluative	meta-codes	
to	analyse	the	performance	of	the	research	measures	as	a	whole	(Weiss,	1986:	42-43).	The	objective	
of	a	meta-analysis	is	to	measure	the	‘effects’	of	research	methods	on	estimates	of	individual	offending	
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rates	and	other	criminal	career	parameters.	This	is	an	invitation	that	criminal	career	research	“should	
treat	the	improvement	of	measurement	as	a	research	and	development	enterprise”	that	is	moderated	
under	the	rules	of	statistical	evaluation	(Weiss,	1986:	42).114	
	
The	 control-command	 for	meta-analysis	 in	 criminal	 career	 research	 is	more	 broadly	 defined	 than	
Weis’s	 own	 circumscribed	 interest	 in	 the	 continuous	 improvement	 of	 potential	 predictor	
measurements.	 Meta-analyses	 of	 evaluative	 data	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 criminal	 justice	
interventions	in	reducing	recidivism	demonstrate	an	increasing	tendency	for	the	interpolation	of	small	
datasets	 into	 the	 combinatory	 logistics	 of	 exponentially	 growing	 datasets,	 regulated	 by	 protocol.	
Meta-analysis	can	be	regarded	as	a	technique	for	moderating	sceptical	scientific	reflexivity	about	the	
capacity	of	any	particular	criminal	justice	intervention	to	reduce	recidivism,	that	in	turn,	can	be	used	
to	adjudicate	whether	or	not	any	particular	penal	intervention	should	be	endorsed	for	transportation	
to	new	jurisdictions,	or	whether	it	should	be	relegated	to	an	archive	where	it	should	be	forgotten	(a	
programming	failure).	Meta-analyses	periodically	assemble	the	totality	of	evaluation	studies	that	have	
accumulated	 in	 time	 and	 space	 to	 more	 authoritatively	 evaluate	 whether	 particular	 kinds	 of	
intervention	have	demonstrated	significant	size-effects	in	reducing	recidivism,	under	strict	meta-rules	
for	evaluation	(Wells,	2009;	Lipsey	et	al.,	2010).	115	Ironically,	it	is	so	sceptical	that	even	a	meta-analysis	
can	be	critiqued	as	a	 result	of	 its	own	selection	criteria	 for	 the	meta-codes	used	to	re-analyse	 the	
sample	of	studies	and	their	evaluation	data.	This	scepticism	explains	the	later	appearance	of	the	meta-
analysis	of	a	sample	of	meta-analyses	in	an	attempt	to	standardise	criteria	of	evaluation	even	further	
(see	Lipsey	and	Cullen,	2007).	
	
As	briefly	discussed	earlier,	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson	(1986:	248)	were	asked	to	conduct	a	review	
of	 whether	 the	 implementation	 of	 actuarial	 instruments	 in	 the	 US	 at	 that	 time	were	 effective	 in	
reducing	recidivism.	In	considering	the	question	in	relation	to	the	panel’s	valorised	Salient	Factor	Score	
instrument,	they	state:	“We	know	of	no	study	that	has	sought	to	test	this	hypothesis”	(1986:	262).	At	
the	 beginning	 of	 their	 review,	 the	 researchers	 assert	 (in	 spite	 of	 this	 context)	 in	 a	 somewhat	
obfuscating	way:	 “when	properly	 implemented,	 apparently	 they	 can	be	 successful”	 (1986:	248).	 If	
protocol	 was	 followed,	 “it	 is	 plausible…that	 one	 could	 expect…a	 selective	 incapacitation	 effect”	
(Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson,	1986:	263).	
	
Gottfredson	and	Gottrfedson’s	comments	are	intelligible	in	the	light	of	efforts	spanning	back	to	the	
early	 1970s	 that	 piloted	 actuarial	 instruments	 in	 parole	 using	 guidelines	 as	 a	 tactic	 to	 modulate	
criminal	 justice	 decision-making.	 These	 guidelines	 attempted	 to	 foster	 participation,	 minimise	
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resistance,	and	lead	professional	conduct	towards	innovation	in	penal	regimes	of	practice.	The	earliest	
efforts	developed	guidelines	 for	decision-making	 that	utilized	 risk	correlates	 that	considered	 to	be	
reasonable	 predictors	 of	 undesirable	 criminal	 justice	 outcomes,	which	were	 then	 far	more	widely	
defined	than	just	recidivism.	In	the	1970s,	prescriptive	guidelines	were	considered	as	being	superior	
to	descriptive	guidelines	in	that	they	were	informed	by	the	“best	and	most	recent	methods	available”	
using	an	empirical	assessment	of	risk	rather	than	“unthoughtfully	conservative	criteria”	that	may	over-
rely	upon	past	practice (Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson,	 1986:	257-59).	 To	 the	extent	 that	 actuarial	
guidelines	shaped	decision-making,	this	accelerated	the	implementation	of	actuarial	decision-making,	
in	 part	 by	 limiting	 older	 correctional	 practices	 that	 interfered	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 that	
policy.116	Prescriptive	guidelines	were	piloted	at	the	federal	level	in	parole	in	1972	(see	Hoffman	and	
Beck,	1974),	and	then	attempted	in	other	penal	domains	in	the	1980s:	in	pre-trial	and	bail	release	(eg	
the	 Philadelphia	 Municipal	 Court	 Project	 -	 see	 Goldkamp	 and	 Gottfredson,	 1981a,b),117	 and	 in	
sentencing	(eg	the	Minnesota	Sentencing	Guidelines	Commission,	1982).118	
	
In	the	absence	of	evaluative	research,	protocollary	codes	for	estimating	recidivism,	can	be	used	to	
modulate	the	future	evaluative	activities	of	diverse	criminal	justice	authorities.	The	problem	was	at	
that	time,	parole	boards	or	other	authorities	had	not	established	a	reduction	in	recidivism	as	the	chief	
outcome	for	measuring	success,	rather	“criminal	justice	functionaries	typically	make	decisions	relative	
to	 compound	 (and	 complex)	 goals”	 that	 may	 include	 an	 assemblage	 of	 rehabilitative,	 deterrent,	
incapacitative	or	other	objectives	(1986:	248).119		They	advise,	to	the	extent	that	administrators	permit	
multiple	and	competing	objectives,	actuarial	predictions	are	weakened	in	their	powers	(1986:	263).	
This	marks	a	 threshold	moment,	where	the	panel	 required	criminal	 justice	administrators	 to	begin	
establishing	audit	apparatuses	that	are	modulated	using	the	criterion	that	arbitrates	whether	or	not	
a	penal	intervention	is	effective	in	reducing	recidivism.	
	
Applying	Massumi’s	(2007:	4-5)	account	of	anticipatory	power	as	possessing	an	operative	logic	that	
“combines	an	ontology	with	an	epistemology	in	such	a	way	as	to	trace	itself	out	as	a	self-propelling	
tendency”:	 actuarial	 justice	 combines	 an	 ontology	 of	 a	 criminal	 career	with	 an	 epistemology	 that	
propels	it	forward	on	the	premise	that	the	high-rate	offender	possesses	an	objectively	given	existence	
prior	to	being	able	to	demonstrate	it	empirically.		It	is	the	anticipatory	tracking	of	offenders	that	loops	
this	together	within	a	repetitive	series	of	forward-moving	and	backward	movements	that	feed	into	
one	 another.	 Benchmark	 projections	 about	 the	 estimated	 level	 of	 offending	 in	 any	 particular	
jurisdiction	can	be	used	to	measure	the	effectiveness	of	whether	any	particular	intervention	has	been	
effective	in	reducing	the	level	of	crime	over	a	particular	period	of	tracking.	Along	the	beginning	and	
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ending	of	any	interval	of	movement	in	the	tracking	of	offenders,	there	remains	doubts.	Firstly,	along	
the	predictive	pole:	does	our	 tracking	 stretch	 far	enough	 in	 time	 to	accurately	predict	 a	high	 rate	
offender,	as	well	as	be	certain	that	any	particular	criminal	career	has	terminated?	And	then	along	the	
evaluative	pole:	has	the	time	interval	we	have	used	to	track	offenders	into	the	future	been	sufficiently	
long	enough	to	demonstrate	that	 it	has	 lowered	the	overall	rate	of	offending,	and	if	the	estimates	
being	used	are	weakened	by	cohort	effects	because	of	the	contingencies	of	the	interval	itself?	(eg	the	
differences	in	the	aggregated	ages	or	other	attributes	of	offenders	that	may	influence	the	point	they	
may	be	in	their	criminal	career	that	generate	artefact	estimates	as	a	result	of	the	sampling	procedure	
rather	than	the	lifetime	of	the	career).	
	
Establish	effective	forms	of	data	capture	and	meta-rules	for	interoperability	between	divergent	
sites	and	kinds	of	data	capture:	The	panel’s	“space	shuttle”	
	
The	panel	emphasised	the	importance	of	establishing	a	networked	data	infrastructure,	described	as	a	
“criminal	career	repository”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	209).	Echoing	the	same	ambitions	as	the	panel	
in	1978,	the	panel	restated	the	importance	of	archiving	all	available	cross-sectional	and	longitudinal	
data	together	in	a	central	repository.	Blumstein	et	al.	(1986a:	209)	commented:	
	
No	single	data	source	yet	collected	contains	so	rich	a	set	of	information	on	an	appropriately	
broad	sample.	In	some	cases,	data	are	only	available	for	juvenile	years;	in	other	cases,	only	
adult	arrest	events	are	available.	Together,	however,	the	wide	variety	of	information	that	has	
already	been	collected	and	used	in	individual	criminal	career	research	projects	represents	a	
rich	collection	on	which	secondary	analysis	is	warranted	and	should	be	pursued.	
	
Linking	data	from	multiple	sites	is	understood	as	being	superior	to	data	collection	from	a	single	site,	
as	it	provides	a	“bigger	story”	that	advances	scientific	knowledge	and	its	application.	The	repository	
and	its	data-linkage	technologies	provides	end-users	with	population	data	that	is	cost-effective	and	
non-intrusive	that	is	captured	in	a	secure	way	(it	is	risk	avoidant	in	its	methodologies)	so	that	these	
agencies	can	investigate	“vital”,	prioritized	research	projects	(in	this	case,	according	to	the	strategic	
goals	of	 the	Department	of	 Justice	and	 its	alliance	with	criminal	career	 researchers).	 	Data-linkage	
protocols	define,	manage,	modulate,	and	distribute	this	information	“throughout	a	flexible	yet	robust	
delivery	infrastructure”	(Thacker	2004:	xv).	Actuarial	meta-codes	operate	like	an	“activated	mechanical	
gear”	(“or	a	stack	of	punched	cards	circulating	through	a	tape-reading	machine”)	that	integrates	the	
multiple	sources	and	forms	of	risk	data	that	have	been	parsed	and	compiled	into	a	string	of	logical	
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syntactical	 components	 (the	 data	 analytic	 codes)	 defined	 by	 the	 ontological	 standards	 of	 criminal	
career	research	(2004:	xiii).	These	gears	or	codes	can	then	channel	the	flows	of	risk	information	using	
the	regulated	and	directed	parameters	of	what	constitutes	a	criminal	career	for	experimental	analysis	
within	a	network	of	end-users.	Data-linkage	 infrastructures	effectively	harvest	data	that	previously	
may	 not	 have	 been	 necessarily	 identified	 as	 being	 useful,	making	 this	 data	more	 visible	 within	 a	
machine-readable	 web	 of	 data-meanings	 that	 enables	 other	 users	 to	 more	 readily	 incorporate,	
process	and	understand	these	emergent	meanings,	and	link	them	with	other	related	data	for	their	
own	purposes	(Kitchen,	2014:	52-53).		
	
The	missionary	zeal	for	what	this	sort	of	data	repository	might	deliver	the	criminal	justice	system	is	
evident	 in	 the	 Panel’s	 agenda	 for	 future	 research.	 The	 Panel	 argued	 that	 after	 a	 decade	 of	
“improvements”	in	research	on	criminal	careers,	the	time	was	now	right	for	a	“high	priority”	research	
project	 that	 undertook	 a	 prospective	 longitudinal	 study	 on	 both	 offenders	 and	 non-offenders	
(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	199).	Such	a	project	would	“provide	a	basis	for	tracking	individual	criminal	
careers	over	time	and	for	linking	the	characteristics	of	an	individual’s	career	to	other	life	events	and	
experiences,	 especially	 to	 interactions	 with	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system”.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
continuation	of	 research	on	 criminal	 career	dimensions	and	 their	 correlates,	 and	 its	 imperative	 to	
identify	the	best	predictors	of	recidivism,	the	Panel	considered	that	prospective	longitudinal	research	
would	assist	in	“explor(ing)	promising	intervention	strategies”	(1986a:	199).	If	one	was	to	distinguish	
“developmental	 sequences	 and	 heterogeneity	 across	 individuals”	 in	 the	 development	 of	 criminal	
careers,	as	well	as	discover	whether	these	trajectories	could	by	interrupted	through	some	particular	
kind	of	intervention,	the	routinization	of	cross-sectional	research	that	was	then	becoming	implanted	
into	the	criminal	justice	system	itself	would	be	insufficient	for	this	objective.	While	data	of	this	sort	
was	then	available	from	birth	cohort	studies,	generalizability	was	limited	by	small	sample	sizes	or	the	
limits	of	the	stage	at	which	these	long-term	projects	were	at	in	the	tracking	of	individuals.	
	
The	Panel	felt	that	it	would	be	more	cost-effective	to	fund	a	large	scale	project	of	this	sort	with	several	
cohorts	 (distributed	across	space)	 than	 it	would	be	to	obtain	the	same	sort	of	 information	using	a	
cross-sectional	design	 that	would	need	 to	use	some	 form	of	data-linking	 to	obtain	 risk	data	about	
“important	life	events	(eg	family	conflict,	divorce,	school	failure	or	drop	out,	drug	initiation,	processing	
by	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 employment,	 marriage	 etc”	 that	 would	 prospectively	 identify	 the	
“sequential	ordering	of	events”	to	develop	probability	models	of	their	relative	influence	(1986a:	200).	
Visioning	 for	 this	 was	 very	 extensive:	 it	 would	 be	 federally	 funded	 as	 a	 national	 study	 to	 ensure	
representativeness,	 while	 also	 drawing	 local	 samples	 for	 “convenience,	 efficiency,	 and	 record	
	 86	
convenience”	(1986a:	201);	at	the	epistemological	 level,	the	data	capture	and	analysis	would	be	at	
the	individual	level	as	this	was	“the	unit	underlying	not	only	the	criminal	career	paradigm	but	also	the	
way	in	which	criminal	justice	decisions	are	made	(1986a:	198-99)	to	do	this	it	would	planning	for	a	
series	of	timely	intervals120	where	it	would	survey	“event	sequences”;	its	research	perspective	would	
need	to	be	necessarily	inter-disciplinary	so	that	it	capture	risk	data	across	the	domains	of	education,	
substance	abuse,	mental	health	and	employment.	
	
In	addition,	at	various	intervals	of	data	capture	the	most	recent	reports	(risk	intelligence	data)	would	
need	 to	 be	 shared	 between	 participating	 alliances	 of	 researchers	 and	 agency	 partners	 directly	
involved	in	the	research,	as	well	as	being	“fed	into	some	public	–use	data	facility”	so	that	all	end-users	
actively	 involved	 in	 its	 network,	 could	 use	 the	 new	 risk	 intelligence	 data	 soon	 after	 it	 is	 made	
accessible.	 This	 longitudinal	 research	 would	 install	 a	 research	 design	 to	 sample	 a	 representative	
national	sample,	but	one	that	was	flexible	enough	to	allow	administrative	decisions	along	the	life	of	
the	 project	 to	 hone	 in	 on	 “high-risk	 populations”	 who	 may	 have	 become	 identifiable	 using	 this	
anticipatory	tracking	and	begin	capturing	risk	data	taken	from	local	samples	(1986a:	200-01).	Finally,	
the	 proposed	 study	 would	 identify	 and	 plan	 “experimental	 interventions	 with	 randomly	 drawn	
subsamples”	 (ibid)	 to	 discover	 the	 sorts	 of	 developmental	 experiences	 that	 engender	 “compliant	
behaviour”,	the	“behavioural	precursors	of	subsequent	delinquency	and	criminality”,	the	influence	of	
a	 young	 person’s	 interactions	 within	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 on	 behaviour,	 and	 the	 “factors	
associated	with	career	 termination”	 (1986a:	200).	Biopolitical	 regulation	 is	achieved	by	setting	 the	
frame	of	reference	for	evaluating	these	sampling	strategies	and	experimental	interventions.	
	
The	 Implementation	 Panel	 provides	 the	 image	 of	 a	 networked	 “consortium”	 that	 is	 centrally	
concerned	with	data	capture	and	data	sharing	designed	to	satisfy	a	broad	constituency	of	potential	
users	 (1986a:	 201).	 The	 image	 of	 a	 “space	 shuttle”	 is	 a	 federated	 project	 that	 elevates	 the	
dissemination	 of	 risk	 intelligence	 information	 as	 critical	 in	 regulating	 a	 distributed	 network	 of	
researchers	and	criminal	justice	agents	and	authorities.	The	space	shuttle	is	a	politico-military	launch	
vehicle	that	has	been	funded	at	the	national	level	as	a	substantive	and	strategic	market	investment	
by	the	state121	to	investigate	as	of	yet	uncharted	or	uncertain	risk	terrains.	Inside	the	shuttle	are	the	
central	 regulators	 who	 direct	 the	 flows	 of	 risk	 intelligence	 data	 to	 the	 many	 different	 kinds	 of	
authorities	that	have	an	investment	in	the	strategic	use	of	this	information.122	To	do	this	they	must	
relay	this	information	about	a	“diversity	of	experiments”	(in	capturing	data,	in	risk	instrumentation,	
in	risk	prevention)	whereby	its	delivers	its	“payload”	to	a	quite	widely	constituted	network	of	agencies	
and	 authorities	 residing	 in	 the	 expanding	 marketplace.	 On	 this	 trajectory	 into	 new	 risk	 terrains,	
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actuarial	 information	about	 recidivism	would	become	the	core	driver	steering	 the	development	of	
social,	economic	and	scientific	knowledge	(Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy,	2015:	171).	
	
This	archiving	and	data-linkage	for	past,	current,	and	future	research	is	designed	to	establish	global	
governance	system	involving	a	central	alliance	between	the	specialist	(electronic	elite)	administrators	
of	the	politico-military	state	dispositif,	and	an	allied	group	of	data	producers	invested	in	the	scientific-
intellectual	development	of	criminal	career	research	knowledge	and	its	active	deployment	in	justice	
security	networks.	The	relation	is	collusive	in	that	it	directs	and	controls	message-traffic	throughout	
the	network,	establishing	protocols	and	pathways	that	attempt	to	more	automatically	regulate	and	
modulate	the	 informational	environment	 (Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy,	2015:	171).	Mellamphy	and	
Mellamphy	refer	to	Robert	MacBride	(1967:	80,	82-83,	in	2015:	170)	in	regards	to	the	digitization	and	
increasing	 automatization	 of	 this	 sort	 of	 data-linkage	 system:	 the	 establishment	 of	 meta-analytic	
algorithmic	rules	not	only	makes	the	management	and	costs	of	doing	justice	business	cheaper	and	
faster	as	it	enables	the	flows	of	information,	it	regulates	the	future	actions	of	both	researchers	and	
administrators	by	making	projections	and	commands	about	the	direction	of	future	action.	Algorithmic	
governance	 “‘synarchically	 regulates’	 by	 creating	 both	 ‘the	 informational	 problems’	 and	 the	
‘computational	solutions’	within	a	given	environmental	system”	(2015:	170).	
	
The	panel	advised	that	it	would	be	necessary	to	“improve	the	accuracy	of	(these	records)”	as	well	as	
invent	new	coding	systems	that	make	this	new	risk	data	equivalent	within	the	actuarial	probabilistic	
codes	that	were	then	emerging.	Within	the	networks	of	any	particular	criminal	justice	milieu,	a	net	is	
cast	that	re-modulates	any	particular	site	(decision-making	for	remand,	sentencing,	probation	and	so	
on)	within	the	anticipatory	engine	of	actuarialism.	This	emerging	risk-based	environment,	will	remain	
under	pressure	to	integrate	actuarial	instruments	at	virtually	all	sites	and	stages	of	decision-making	
which,	 over	 time,	 ensures	 that	 flows	 of	 data	 into	 criminal	 justice	 repositories	 are	 increasingly	
standardised.	At	the	same	time	the	technology	of	anticipatory	tracking	and	its	regulatory	information	
flows	become	a	central	mechanism	of	performance	government.	
	
3.5.	Searching	for	predictive	associations	
	
It	was	in	this	new	techno-scientific	milieu	that	the	contemporary	hybrid	actuarial	risk-based	criminal	
justice	 emerged,	 founded	 upon	 the	 imperative	 to	 selectively	 incapacitate.	 This	 was	 driven	 by	 an	
insistence	to	partition	categories	of	offender	across	the	age-crime	curve,	as	this	would	determine	the	
most	appropriate	risk	intervention	according	to	an	offender’s	allotment	within	a	topological	field	of	
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risk,	which	may	in	turn	require	his	re-allotment	as	the	suspect	is	tracked	over	time.	It	is	the	uncertainty	
that	this	allotment	is	accurate,	which	fuels	the	interpolation	of	anticipatory	tracking	of	recidivism	into	
every	 penal	 space	 within	 the	 criminal	 justice,	 even	 into	 those	 domains	 which	 seek	 to	 divert	 the	
offender	 from	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 or	 that	 purport	 to	 provide	 alternatives	 to	 the	 criminal	
justice	system;	as	well	as	into	non-criminal	domains	such	as	juvenile	anti-social	conduct.	
	
Re-coding	algorithms	to	include	childhood	anti-social	behaviour	
	
As	I	have	discussed,	the	inclusion	of	predictive	data	about	young	offenders	was	a	controversial	aspect	
of	the	panel’s	deliberations:	“children	are	less	responsible	than	adults”,	and	so	were	considered	less	
blameworthy	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	166).	Legal	and	data	infrastructure	boundaries	for	sealing	and	
purging	juvenile	criminal	records,	posed	an	institutional,	practical,	and	ethical	limit	to	including	this	
data	for	research	(1986a:	192,	192-193).	And,	at	that	interval	of	time,	the	penal	welfarist	rationalities	
of	the	juvenile	court	were	still	intact	(1986a:	193).123	At	the	same	time,	research	about	criminal	careers	
had	identified	age	and	the	age	of	onset	of	a	criminal	career	as	predictors	of	recidivism	that	provided	
clues	about	how	it	 is	distributed	within	the	offender	population	 in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	risk	
(1986a:	41-42,	67-69).	
	
At	the	beginning	of	the	panel’s	report,	“adverse	family	influences	and	early	anti-social	behaviour	(were	
identified)	as	major	risk	factors	associated	with	participation	 in	delinquency	and	crime”	 (1986a:	3).	
From	 the	 start	 of	 the	 report,	 scientific	 uncertainty	 envelopes	 the	 risk	 terrain:	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
“prospectively	identify	offenders”	as	most	youth	who	demonstrate	risks	linked	to	a	criminal	career	do	
not	go	on	to	“serious	criminal	careers”;	there	is	“uncertainty	about	effective	interventions”	as	early	
interventions	into	familial	contexts	do	not	necessarily	reduce	offending;	there	is	“uncertainty	to	the	
optimal	 age	 of	 intervention”	 (if	 interventions	were	made	when	 a	 child	was	 4	 years,	 it	 is	 virtually	
impossible	to	identify	which	children	are	at	greatest	risk	of	becoming	offenders);	and,	are	there	legal,	
ethical	 or	 unintended	 consequences	 about	 interventions	where	 a	 child	 has	 not	 yet	 committed	 an	
offence?	(1986a:	3-4).	Later,	in	discussing	the	use	of	juvenile	records	in	criminal	career	research,	the	
tenor	is	more	concerned	with	establishing	criteria	for	gaining	access	to	juvenile	histories	of	offending	
to	answer	criminal	career	research	questions	that	have	“been	hindered	by	the	bifurcation	of	juvenile	
and	 adult	 record	 systems”,	 and that	 have	 generated	 “problems”	 about	whether	 or	 not	 a	 juvenile	
offender	has	really	desisted	(“false	desistance”),	and	the	ways	in	which	estimates	of	the	length	of	a	
criminal	 career	 are	 inaccurate	 by	 not	 included	 this	 data	 (1986a:	 194).	 The	 protocollary	 rule	 is	
articulated	at	the	end	of	this	problematization:	“There	would	be	considerable	research	value	in	linked	
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records	 of	 juvenile	 and	 offender	 risks	 and	 dispositions.	 Record	 purging	 precludes	 such	 research.	
Therefore,	 while	 access	 to	 juvenile	 records	 should	 be	 carefully	 controlled	 to	 protect	 individuals’	
identities,	those	records	should	be	stored	as	the	basis	for	research”	(ibid).	
	
One	year	before	the	panel	tabled	its	report,	the	chairman,	Blumstein	published	a	paper	with	Moitra	
and	Farrington	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1985).124	They	claimed	(1985:	190)	that	data	obtained	at	ages	eight	
to	 ten	 can	 be	 used	 to	 distinguish	 “chronic	 offenders”	 from	 “nonchronic	 offenders”	 at	 their	 first	
conviction.	They	identified	seven	predictor	variables	that	were	derived	from	prospective	longitudinal	
data	 captured	 from	 the	 Cambridge	 Study	 in	 Delinquent	 Behaviour	 (West,	 1969,1982;	 West	 and	
Farrington,	1973).	These	predictor	codes	were:	three	measures	of	“bad	behaviour”,	“social	handicap”,	
convicted	parents,	low	nonverbal	IQ,	and	poor	parental	child	rearing	(1985:	199).	
	
The	authors	stated	that	they	were	quite	“disappointed”	with	the	lack	of	research	that	prospectively	
identifies	“chronics”	at	a	very	early	age	(1985:	190).	The	Philadelphia	cohort	study	(Wolfgang	et	al.,	
1972)	is	the	primary	source	of	this	disappointment.	The	authors	begin	their	article	by	questioning	the	
utility	of	its	much-cited	finding	that	only	6%	of	the	birth	cohort	of	9,945	were	chronic	offenders	(1985:	
180-90).	 They	 insist	 that	 the	 sample	 population	must	 be	 disaggregated	 so	 that	 “innocents”	 (non-
offenders)	are	removed	from	the	identification	of	the	high-rate	offenders.	In	order	to	identify	these	
persisters,	predictor	modelling	should	only	be	derived	from	the	sub-sample	of	“boys	ever	arrested”	
(1985:	 188).	 On	 the	 ontological	 level,	 they	 contest	 Wolfgang	 et	 al.’s	 probability	 modelling	 that	
assumes	 population	 homogeneity	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 lambda.	 	 Their	 intent	 is	 to	 prospectively	
identify	and	distinguish	the	persister	from	the	desister	using	aggregated	longitudinal	data	designed	to	
classify	these	two	categories	of	offender	somewhere	between	the	interval	of	the	first	and	third	arrest	
(1985:	189).125		Those	who	wished	to	implement	a	policy	selective	incapacitation	wanted	to	control	
the	persistent	young	offender	as	much	as	they	wanted	to	incapacitate	the	persistent	adult	offender.	
	
In	Wolfgang	et	al.’s	probability	model	of	recidivism,	 it	 is	assumed	that	“any	stochastic	sequence	of	
events	with	a	nonzero	probability	of	termination	after	the	event	will	inevitably	result	in	a	distribution	
of	 (criminal	 career)	 lengths”	 (Blumstein	 and	Moitra	 (1980:	 322).	 The	 chronic	 group	 of	 recidivists	
aggregate	 towards	 the	 right-hand	 side	 of	 the	 age-crime	 curve	when	 official	 crime	 data	was	 used;	
however,	self-report	data	reveals	the	reverse:	high-rate	offenders	begin	their	careers,	heavily	skewed	
to	the	left	side	of	the	curve,	and	continue	long	careers	into	the	right-side	of	the	curve.	Official	data	
can	only	be	used	to	identify	the	recidivist	in	retrospect,	far	too	late	in	the	probabilistic	process	–	after	
their	third	arrest	-	where	the	precise	number	of	arrests	is	no	longer	relevant	(1980:	323).126	If	there	
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are	desisters	or	“amateur”	and	short-lived	criminal	careers,	this	modelling	was	premised	upon	a	fixed	
probability	of	recidivism,	which	the	researchers	considered	was	unable	to	differentiate	desisters	from	
persisters.	 Selective	 incapacitation	 cannot	 be	 implemented	 without	 prospectively	 identifying	 the	
chronic	offender	in	early	adolescence:	“The	fundamental	policy	question,	then,	is	whether	the	‘chronic	
offenders’	are	identifiable	in	prospect…can	one	predict	which	individuals	will	turn	out	to	be	the	ones	
with	the	longest	sequence?”	(ibid).		
	
The	desire	to	anticipate	the	persistent	offender	at	this	earlier	interval	is	precautionary	in	character.	It	
seeks	to	capture	that	imperceptible	stirring	in	bodily	movement	where	the	young	offender’s	vector	of	
movement	speeds	up	and	intensifies	along	an	imagined	criminal	career	trajectory	(which	is	imagined	
in	mathematical	terms	as	a	threshold	point	where	there	is	a	demonstrated	growth	in	the	probability	
of	 recidivism).	Data	capture	must	 intercept	and	 record	bodily	movement	as	 it	 is	observed	“on	 the	
ground	at	any	(particular)	moment”,	effectively	recording	this	through	some	inscriptive	device	(a	case	
file,	a	risk	fragment	that	is	rendered	measureable	within	a	particular	location	at	a	particular	point	in	
time,	 an	 image-code	etc)	 as	 a	 fragment	of	 risk	 information	 that	 records	bodily	 “transition”	 (Adey,	
2010:	89).	This	requires	“multi-factorial”	predictors	that	could	not	then	be	easily	or	reliably	captured	
in	criminal	justice	databases.		
	
Given	 the	 lack	 of	 available	 evidence,	 the	 emerging	 alliances	 between	 mathematical	 and	 lifespan	
development	 criminal	 career	 researchers	 began	 to	 integrate	 different	 kinds	 of	 datasets	 and	
experiment	with	possible	predictor	associations	using	factor	analysis	and	cluster	analysis	to	explore	
and	 prioritize	 the	 most	 relevant	 and	 effective	 algorithmic	 combinations.	 This	 experimentation	 is	
founded	upon	technical	relevance,	where	parsimonious	tactics127	are	used	for	legitimating	thresholds	
of	 acceptability	 for	 revealing	 “where”	 the	 child	 or	 young	 person	 is	 located	 within	 the	 offender	
population	so	that	he	can	be	placed	in	the	“correct	position”	on	any	particular	local	map	of	risk	from	
a	“strictly	intelligence	point	of	view”	(Adey,2010:	89).	As	described	below,	this	strategy	relies	upon	
tinkering	with	the	classification	rule’s	cut-off	point	premised	upon	the	“expected	utility”	of	the	costs	
and	benefits	of	an	acceptable	ratio	of	correct	and	incorrect	predictions.	
	
Blumstein	et	al.	accused	Wolfgang	and	his	colleagues	of	“fitting”	their	probability	model	of	recidivism	
to	their	data.	In	doing	so	they	had	underestimated	the	extent	of	the	problem	–	by	only	considering	
the	aggregated	data	for	all	those	arrested,	the	authors	claim	that	by	18	years	of	age	the	“persisters”	
represent	18%	of	this	“population”	(rather	than	the	famous	6%)	(1985:	188).		They	re-analysed	the	
Philadelphia	 data	 replacing	 its	 probability	 model	 with	 an	 arrest	 branching	 process	 for	 shifted	
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geometric	distribution	(Blumstein	and	Moitra	(1980:	323-27)	to	fit	its	data	to	their	proposed	model.	
They	used	a	Chi-Square	goodness	of	fit	test	to	confirm	that	there	is	a	statistically	significant	difference	
between	 “amateurs”	 and	 “persisters”	 (1980:	 325).	 In	 their	 revised	 geometric	model,	 they	 intuit	 a	
series	of	bifurcating	probability	moments	in	the	escalation	and	de-escalation	of	recidivism	which	is	
visualized	as	a	branching	probability	process	(see	Figure	8).	If	the	probability	models	could	not	isolate	
the	desisters,	then	the	policy	of	selective	 incapacitation	would	become	too	politically	charged	as	a	
result	of	any	particular	predictor	instrument’s	high	rate	of	false-positives.	This	proposed	model	has	a	
certain	economy	to	it,	in	that	it	can	still	rely	heavily	upon	the	convenience	of	retrospective	arrest	data,	
however	 it	can	 justify	precaution	 (articulated	then	as	“early	prevention”),	on	the	basis	of	valorised	
predictors	captured	from	longitudinal	datasets,	such	as	the	London	cohort.	
	
	
Figure	8.		Geometric	probability	model:	Arrest	branching	process	for	shifted	geometric	distribution	
	
In	the	1980s	advances	in	multivariate	statistics	enabled	Blumstein	et	al.	to	create	a	decision-tree	that	
attempts	to	retrospectively	classify	members	of	a	known	population	of	offenders	by	splitting	it	(in	this	
case)	 into	 two	 sub-populations	 (persisters	 and	 desisters).	 	 Their	 revised	 model	 estimates	 the	
probability	of	being	classified	 into	 the	persister	group	given	a	certain	number	of	arrests.	A	kind	of	
diagnostic	test	 is	applied	on	the	basis	of	an	intuition	that	within	the	interval	between	the	first	and	
third	offence,	 it	 is	possible	to	 identify	a	homogenous	sub-population	of	high	rate	offenders	well	 in	
advance	of	their	peak	rate	of	individual	offending.	This	micro-technique	then	uses	a	goodness	of	fit	
test	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 sampled	 data	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 hypothesized	 distribution	 of	
categorical	differences	between	sub-populations	according	to	differences	in	“transition	probabilities”	
(see	Blumstein	and	Moitra,	1980;	Blumstein	et	al.,	1985:	191-95).	Figure	9	demonstrates	the	results	
of	 this	 procedure,	 its	 image-code	 “visually	 confirming	 the	 benefit	 of	 partitioning	 the	 persister	
population”	(1985:	192).	They	claimed	that	they	were	able	to	consistently	identify	a	“rapidly	increasing	
probability	of	recidivism	through	the	first	few	(three	or	four)	 involvements	with	the	law”	across	all	
jurisdictions	where	 they	 applied	 arrest	 data	 to	 the	 test	 (1985:	 194).	 This	was	 used	 to	 contest	 the	
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“arbitrariness”	of	Wolfgang	et	al.’s	decision-making	rule	to	retrospectively	classify	“chronics”	at	the	
threshold	of	six	or	more	arrests.		
	
	
Figure	9.	Recidivism	probability	as	a	function	of	involvement	number	for	various	cohorts	
	
Given	their	claim	to	generalizability	across	time	and	place,	the	researchers	then	analysed	the	London	
cohort	data	of	convicted	offenders	up	until	the	age	of	25	in	an	attempt	to	identify	chronics	on	the	
basis	of	prospective	data	captured	from	when	the	boys	were	8	to	10	years	old.	Regression	analysis	
identified	the	following	best	predictors:	conviction	by	age	thirteen,	then	having	a	convicted	sibling,	
and	 then,	 troublesomeness	 at	 ages	 8-10,	 and	poor	 junior	 school	 attainment	 at	 age	 10	 to	 a	 lesser	
degree.	 At	 a	 50%	 probability	 rule	 these	 predictors	 could	 retrospectively	 distinguishing	 chronics	
(11.36%	of	the	sample)	form	nonchronics	(1985:	196-197).	Their	prediction	model	was	only	able	to	
correctly	 identify	11	out	of	15	probable	chronics	 (a	26.7%	error	 rate).	After	an	elaborate	 series	of	
analyses	premised	on	even	lower	probability	thresholds	and	multiple	comparisons	of	partitioned	sub-
groups,	the	researchers	had	also	found	that	their	model	did	not	identify	chronics	who	started	their	
criminal	career	at	an	older	age.	
	
Undeterred,	 the	 researchers	 then	attempted	 to	 construct	 and	 validate	 a	prediction	 instrument	by	
randomly	 assigning	 the	 London	 cohort	 into	 two	 groups	 (a	 construction	 sample	 and	 a	 validation	
sample)	to	demonstrate	the	effectiveness	of	their	prediction	instrument.		They	followed	the	criminal	
career	protocol;	however,	they	did	so	in	a	way	that	compromised	its	rigor	for	validation	by	significantly	
compromising	on	sample	size128	and	sample	diversity,	undermining	standards	for	validating	predictive	
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accuracy	 on	 the	 validation	 sample.129	 They	 then	 attempted	 to	 establish	 a	 classification	 rule	 for	
assigning	individuals	to	the	chronic	group	based	on	the	benefits	and	costs	associated	with	correct	and	
incorrect	predictions.	The	“hazards”	of	 “the	correct	and	 incorrect	 labelling	of	 individuals”130	was	a	
trade-off	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 “expected	 utility”.	 Establishing	 an	 acceptability	 threshold	 for	 the	
administrative	commission	of	erroneous	classifications	was	considered	to	be	analogous	to	the	point	
where	investing	in	the	lottery	could	be	understood	as	a	“rational	decision	to	maximize	the	net	utility”	
founded	 upon	 a	 formula	 that	 the	 chance	 of	winning	 the	 lottery	 is	p	 and	 the	 prize	 is	V,	 then	 the	
expected	benefit	is	pV	and	the	cost	of	a	ticket	is	C,	so	that	the	expected	net	utility	is	pV-C	(1985:	201,	
footnote	14).	The	final	mathematical	equation	used	calculates	a	disutility	score	(r),	which	is	then	used	to	
established	the	best	point	 to	establish	a	classification	rule,	determined	by	 the	ratio	of	positives	 to	
false-positives	and	false-negatives.	
	
Clear	and	Barry	(1983:	533)	have	described	this	sort	of	attempt	to	balance	the	relative	costs	associated	
with	false-positives	and	false-negatives	as	being	very	like	a	model	that	was	developed	in	perceptual	
decision-making	 behaviour	 concerned	 with	 signal	 detectability	 (Peterson	 et	 al.,	 1954;	 Green	 and	
Swets,	1966).131	The	model	allows	one	to	test	the	“sensitivity”	or	discriminatory	power	of	the	observer	
(or	 instrument),	 and	 to	 establish	 the	 “optimal	 cut-off	 point”	 or	 beta	 probability	 of	making	 type-II	
errors,	this	being	a	trade-off	between	the	ratio	of	false-positives	and	false-negatives.	This	test	provides	
a	techno-utilitarian	 justification	for	establishing	a	rule	for	classifying	high-rate	or	chronic	offenders	
derived	from	measures	of	marginal	values	where	prediction	is	quite	difficult	given	the	low	frequency	
of	events;	however,	where	the	event	 itself	 is	considered	serious.	That	 is,	 the	threat	of	becoming	a	
serious	 offender	 overcomes	 the	 need	 to	 exercise	 precaution	 in	 relation	 to	 possible	 error.	 In	 this	
context,	the	utility	test	established	a	decision-making	rule	that	based	on	the	precautionary	principle:	
it	is	better	to	tolerate	a	relatively	higher	ratio	of	false-negatives	compared	to	false-positives	due	to	
the	seriousness	of	infrequent	behaviours	(1983:	533;	535).	From	that	perspective	“the	‘overprediction	
of	violence’…might	be	an	eminently	reasonable	consequence	of	decision-makers’	tendencies	to	view	
“misses”	 (predicting	 nonviolence	 for	 truly	 violent	 persons)	 as	 more	 serious	 than	 ‘false	 alarms’	
(predicting	violence	for	nonviolent	ones)”	(1983:	 ibid).	Blumstein	et	al.’s	use	of	this	test	distorts	 its	
purpose	as	its	objective	is	to	determine	a	utility	decision	that	is	not	founded	upon	anticipated	“serious	
risk”	 (Floud’s	 grave	 harm)	 but	 rather	 “chronic	 offending”	 based	 on	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 juvenile	
offending.	
	
This	 de-politicizing	 technique	 was	 described	 by	 the	 researchers	 as	 a	 “civil-libertarian	 index”	 that	
established	an	authoritative	classification	rule	for	allocating	offenders	to	risk	categories	(Blumstein	et	
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al.,	1985:	204).	Using	the	test,	the	researchers	determined	that,	when	the	seven	risk	item	scores	were	
added	together,	a	score	of	4	would	be	used	to	allocate	offenders	to	the	chronic	group,	achieving	a	
55%	expected	utility	 (1985:	 204-05).	 This	 translates	 into	 a	 probability	 ratio	 that	 the	 social	 control	
disutility	 of	 failing	 to	 predict	 a	 chronic	 offender	 is	 a	 trade-off	 that	 is	 equal	 to	 the	 doubled	 risk	 of	
incorrectly	identifying	a	desister	as	a	chronic	offender	(the	civil	rights	or	humanitarian	concern).	At	
that	threshold,	based	on	their	sample,	15	chronics	are	correctly	identified,	8	are	missed,	while	22	are	
mislabelled	 as	 chronics.	 In	 responding	 to	 these	 anticipated	 risks	 at	 this	 earlier	 stage,	 their	 data	
indicates	 that	 these	 academics	would	 tolerate	 a	 success/failure	 ratio,	where	 in	 order	 to	 correctly	
identify	15	persistent	offenders	at	age	13,	the	“preventative”	intervention	implemented	in	response,	
would	take	30	casualties	(8	persistent	offenders	who	were	missed,	and	22	mislabelled	desisters).132	
	
The	authors’	findings	create	the	impression	that	selective	incapacitation	could	be	an	effective	penal	
policy	if	it	redirected	its	attention	towards	the	“early	discrimination	between	more	and	less	serious	
offenders”	(1985:	217),	redirecting	biopolitical	governance	away	from	the	chronic	adult	offender	to	
make	more	visible	incipient	criminality	that	could	be	profiled	from	the	aggregated	biographies	of	these	
young	people.	Here,	the	sum	total	of	multiple	“natural”	but	determinate	individual	histories,	is	reified	
by	a	branch	probability	model	that	conceives	of	subjectivity	as	being	linear	and	additive.	The	authors	
state	 their	 instrument	demonstrates	 the	 “appropriateness	of	 distinguishing	 individuals	 in	 terms	of	
differential	recidivism	probabilities”	(1985:	215).	This	discourse	is	couched	on	a	moral	register	and	is	
framed	 in	 terms	of	 commands	 to	 speed	up	 a	 technocratic	 solution	 that	would	 transport	 actuarial	
justice	to	the	boundaries	of	the	criminal	justice	system	-	to	schools,	disadvantaged	families	and	other	
milieu	where	 the	persister	profile	 could	be	 identified	and	 targeted.133	 In	 this	 imaginary,	 a	 security	
dispositif	 would	 need	 to	 be	 constructed	 that	 is	 founded	 upon	 the	 environmental	 government	 of	
criminal	risk:	“Efforts	could	then	be	made,	using	experimental	design,	to	counteract	or	alleviate	some	
of	the	risk	factors”	(1985:	218).134	
	
The	epistemological	standards	that	are	at	play	 in	the	protocols	of	criminal	career	research	are	 less	
governed	by	the	work	of	proof	and	refutation,	but	rather	of	an	applied	“collective	development	of	
algorithmic	 approaches	 to	 data	 handling”	 that	 searches	 through	 the	 data	 checking	 every	 possible	
outcome,	pattern,	or	configuration.	It	becomes	efficient	on	the	plane	of	immanence	at	a	particular	
moment	when	it	can	offer	a	business	solution	that	can	be	used	in	the	more	effective	management	of	
selective	incapacitation	(Lowrie,	2017:	6).	In	the	fledgling	knowledge	economy	about	criminal	careers,	
these	epistemological	standards	operate	within	utilitarian	concerns,	where	the	criterion	of	efficiency	
is	a	momentary	step	forward,	the	“contingent	result	of	the	current	situation	of	data	science	within	the	
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contemporary	knowledge	economy”	(2017:	6).	The	sort	of	parsimony	that	these	researchers	desired	
was	to	be	found,	not	only	in	its	syntactical	parsimony,	but	also	“its	practical	economy”	(2017:	8)	Lowrie	
comments:	“ultimately,	an	algorithm	is	a	crystallization	and	representation	of	cognitive	processes	that	
might	otherwise	be	performed	by	humans”	(2017:	8).	This	epistemological	standard,	is	an	evaluative	
standard	“immanent	to	the	fact	of	being	an	algorithm”.	
	
The	 alliance	 between	 researchers	 in	 the	 criminal	 career	 paradigm	 working	 with	 cross-sectional	
criminal	 justice	 data,	 and	 sympathetic	 researchers	 engaged	 in	 longer-term	 longitudinal	 research	
captured	 from	birth	 cohort	 studies,	 clearly	 exaggerated	 their	 claims	when	one	 examines	 the	data	
closely.	The	omissions	in	their	reporting	data,	their	obfuscating,	techno-scientific	narration,	and	the	
leaps	of	faith	in	the	reach	of	their	conclusions,	lend	support	for	Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy’s	(2015)	
argument	 that	 this	 mode	 of	 communicating	 or	 disseminating	 information	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	
establishing	an	ideologico-intellectual	acceptance	for	the	emerging	configuration	of	actuarial	justice.	
“Synarchic	regulation	(‘syn’	meaning	together)	is	proposed	to	categorize	this	(communicative)	system”	
(Rasmussen,	 1981:2,	 cited	 in	 2015:	 164).	 As	 archons	 of	 the	 new	 regime	 of	 government,	 this	
conjunction	 of	 sympathetic	 information	 brokers135	 directs	 the	 flows	 of	 information	 to	 minimize	
friction,	so	that	ideological	concerns	about	just	deserts	or	the	ethics	of	incapacitating	an	individual	on	
the	basis	of	a	prediction	about	crimes	committed	in	the	future,	could	be	more	readily	assimilated	into	
the	 governmental	 environment.	 In	 many	 ways,	 the	 decision-making	 of	 judges	 and	 correctional	
personnel	 were	 still	 (and	 to	 some	 degrees	 are	 always)	 externalities	 to	 the	 purity	 of	 the	 actuarial	
diagram	of	power,	whose	cascading	contingencies,	disrupt	 the	 sort	of	 system	re-ordering	 that	 the	
federal	leaders	were	determined	to	establish.	In	order	to	establish	a	centralized	network	of	control,	a	
mechanism	of	information	transfer	is	required	in	to	“infomatically	manage”	within	the	environment,	
a	process	analogous	to	“info-metabolism”	(2015:	165).	
	
3.6	 Conclusion	
	
As	 described	 in	 the	 Introduction,	 Deleuze	 (1992)	 coined	 this	 network	 of	 biopolitical	 power	more	
precisely	as	being	“control”,	an	abstract	diagram	that	can	be	understood	as	a	virtual	power	that	uses	
a	networked	computerized	modulation	of	interconnected	and	variable	numerical	codes	continuously	
(re)modulating	life	as	dividuals,	masses,	samples,	data,	markets	and	banks	(1992:	4-5).	This	mode	of	
operation	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 panel’s	 vision	 for	 a	 future	 research	 agenda	 as	 it	 is	 articulated	 along	 a	
continuous	line	of	modulation	about	the	anticipatory	tracking	of	offenders	that	uses	developmental	
criminal	career	probability	modelling	for	distributing	dviduals	within	a	topological	field	of	risk.	By	1987	
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components	of	this	network	were,	in	part,	assembled	in	the	criminal	justice	system	as	evidenced	in	
the	US	Federal	Sentencing	Guidelines,	and	the	rising	use	of	actuarial	instruments	in	criminal	justice	
decision-making	more	widely;	 and,	 new	 frontiers	were	 continuing	 to	 be	 established	 in	 identifying	
various	 risk	 domains	 of	 a	 child’s	 development	 by	 alliances	 between	 longitudinal	 researchers	 and	
mathematical	criminologists.	
	
In	Deleuze’s	diagram,	the	net	 is	 like	“a	self-deforming	cast	 that	will	continuously	change	from	one	
point	to	the	other”	(1992:	4).	The	panel	commented:	“To	describe	and	understand	criminal	careers,	it	
is	essential	to	recover	as	many	offences	and	other	life	events	as	possible	and	precisely	order	them	in	
time.	In	repeated	cross-sections	with	different	individuals,	information	would	have	to	be	collected	for	
a	very	long	time	on	any	individual	to	attain	the	necessary	level	of	accuracy”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	
200).	 A	 net	 is	 caste	 over	 the	 entire	 age-crime	 curve;	 and,	 as	 offenders	 enter	 the	 criminal	 justice	
networks,	 they	 become	 a	 population	 of	 suspects	 within	 actuarial	 codes	 of	 distributed	 risk.	 This	
ensnares	 the	 offender	 within	 an	 apparatus	 of	 capture,	 where	 anticipatory	 tracking	 operates	 in	 a	
metastable	way	 in	 the	 light	of	 continuous	 relays	of	 risk	 information.	 The	offender	 is	 an	aggregate	
member	of	a	distributed	risk	population,	where	actuarial	codes	decide	allotment	to	incapacitation	or	
a	more	“mobile	confinement”	that	regulates	movement,	and	adjusts	to	the	body	as	it	moves,	founded	
upon	the	will-to-incapacitate	(Bogard,	2007:3).	To	the	extent	that	the	criminal	justice	milieu	becomes	
an	evidence-based	environment,	centred	upon	anticipating	and	controlling	recidivism,	offenders	are	
more	intensely	captured	within	the	two	mutually	conditioning	pincers:		actuarial	risk	management	of	
levels	of	risk,	and	feedback	messages	about	the	performance	of	the	criminal	justice	interventions	that	
continue	to	modulate	risk	interventions	over	time.	The	tendency	to	bring	variable	components	of	a	
surveillance	 system	 together	 in	 order	 to	 integrate	 them	 into	 a	 larger	whole	 is	 the	 sense	 in	which	
Haggerty	and	Ericson	understand	 surveillance	as	a	 “surveillant	assemblage”	 (2000:	610-611).	 They	
comment:	“…to	the	extent	that	the	surveillant	assemblage	exists,	it	does	so	as	a	potentiality,	one	that	
resides	at	the	intersections	of	various	media	that	can	be	connected	for	diverse	purposes”	(2000:	609).		
	
Galloway	argues	that	information	protocols	are	always	stratified,	and	sometimes	blatantly	hierarchical	
as	is	evidenced	in	the	Panel’s	treatment	of	the	Rand	Project’s	actuarial	research	where	the	imposition	
of	the	technical	protocol	was	isomorphic	with	politics.	At	the	same	time,	protocols	are	participatory,	
although	their	circuits	are	modulated	or	controlled.	The	relays	and	channels	between	different	sites	
of	penal	risk	management	(bail,	sentencing,	prison,	parole,	probation	and	so	on)	become	a	distributed	
network	of	risk	management	of	the	population	of	offenders	governed	by	the	will-to-incapacitate.	Over	
time,	this	de-territorializes	and	de-stratifies	the	vertical	hierarchy	of	the	criminal	justice	system	and	
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its	 centralized	 network	where	 ultimately	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 final	 say	 over	 all	matters	 of	 law	
(Galloway,	2004:	31-32);	this	is	frequently	achieved	by	extra-legal	means	rather	than	the	rule	of	law.	
	
While	the	federal	panel	held	tight	reigns	over	steering	conduct	from	a	central	position,	the	protocol	
was	 both	 regulatory	 and	 participatory	 in	 that	 it	 sought	 to	 distribute	 biopolitical	 power	 within	 a	
network	of	relatively	autonomous	social	actors	that	were	invested	in	the	biopolitical	production	of	
statistical	knowledge	about	recidivism	and	about	the	parameters	of	a	criminal	careers,	as	well	as	those	
criminal	 justice	 authorities	who	were	 implementing	 and	 evaluating	 risk	 interventions.	 The	 Panel’s	
elaboration	of	its	centralized	“space	shuttle”	demonstrates	the	necessity,	strategically,	to	link	multiple	
autonomous	 and	 heterogeneous	 nodes	 together	 to	 object-oriented	 criminal	 career	 research	 and	
development	about	actuarial	prediction	and	control.	It	was	strategic	in	that,	given	the	state	of	global	
knowledge	about	the	risk	of	chronic	recidivism	and	the	poor	capabilities	of	accurately	applying	this	
risk	intelligence	data	to	effectively	incapacitate	offenders,	it	was	heavily	dependent	upon	intercepting	
data	from	domains	both	inside	and	outside	the	traditional	boundaries	of	the	criminal	justice	system.	
That	is,	it	was	dependent	upon	forms	of	risk	information	capture,	where	intelligence	is	site-specific,	
and	dynamic	 or	 aleatory.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Panel	was	 aware	 that	 its	 distributed	network	 for	
capturing	risk	intelligence	data	was	always	limited	by	the	particular	milieu	in	which	it	was	connected	
to,	where	the	meaning	of	that	data	is	never	complete	or	integral	in	itself	(2004:	34).	
	
Thacker	(2004:	xviii-xix)	maps	the	bio-political	protocol	of	distributed	networks:	
	
Protocol	 considers	 networks	 through	 a	 ‘diagram’,	 a	 term	 borrowed	 from	 Gilles	 Deleuze,	
Protocol	considers	first	network	as	a	set	of	nodes	and	edges,	dots	and	lines.	The	dots	may	be	
computers	 (server,	 client,	 or	 both),	 human	 users,	 communities,	 LANs,	 corporations,	 even	
countries.	The	lines	can	be	any	practice,	action,	or	event	effectuated	by	the	dots…with	this	
basic	‘diagram’	you	can	do	a	number	of	things.	You	can	connect	the	dots	–	all	of	them	–	making	
a	totally	connected,	distributed	network	with	more	than	one	path	to	the	destination.	You	can	
also	disconnect	dots,	even	delete	dots	(no	paths,	no	destination).	You	can	filter	out	which	dots	
are	connected	to	the	network.	You	can	create	portals	for	the	addition	of	future	dots.	You	can	
designate	which	kinds	of	lines	you	want	between	the	dots	(for	not	all	lines	are	equal;	some	
diverge,	 flee;	others	 converge,	 coalesce).	 In	 short,	 a	network-as-diagram	offers	all	 sorts	of	
possibilities	for	organization,	regulation,	and	management.	
	
If	anything,	the	Panel’s	central	data	repository	was	quite	limited	in	its	imagined	possibilities	because	
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of	its	own	despotic	desire	for	control	–	all	dots	would	need	to	be	connected	together	to	produce	a	
totally	 connected,	distributed	network	completely	controlled	by	 the	modulating	actuarial	 codes	of	
criminal	career	research.	The	dot	may	well	be	a	criminal	justice	server	or	other	(privatized,	academic,	
or	non-government	sector)	portal	that	connects	together	particular	nodes	of	actuarial	control,	and	
then	channels	and	distributes	 these	throughout	the	network.	Within	 the	apparatus	of	anticipatory	
longitudinal	 tracking,	a	permanent	 channelling	of	potentials	 is	established	 that	 relays-forward	and	
feeds-back	information	flows	for	perpetual	risk-control	experimentation	and	re-modulation.	Actuarial	
prediction	and	control	will	become	more	multidimensional,	 thereby	multiplying	 the	dots	and	 lines	
that	 become	 implicated	 in	 the	 risk	 intelligence	 data	 capture	 and	 environmental	 control.	 What	
connects	the	dots	is	not	the	data	server	but	rather	the	protocollary	lines	(that	is,	actuarial	standards	
of	 practice)	 that	 modulate	 the	 direction	 of	 knowledge-building,	 control	 innovation,	 and	 techno-
scientific	reflexivity	about	the	performance	of	the	criminal	justice	system.		
	
What	is	striking	in	the	Panel’s	deliberations	and	within	the	new	alliances	being	forged	at	that	time	by	
criminal	 career	 researchers,	 was	 the	 considerable	 attention	 devoted	 to	 advancing	 biopolitical	
knowledge	 about	 the	 best	 predictors	 of	 problematic	 developments	 in	 childhood	 and	 the	 sorts	 of	
associations	 between	 anti-social	 behaviours	 and	 the	 onset	 of	 juvenile	 offending.	 As	 one	 wades	
through	 the	 two	 volumes	 of	 the	 panel’s	 report,	 there	 is	 the	 overall	 impression	 that	 selective	
incapacitation	is	an	actuarial	design	for	targeting	the	adult	chronic	offender.	This	is	perhaps,	enshrined	
in	 the	 simplistic	 slogan:	 “three	 strikes	and	you’re	out”	 (Greenwood	et	al.,	 1994).	One	of	 the	most	
obfuscating	aspects	of	the	report,	is	that	it	never	directly	addresses	the	question:	at	which	stage	in	
the	development	of	a	criminal	career	would	criminal	justice	decision-making	be	willing	to	follow	the	
strategy	of	selective	incapacitation	to	its	logical	conclusion?	(given	that	it	is	only	possible	to	effectively	
implement	a	policy	of	selective	incapacitation	if	one	admits	that	the	third	strike	must	be	targeted	at	
the	young	offender	and	not	an	adult	chronic	offender).	
	
Gottfredson	 and	 Hirschi	 (1986),	 staunch	 critics	 of	 criminal	 career	 research,	 published	 a	 paper	 in	
Criminology,	“The	true	value	of	lambda	would	appear	to	be	zero”.	There	they	argue	that	a	policy	of	
selective	incapacitation	would	come	too	late,	that	they	cannot	be	identified	until	they	are	“no	longer	
active	and	their	replacements	cannot	be	identified	until	they	are	on	the	verge	of	‘retirement’”	(1986:	
217).	 They	 are	 cynical	 that	public	 funding	 should	be	directed	 to	 longitudinal	 research	 that	 cannot	
accurately	identify	high-rate	offenders	“in	advance	of	their	criminal	careers”,	when	what	this	research	
would	do	was	little	more	than	try	to	improve	this	capability.	In	that	paper,	they	state:	“the	optimal	
point	of	intervention	for	purposes	of	incapacitation	is	just	prior	to	the	age	at	which	crime	peaks	–	that	
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is,	13	or	14”	(1986:	218).136	In	a	sense,	Gottfredson	and	Hirschi	identify	the	trajectory	of	desire	that	
guides	selective	incapacitation.	
	
Criminal	career	researchers	are	relatively	short	in	their	elaboration	of	what	sort	of	measures	might	be	
taken	to	control	this	acceleration	in	offending.	This	contrasts	with	their	lengthy	technical	obfuscation	
for	establishing	classification	rules	for	an	acceptable	odds	ratio	of	the	expected	utility	of	the	costs	and	
benefits	of	the	correct	and	incorrect	identification	of	high	rate	offenders.	One	method	for	helping	to	
clarify	these	unanswered	questions	is	to	examine	other	research	papers	that	have	not	figured	in	public	
reports	such	as	the	panel’s	where	advocates	of	criminal	career	research	or	selective	 incapacitation	
speak	more	candidly.	For	example,	Clear	and	Barry	(1983:	530,	540)	make	the	simple	statement	that	
selective	incapacitation	does	not	necessarily	require	incarceration137	as	it	can	be	implemented	using	
other	measures:	“Antabuse,	prefrontal	lobotomies,	chemical	behaviour	control….(any)	use	of	physical	
constraint	to	prevent	certain	kinds	of	behaviour	(such	as)	weekend	incarceration	(for	certain	types	of	
crimes	such	as	burglary)…probation	with	heavy	surveillance”.		
	
In	Galloway’s	(2004:	85)	reading	of	Foucault’s	earliest	elaboration	of	Foucault’s	concept	of	biopolitics	
in	the	final	chapter	of	the	History	of	sexuality,	Volume	1	(1976),	he	asserts	that	Foucault’s	reference	
to	the	“first	eugenicists”	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	in	Europe	,	who	were	focused	
on	“dreams	of	the	perfecting	of	the	species	inclined	the	whole	problem	toward	an	extremely	exacting	
administration	of	 sex”	 (1978:	 148)	 as	being	 an	 important	 sign-post	 to	what	 is	 critically	 at	 stake	 in	
biopolitics.	He	argues	that	biopolitics	is	really	about	control	over	life	–	be	it	fascist	or	pharmaceutical”	
(or	nuclear	or	genetic	engineering)	 (Galloway,	2004,	85	 footnote	13).	 It	 is	 the	 totalizing	aspect	of	 this	
exhaustive	 “making-statistical”	 of	 large	 living	 masses	 (2004:	 87),	 and	 its	 attendant	 multiple	
environmental	regulations	-	designed	to	install	“a	long	series	of	permanent	interventions	at	the	level	
of	 the	 body,	 conduct,	 health	 and	 everyday	 life”	 -	 that	 reveals	 biopolitics	 as	 possessing	 fascist	 or	
authoritarian	tendencies	(Foucault	1978:	149).	
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Conclusion	
	
Actuarial	power	is	aimed	at	preventing	future	offences,	driven	by	the	will-to-incapacitate.	Actuarial	
logic	is	deployed	like	a	“computer	program”	–	it	is	strategized	and	governed	through	criminal	justice	
system	thinking	concerned	with	the	efficient	management	of	danger,	that	transfigures	rationalities	
and	 practices	 at	 divergent	 sites	within	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 so	 that	 they	 begin	 to	 resonate	
together.	
	
While	my	own	genealogical	analysis	is	limited	by	considering	only	one	particular	space	of	emergence	
–	the	incapacitation	of	high-rate	offenders	in	the	US	in	the	period	between	the	1970s	and	1980s	–	my	
findings	 both	 confirm	 and	 enrich	 Feeley	 and	 Simon’s	 topology	 of	 power,	 which	 I	 outlined	 in	 the	
Introduction.	My	conclusion	 summarizes	 these	 contributions	 towards	a	more	complex	mapping	of	
actuarial	justice	as	a	diagram	of	biopolitics,	as	it	is	managed	within	the	criminal	justice	“system”	by	a	
continuous	 and	 metastable	 modulation	 of	 risk	 information	 within	 the	 networks	 of	 control	 that	
constitute	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 under	 its	 contemporary	 neo-liberal	 rule	 of	 evidence-based	
policy	 and	 practice.	 My	 analysis	 makes	 explicit	 the	 biopolitical	 character	 of	 punishment,	 that	
reconstitutes	the	criminal	justice	system	as	a	networked	security	dispositif	(Foucault,	2003,	2007).	This	
addresses	a	significant	omission	in	the	criminological	literature	about	actuarial	justice.	It	also	suggests	
that	the	conceptual	apparatus	used	to	describe	actuarial	justice	should	dispense	with	concepts	such	
as	 the	 “criminal	 justice	 system”;	 instead	 I	 have	 identified	 the	 multiple	 sites	 of	 regulation	 or	
management	of	risk	that	are	implicated	within	the	distributed	networks	of	actuarial	control	that	are	
rationalized	and	acted	upon	by	a	telos	of	biopoltical	security.	
	
In	this	way,	I	have	mapped	incapacitation	as	being	a	knowledge/power	formation	that	is	always	in-
formation	 as	 it	 must	 constantly	 re-constitute	 itself	 in	 terms	 of	 new	 information	 about	 aleatory	
conditions	of	the	offender	population	itself,	and	of	the	effectiveness	of	its	networked	interventions	in	
achieving	 security.	 This	 security	 network,	 as	 it	 operates	within	 criminal	 justice,	 is	 constituted	 as	 a	
security	 dispositif	 where	 the	 will-to-knowledge	 is	 centrally	 concerned	 with	 predicting	 and	
incapacitating	 the	 chronic	 or	 high-rate	 offender	 using	 an	 apparatus	 of	 capture	 centered	 on	 the	
anticipatory	longitudinal	tracking	of	offenders	for	selective	incapacitation.	One	of	the	most	common	
depictions	 of	 actuarial	 justice	 is	 that	 it	 deploys	 technologies	 of	 actuarial	 prediction	 based	 upon	
algorithmic	codes	that	are	based	upon	a	known	population	of	offenders,	relying	heavily	upon	prior	
transactions/criminal	histories.	This	 is	partially	accurate,	 in	 that	probabilistic	models	 for	predicting	
recidivism	do	rely	heavily	upon	data	captured	from	offenders	that	are	tracked	over	time	after	their	
	 101	
first	observed	offence.	This	is	particularly	so	for	installing	actuarial	decision-making	techniques	within	
various	sites	or	nodes	of	criminal	justice,	as	well	as	for	establishing	benchmarks	for	estimating	levels	
of	 recidivism	 to	 evaluate	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 particular	 criminal	 justice	 interventions.	 As	 is	
demonstrated	in	Chapter	3,	the	desire	to	anticipate	or	predict	high-rate	offenders	as	early	as	possible	
for	 incapacitation	 renders	 the	 population	 of	 captured	 offenders	 subject	 to	 an	 incessant	 profiling	
driven	by	the	will-to-incapacitate.	And,	this	anticipation	projects	a	suspicion	over	all	citizen-subjects	
as	non-criminal	sites	are	screened	using	actuarial	codes	about	recidivism,	typically	framed	as	being	
anti-social	behavior.		This	is,	in	part,	recognized	in	Feeley	and	Simon’s	(1994:	181-185)	depiction	of	
the	 actuarial	 profiling	of	 citizens	by	police	 as	 it	may	be	used	 for	 stopping,	 searching,	 or	 detaining	
individuals	 who	 match	 codes	 used	 in	 these	 profiles	 based	 on	 “categoric”	 or	 “probabilistic”	
information”	about	a	profile	of	risky	persons	(eg	a	drug	courier	profile);	however,	it	does	not	foresee	
the	extension	of	actuarial	justice	into	domains	of	normalization	that	are	located	outside	of	the	state	
criminal	justice	apparatus.	
	
When	an	actuarial	profile	of	suspicion	is	transported	to	these	governmental	domains	to	identify	the	
risk	 of	 (re-)offending	 before	 a	 crime	 has	 been	 committed,	 or	 at	 the	 very	 early	 stages	 of	 criminal	
offending	when	it	is	difficult	to	discern	its	trajectory,	the	preventive	objectives	of	normalization	are	
re-configured.	 New	 sites	 of	 biopolitical	 security	 are	 established	 within	 the	 existing	 networks	 of	
criminal	justice.	Statistical	techniques	are	no	longer	being	used	to	plot	the	normal	and	the	abnormal	
so	that	interventions	can	be	carried	out	in	relation	to	a	fixed	norm	designed	to	integrate	the	individual	
within	society	(Foucault,	2007:	63).	Rather,	statistical	techniques	are	used	to	calculate	the	normal	or	
general	curve	of	criminal	offending	from	aggregated	data	and	then	identify	the	interplay	of	differential	
distributions	of	normality	 (or	dangers)	 in	relation	to	a	variable	but	more	favorable	norm.	Actuarial	
control	seeks	to	“reduce	the	most	unfavorable,	deviant	normalities	in	relation	to	this	interplay	of	risks	
using	mechanisms	 of	 security	 that	 are	 centrally	 concerned	with	 the	 problem	 of	 circulation:	 “how	
should	things	circulate	or	not	circulate?”	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	danger	and	the	overall	safety	
of	the	population	as	a	whole?”	(2007:	63-65).	When	actuarial	rationalities	and	controls	are	initiated	in	
the	 older	 sites	 of	 normalization	 based	 upon	 these	 risk	 classifications,	 a	 biopolitical	 caesura	 is	
established	that	I	have	argued	is	precautionary	in	character,	and	where	new	governmental	tactics	and	
techniques	 are	 invented	 that	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 population	 as	 it	 is	 viewed	 from	 the	
perspective	of	actuarial	justice	(2007:	107-108).		
	
Feeley	 and	 Simon	 (1994:	 178)	 understand	 actuarial	 justice	 as	 an	 effect	 of	 actuarial	 techniques	 of	
danger	 management,	 which	 become	 the	 rationality	 of	 the	 system,	 analogous	 to	 “computer	
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programs”.	This	refers	to	“computer	technologies”	that	are	linked	to	criminal	justice	administration,	
driven	by	the	prediction	of	future	offending	as	well	as	the	emergence	of	new	forms	of	expertise	that	
predict	 crime	 patterns,	 sentencing	 trends,	 and	 that	 audits	 governmental	 performance.	 More	
specifically,	 this	quite	general	 reference,	 is	best	understood	by	Deleuze’s	 (1992)	 concept	of	digital	
control,	where	biopolitical	codes	about	recidivism	capture	risk	data	designed	to	continuously	track,	
map,	 and	mine	 information	 about	 offenders	 that	 is	 fed-back	 into	 a	 distributed	 network	 of	 penal	
techniques	of	control	and	security,	and	that	manage	the	bodily	movement	of	 these	offenders	 in	a	
more	dynamic	way.		
	
Chapter	2	and	Chapter	3	have	mapped	the	technologies	of	probability	modelling	used	in	incapacitation	
and	selective	incapacitation	that	were	developed	by	researchers	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	to	generate	
estimates	 about	 the	 crime	 rate	 and	 for	 predicting	 and	 classifying	 offenders	 and	 evaluating	 the	
effectiveness	of	criminal	justice	interventions.	I	have	tried	to	demonstrate	a	number	of	key	points	in	
my	mapping	of	these	technologies.	Firstly,	 the	conditions	of	possibility	 for	particular	techniques	of	
selective	 incapacitation	 (eg	 the	 development	 of	 an	 actuarial	 technique	 for	 predicting	 high-rate	
offenders,	or	a	futures	model	for	estimating	recidivism	to	benchmark	the	effectiveness	of	a	change	in	
sentencing	policy)	are	assemblages	that	connect	to	a	central	apparatus	of	capture	that	codes	these	
flows	using	risk	information	enumerated	from	the	anticipatory	tracking	of	the	population	of	offenders.	
This	apparatus	is	the	net	that	captures	these	and	other	territories	of	penal	management	so	that	they	
increasingly	resonate	together	on	a	plane	of	consistency.	
	
In	the	1970s	the	researchers	who	conducted	this	research	were	largely	working	independently	of	one	
another,	and	they	were	located	outside	of	the	criminal	justice	system;	however,	their	research	agenda	
was	framed	by	perceptions	within	the	criminal	justice	system	that	there	was	little	evidence	of	criminal	
justice	effectiveness.	They	developed	a	probability	model	of	recidivism	that	projected	an	image	of	the	
offender	as	being	homogenous	in	identity:	the	offender	was	not	considered	to	be	a	rational	choice	
actor,	 but	 rather	 someone	 who	 committed	 crimes	 at	 a	 constant	 rate	 unless	 incapacitated.	 As	
demonstrated	in	the	thesis,	this	quite	simplistic	model	was	contested	in	the	late	1970s	by	an	emerging	
coalition	of	criminal	career	researchers	who	assumed	that	there	was	greater	population	heterogeneity	
within	 offenders	 and	 that	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 chart	 these	 differences	 to	 distinguish	 the	 different	
pathways	along	an	imagined	criminal	career	(these	careers	having	distinctive	beginnings,	courses	of	
development	 and	 endings).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 researchers	 shared	 a	 necessarily	 pessimistic	
assumption	 that	 it	 is	almost	 impossible	 to	ever	be	sure	 that	an	 individual	has	 really	desisted	 from	
offending.	The	criminal	career	protocol	and	its	research	agenda	was	afforded	considerable	authority	
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at	the	federal	 level,	where	 leaders	 in	the	development	of	this	protocol	were	appointed	to	the	two	
select	panels	established	for	considering	how	to	implement	a	policy	of	incapacitation.	It	is	argued	that	
by	the	mid-1980s	funded	criminal	career	research	must	be	viewed	as	being	located	within	the	criminal	
justice	 system	 networks	 as	 its	 research	 agenda	 and	 protocols	 were	 modulated	 by	 actuarial	
rationalities,	 and	were	 afforded	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 dissemination	 of	 risk	 information	 using	 data	
repositories,	and	in	the	development	of	actuarial	risk	technologies	in	the	emerging	global	marketplace	
for	use	in	criminal	justice	jurisdictions.		
	
Secondly,	 my	 description	 of	 the	 extensive	 labor	 that	 the	 Panel	 on	 Research	 on	 Criminal	 Careers	
(Blumstein	 et	 al.,	 1986	 a,	 b)	 devoted	 to	 critiquing	 other	 longitudinal	 research	 into	 selective	
incapacitation,	 in	 particular	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	Rand	Project’s	work	by	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	
(1982)	demonstrates	the	importance	of	making	sense	of	actuarial	algorithms	at	the	ontological	and	
epistemic	levels.	The	contestation	of	the	earlier	probability	models	about	recidivism	was	waged	by	an	
alliance	 of	 criminal	 career	 researchers,	many	 of	whom	were	 engaged	with	 actuarial	 pilot	 projects	
within	criminal	justice	networks	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	It	was	clear	that	over	the	three	years	that	
these	 academics	 conducted	 a	 review	 of	 possible	 actuarial	 models	 for	 predicting	 and	 classifying	
offenders	for	selective	 incapacitation,	that	their	developing	protocol	 for	how	actuarial	 instruments	
should	be	coded,	validated,	and	 transported	 for	 implementation	 in	other	 jurisdictions	had	already	
influenced	others	who	were	developing	actuarial	instruments	at	that	time.	
	
The	protocol	establishes	a	global	market	for	the	transportation	and	implementation	of	standardized	
and	 replicable	 actuarial	 prediction	 instruments	 for	 implementation	 in	 criminal	 justice	 decision-
making.	This	protocol	continues	to	modulate	research	protocols	for	conducting	longitudinal	research	
about	criminal	careers,	as	they	are	currently	practiced	within	lifespan	and	developmental	criminology.	
Moreover,	the	probability	models	that	are	coded	into	this	research	continue	to	be	used	to	establish	
benchmarks	 for	 evaluating	 criminal	 justice	 interventions.	 These	 actuarial	 codes	 are	 “defined	 by	
ontology	standards”	that	modulate	and	standardize	risk	information	within	actuarial	justice	networks,	
its	 development	 of	 software	 programs,	 and	 its	 decision-making	 procedures	 for	 revising	 and	 re-
configuring	 algorithmic	models	 for	 optimizing	 efficacy	 (Thacker,	 2004:	 xiii).	 The	 establishment	 and	
policing	of	these	protocols	by	means	of	meta-analysis	techniques,	data	brokerage	and	the	curatorial	
management	of	actuarial	information	within	data	repositories	and	their	deployment	within	networks	
is	data	politics,	which	is	isomorphic	with	biopolitics.				
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Thirdly,	 chapters	 two	and	 three	demonstrate	 that	both	 incapacitation	and	 selective	 incapacitation	
emerged	as	a	techno-scientific	governmental	problematization	within	a	field	of	considerable	scientific	
uncertainty.	In	the	1970s,	the	scattered	attempts	to	demonstrate	the	efficacy	of	implementing	a	policy	
of	incapacitation,	were	developed	in	the	absence	of	any	convincing	evidence	that	prison	as	a	form	of	
general	 deterrence	 or	 rehabilitation	 as	 a	 penal	 strategy	 for	 re-integrating	 offenders	 worked,	 and	
considerable	political	 debate	 about	whether	 such	a	policy	 should	be	 supported.	 In	 the	1980s,	 the	
desire	to	selectively	incapacitate	the	high-rate	offender	was	hampered	more	specifically	by	the	poor	
predictive	powers	of	actuarial	instruments.	
	
It	 was	 protocollary	 power,	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 techno-scientific	 standardization	 of	 research	
protocols,	that	paved	the	way	forward	for	a	de-politicized	strategy	that	utilized	evidence-based	penal	
practice	and	policy.	As	I	have	discussed,	in	the	short	interval	of	time	between	these	recommendations	
and	 the	 publication	 of	 Greenwood	 and	 Abrahamse’s	 prediction	 instrument	 for	 implementing	 a	
sentencing	policy	 of	 selective	 incapacitation	 in	 1982,	 an	 emerging	body	of	 research	was	 forging	 a	
tentative	criminal	career	research	protocol.	The	second	panel’s	efforts	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a,	b)	was	
a	decisive	moment	in	taking	command	in	the	establishment	of	this	research	protocol,	again	forged	
within	a	context	of	quite	limited	scientific	support	for	the	efficacy	of	actuarial	prediction.	This	included	
the	valorization	of	 the	 long-term	anticipatory	 tracking	of	offenders	within	a	 spirit	of	 collaborative,	
inter-disciplinary	 experimental	 and	 reflexive	 research	 aimed	 at	 the	 continuous	 improvement	 and	
refinement	of	algorithmic	codes	founded	upon	a	quest	to	identify	the	predictors	of	chronic	recidivism	
based	on	data	taken	from	the	life-course	at	the	earliest	stage	possible	(that	is,	in	childhood).		In	order	
to	 realize	 this	 research	 agenda,	 the	 research	 protocol	 relied	 upon	meta-analytic	 and	 data	 linkage	
techniques	for	integrating	heterogeneous	criminal	and	non-criminal	data	sets,	and	that	archived	this	
data	in	data	repositories	so	that	analysis	could	be	conducted.	This	data	would	be	captured	from	an	
increasingly	complex	criminal	justice	environment	of	responsibilized	authorities	located	both	within	
criminal	justice	institutions	and	the	non-government	or	community	sector.	
	
My	fourth	point	is	linked	to	the	one	above	in	terms	of	the	precarious	state	of	scientific	knowledge,	in	
particular	in	relation	to	its	poor	predictive	powers	in	accurately	classifying	high-rate	offenders.	In	my	
analysis,	uncertainty	generates	the	need	for	protocol,	and	protocol	appears	as	neutral,	apolitical	and	
free	from	the	need	for	critical	analysis.	Protocol	establishes	a	monotonous	recursion	of	activity	as	a	
result	of	replicability,	transportability	and	ongoing	evaluation.	The	materiality	of	statistical	 findings	
eclipses	their	constructed	and	contingent	character	as	very	little	attention	is	devoted	to	the	technical	
procedures,	except	by	those	researchers	immersed	within	the	actuarial	regime	of	research.	A	mapping	
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of	protocollary	power	helps	us	to	see	how	the	management	style	of	protocol	defines	these	technical	
procedures,	guides	decision-making	for	filtering	information,	re-arranging	data	and	re-analyzing	it	to	
suit	research	objectives,	how	the	findings	of	research	are	presented,	and	subsequently	channeled	for	
distribution	within	the	criminal	justice	networks	of	operation.	That	is,	protocol	modulates	the	flows	
of	information,	both	directly	and	indirectly	influencing	regimes	of	practice.		
	
We	might	note	here	the	way	that	uncertainty	relates	to	truth	and	power.	 In	Nietzsche,	genealogy,	
history,	Foucault	makes	the	point	that	the	will-to-knowledge,	at	the	interval	where	it	enters	the	stage	
of	appearance,	intensifies	the	struggle	to	gain	durability	as	a	prevailing	“species”,	often	being	highly	
inflated	 and	 excessive	 in	 its	 claims	 as	 well	 as	 militaristic	 in	 its	 de-legitimation	 of	 competing	
epistemological	modes	of	truth-telling.	“Emergence	is	always	produced	through	a	particular	stage	of	
forces”	that	must	constantly	wage	a	battle	with	oppositional	forces	that	threaten	to	decompose	it,	by	
“dividing	these	forces	against	themselves”	to	regain	strength	(1977b:	149).		In	this	somewhat	tentative	
phase	of	emergence,	is	depicted	by	Foucault	(ibid):	
	
It	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 species…and	 its	 solidification	 are	 secured	 ‘in	 an	
extended	battle	against	conditions	which	are	essentially	and	constantly	unfavourable’.	In	fact,	
‘the	species	must	 realize	 itself	as	a	species	as	something	–	characterized	by	 the	durability,	
uniformity,	 and	 simplicity	 of	 form	 –	 which	 can	 prevail	 in	 the	 perpetual	 struggle	 against	
outsiders	or	the	uprising	of	those	it	oppresses	from	within.	
	
At	the	time	that	the	second	panel	was	developing	their	criminal	career	research	protocol,	there	were	
two	contradictory	 forces	at	play:	Along	one	vector,	 stretching	 from	the	1960s	 though	 to	 the	early	
1980s	 a	 number	 of	 pilot	 projects	 that	 developed	 actuarial	 instruments	 to	 improve	 bail,	 parole	 or	
sentencing	decision-making	published	the	results	of	the	early	stages	of	this	work,	making	strong	claims	
about	the	predictive	powers	of	their	actuarial	instruments.	These	sorts	of	claims	had	a	cascading	effect	
in	 that	 they	 stimulated	 others	 to	 adopt	 the	 instrument	 to	 improve	 decision-making,	 when	 its	
predictive	accuracy	had	not	been	validated.	 In	a	 line	of	opposition,	a	 second	vector	emerged	 that	
provided	 moral,	 ethical,	 juridical	 and	 technical	 opposition	 to	 implementing	 a	 system	 of	 actuarial	
decision-making,	in	particular	in	relation	to	sentencing.	The	second	panel’s	response	was	ironical	in	
response	to	the	tension	between	the	two	vectors	–	it	sought	to	improve	standards	of	development	
and	 predictive	 accuracy	 based	 on	 technical	 criterion	 of	 functionality	 and	 efficiency,	 and	 create	 a	
shared	 consensus	 about	 how	 to	 develop	 probability	 models;	 and,	 it	 simultaneously	 validated	 a	
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number	of	existing	actuarial	instruments	by	obfuscating	its	audience	to	downplay	a	clear	articulation	
of	the	predictive	accuracy	of	these	instruments.	
	
My	fifth	point	 is	as	follows:	The	open-ended	character	of	actuarial	 justice	has	not	been	sufficiently	
recognized	with	the	actuarial	justice	literature.	Within	critical	accounts	of	actuarial	justice,	actuarial	
instruments	have	been	considered	as	being	static:	the	actuarial	codes	of	are	a	composite	form	that	
were	heavily	reliant	upon	prior	criminal	history	(see	Harcourt,	2007:	96-98).	Little	or	no	attention	has	
been	afforded	to	their	ongoing	development.	I	have	demonstrated	that	this	open-ended	inquiry,	in	a	
quest	to	find	the	most	effective	combination	of	predictors,	has	been	a	necessary	part	of	the	criminal	
career	protocol.	This	is	not	only	because	of	the	poor	ability	to	accurately	identify	high-rate	offenders,	
but	also	because	a	policy	of	selective	incapacitation	would	not	be	effective	unless	it	found	effective	
ways	to	 identify	high-rate	offenders	at	the	beginning	of	their	criminal	career	rather	than	at	a	 later	
stage	when	 their	 career	 had	 reached	 its	 peak	 or	was	 declining.	When	 one	 thinks	 about	 selective	
incapacitation,	 the	 impression	 is	 that	 it	was	a	system	of	security	management	geared	towards	the	
adult	 offender.	My	analysis	 demonstrates	 that,	 from	 its	 early	 stages	of	 emergence,	 its	 biopolitical	
objectives	were	clearly	focused	on	juvenile	crime	and	its	stages	of	incipient	development	as	childhood	
delinquency.	Although	it	would	appear	that	the	chronic	adult	offender	is	the	target	of	incapacitation,	
this	 is	merely	a	symptom;	the	 focus	 in	 the	actuarial	model	 is	 the	child.	This	 is	most	evident	 in	 the	
criminal	career	protocol’s	valorization	of	longitudinal	research	across	the	lifespan,	and	the	subsequent	
alliances	 between	 criminal	 justice	 statistical	 research	 about	 recidivism	 and	 its	 alliances	 with	
researchers	 who	 were	 engaged	 on	 long-term	 birth	 cohort	 studies	 and	 their	 efforts	 to	 anticipate	
recidivism	in	late	childhood.		
	
Importantly,	 actuarial	 techniques	 operate	 in	 a	 dubious	 space	with	 respect	 to	 the	 juridical	 sphere.	
Foucault	 (2007:	 56)	 suggested	 that	 techniques	 of	 normalization	 (whether	 they	 be	 disciplinary	 or	
biopolitical)	“develop	from	and	below	a	system	of	law,	in	its	margins	and	maybe	even	against	it”.	This	
is	certainly	the	case	with	selective	incapacitation,	its	tactics	were	backdoor	driven	by	a	political	will	to	
redistribute	 risks	 in	 favor	of	 the	overall	well-being	and	safety	of	 the	community	within	a	milieu	of	
techno-scientific	experimentation,	which	subsequently	was	adopted	as	a	policy	of	guided	actuarial	
risk	 assessment	 within	 the	 nodes	 of	 criminal	 justice	 decision-making	 aimed	 at	 preventing	 future	
offences.	Arguably,	Feeley	and	Simon	(1992:	456;	1994:	179)	underestimated	the	way	in	which	this	
biopolitical	will	was	to	become	so	centrally	focused	upon	the	reduction	of	recidivism.	In	their	mapping	
of	 actuarial	 justice,	 criminal	 justice	 nodes	 began	 to	 measure	 their	 own	 outputs	 as	 indicators	 of	
performance,	with	a	subsequent	“waning	of	concern	over	 recidivism”	 (1992:	456).	They	suggested	
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that	data	about	recidivism	was	nothing	more	than	one	indicator	at	the	intersection	of	other	indictors	
linked	to	classification,	 incarceration,	and	surveillance	(1994:	178,	179).	A	close	examination	of	the	
archive	concerned	with	selective	incapacitation	reveals	the	opposite:	the	dvidual,	once	enrolled	within	
networked	criminal	justice	data-bases	is	the	target	of	a	permanent	anticipatory	tracking,	where	the	
chief	measure	of	any	particular	criminal	justice	intervention	is	the	reduction	in	recidivism.	Estimates	
about	recidivism	are	elevated	to	the	focal	point	of	analysis;	they	are	used	to	manage	levels	of	risk	in	
the	offender	population,	and	to	benchmark	and	evaluate	penal	interventions.	The	valorization	of	this	
evidence-based	policy,	as	it	is	implemented	over	time,	will	result	in	a	reconfiguration	of	both	internal	
and	external	biopolitical	perceptions	about	what	risks	are	considered	the	most	important,	which	will	
in	turn	shape	the	nature	of	criminal	justice	interventions.	
	
To	the	extent	that	criminal	justice	clearinghouses	develop	increasingly	interactive	interfaces	with	the	
“public”	 who	 can	 access	 and	 download	 information	 about	 crime	 in	 their	 neighborhood	 or	 about	
recidivism	 and	 criminal	 justice	 effectiveness,	 this	 marketing	 of	 biopolitical	 information	 circulates	
within	the	security	dispositif,	shaping	the	public’s	political	opinions	about	criminal	justice	reform	as	
well	 as	 their	 own	participation	within	 security	management.	 The	 constant	 relaying	 of	 information	
about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 particular	 kinds	 of	 intervention	 will	 exert	 pressure	 upon	 senior	
administrators	within	the	criminal	justice	milieu	to	consider	culling	programs	that	do	not	demonstrate	
effectiveness	in	reducing	recidivism,	inventing	new	programs	that	might	be	more	effective.	It	can	be	
predicted	that	over	time,	the	channeling	of	this	sort	of	information	will	undermine	particular	policy	
and	practice	 legislative	principles	that	may	eventually	result	 in	 legislative	change	as	a	result	of	 the	
intensification	 of	 biopolitical	 concern	 about	 high-rate	 offenders.138	 The	 avalanche	 of	 biopolitical	
information	 about	 recidivism	and	 criminal	 justice	 performance	does	 not	 insulate	 the	 system	 from	
external,	 “messy,	 hard-to-control	 demands”	 (Feeley	 and	 Simon,	 1992:	 456);	 on	 the	 contrary,	 it	
intensifies	these	pressures	as	the	public	is	reconstituted	as	a	key	stakeholder	in	security	management	
under	neo-liberal	rule.		
	
Selective	 incapacitation	 –	 and	 its	 more	 contemporary	 incantations	 of	 risk	 assessment	 and	 case	
management	–	imported	probabilistic	mathematical	techniques	from	outside	of	the	criminal	justice	
system	(for	managing	insurance	in	work	accidents	or	public	safety),	and	the	deployment	of	economic	
rationalities	within	criminal	justice	governmentality	-		and	integrated	it	within	criminal	justice	decision-
making	in	ways	that	were	unthinkable	in	the	mid-1970s,	but	that	were	complimentary	to	emerging	
biopolitical	priorities.	Poisson	probability	models	are	capable	of	forecasting	future	fiscal	and	systemic	
demands	within	the	criminal	justice	system	in	the	same	way	that	they	could	be	used	to	estimate	the	
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triage	 demands	 of	 a	 casualty	 ward	 in	 a	 hospital	 or	 the	 critical	 response	 required	 for	 a	 projected	
disaster.	Selective	incapacitation	was	a	biopolitical	strategy	for	managing	and	attempting	to	neutralize	
the	 systemic	pressures	of	purported	 rising	crime	 rates,	elevated	 security	 concerns	 linked	 to	urban	
disorder	 and	 rioting,	 rising	 concerns	 with	 public	 safety	 and	 (potential)	 victimization,	 prison	
overcrowding,	poor	crime	clear-up	rates,	and	an	arbitrary	use	of	penal	sanctioning.	It	assured	some	
guarantee	of	success	in	reducing	the	crime	rate	in	the	absence	of	other	effective	penal	strategies.	
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 its	 futures	 modelling	 of	 systemic	 parameters,	 widened	 the	 orbit	 of	 security	
management	 to	begin	a	biopolitical	 project	 that	 attempted	 to	modulate	other	elements	of	 reality	
within	 the	 criminal	 justice	 dispositif	 (eg	 improving	 police	 rates	 of	 prosecution,	 applying	 a	 more	
consistent	 policy	 of	 sanctioning	 etc)	 function	 in	 a	 way	 that	 it	 might	 optimize	 outcomes	 for	 the	
implementation	 of	 a	 policy	 of	 selective	 incapacitation.	 Selective	 incapacitation	 is	 a	 “double	
integration”	of	the	“rationalization	of	chance	and	probabilities”,	with	the	particular	security	technique	
of	incapacitation	(Foucault,	2007:	59).	Its	biopolitical	strategy	seeks	to	nullify	the	detrimental	effects	
of	unexpected	events	by	re-arranging	multiple	elements	and	forces	within	the	criminal	justice	milieu	
to	bring	 these	 forces	 into	greater	 alignment	 in	 reducing	 the	 crime	 rate.	 Selective	 incapacitation	 is	
therefore	intelligible	within	the	context	of	an	environmental	governmentality,	it	is	a	security	dispositif.	
As	 a	 technique	 of	 security,	 selective	 incapacitation	 is	 centrally	 concerned	 with	 the	 problem	 of	
circulation	and	the	question	of	how	things	should	circulate	or	not	circulate	(2007:	64).	
	
To	restate	this	using	Deleuze’s	diagram	of	power,	the	constant	surveillance	of	cases	of	risk	tracks	each	
person’s	licit	and	illicit	movement	deploying	the	control	logic	of	modulation,	which	both	adjusts	to	the	
body	as	 it	moves	within	a	networked	apparatus	of	mobile	confinement,	and	that	uses	a	“‘moving’	
form	of	coding”	concerned	with	metastable	“modulations	of	coded	information”	(Bogard,	2007:	5).	
Risk	case	management	and	the	deployment	of	feedback	about	reducing	levels	of	recidivism	are	never	
done	with,	 they	circulate	 throughout	 the	networks	of	 the	criminal	 justice	milieu	as	potentials	 that	
reside	within	the	digital	network	that	can	be	realized	in	a	myriad	of	ways	through	their	uptake	and	
deployment	given	a	telos	of	continuous	improvement	in	the	face	of	constant	disappointment	in	the	
effective	control	of	recidivism	(Ruppert	et	al.,	2017:	2).	Re-classifications	of	risk	over	time	modulate	
and	 control	 the	 offender’s	 bodily	 movement.	 And,	 new	 risk	 information	 becomes	 a	 key	 line	 of	
modulation	 that	 is	 enacted	 through	 protocol	 to	 invent	 further	 refinement	 in	 probability	 model-
building	and	the	development	of	actuarial	instrumentation,	and	program	development	for	the	control	
of	recidivism.	To	the	extent	that	new	series	of	actuarial	information	are	a	contingent	actualization	of	
protocollary	power	(that	is,	they	are	constantly	materializing	their	logics	and	practices),	this	functions	
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as	potential	as	this	information	is	always	about	to	be	enacted	upon	(Thacker,	2004:	xiv).	These	effects	
need	to	be	mapped	over	time	to	critically	evaluate	their	impacts.	How	is	this	information	enacted?	
Are	new	thresholds	reached	that	begin	to	reshape	penal	practice?	Are	these	logistics	and	practices	
resisted,	and	if	so	how	is	this	enacted?	
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1	This	is	the	title	of	Clarke’s	(1973)	research	paper	on	incapacitation.	
2	Feeley	and	Simon	(1994:	197	footnote	3)	continue:	“Some	regard	it	as	a	bad	memory	from	the	1980s	but	we	
suspect	it	will	continue	to	reappear	in	more	subtle	forms	within	sentencing	schemes	that	do	not	highlight	the	
centrality	of	selectivity”.	This	elevates	the	criminal	code	to	a	central	place	in	the	operations	of	actuarial	justice.	
If	normalization	had	dispersed	itself	throughout	the	networks	of	criminal	justice,	surely	actuarial	modes	of	
decision-making	are	as	equally	dispersed	and	ubiquitous?	
3	That	is,	“a	series	of	supervisory,	disciplinary	and	correctional	interventions	administered	under	the	threat	of	
punishment	but	which	remain	distinct	from	it”	(Garland,	1981:	29).	The	sanction	(eg	probation,	parole,	
individualization	in	sentencing,	preventive	detention)	extends	legal	control	by	deploying	extra-legal	(social	
work,	psychiatric	and	psychological)	expertise	to	establish	a	program	of	intervention	aimed	at	transforming	
the	individual	for	effective	re-integration	into	society.	This	individualization	of	punishment	strategically	
deploys	the	breach	of	law	as	a	“point	of	access”	that	provides	an	opening	for	an	array	of	normalizing	
interventions	unless	clinical	expertise	considers	that	the	individual	cannot	be	treated	(1981:	29,	38).	The	penal	
institution	stretches	into	the	social	field,	an	extensive	network	of	normalizing	interventions	enacted	by	diverse	
agents	and	authorities	(Foucault,	1977:	293-308;	Cohen,	1985).	
4	A	regime	of	government	refers	to	the	“relatively	organized	and	systemized	ways	of	doing	things	(such	as	
punishing)”	(Dean,	1999:	211).	Any	particular	regime	of	government	both	directs	the	conduct	of	self	and	
others,	this	being	mutually	conditioned	by	four	distinctive	but	inter-connected	axes:	fields	of	visibility,	forms	of	
rationality,	techniques	and	technologies,	and	identities	and	agencies	(ibid).		
5	https://scholar.google.com.au/citations?user=nipCxXIAAAAJ&hl=en,	Accessed	9th	September	2017.	
6	Diagnosis	is	a	term	used	by	Foucault	throughout	his	investigations	(see	Flynn,	2005:	44-45).	It	appeals	to	“the	
case	study	method”	used	in	modern	medicine	(which	Foucault)	employs	throughout	his	histories”	to	describe	
an	emerging	“event-fact”	in	a	figurative	(rather	than	its	literal)	sense	that	can	only	be	rendered	intelligible	in	its	
multiplicity	of	elements	and	their	dispersion	as	a	network	of	events	or	practices	that	bring	them	into	being	
(ibid).	Like	the	physician,	a	diagnosis	renders	intelligible	the	conditions	of	emergence	of	particular	truth-power	
formation	that	we	have	taken	as	being	self-evident,	so	that	we	might	begin	to	suggest	alternative	avenues	of	
behavior.	
7	They	dryly	comment:	“The	same	techniques	that	can	be	used	to	improve	the	circulation	of	baggage	in	
airports	or	delivery	of	food	to	troops	can	be	used	to	improve	the	penal	system’s	efficiency”	(Feeley	and	Simon	
1994:	467).	
8	The	high-risk,	chronic	or	dangerous	offender	is	recast	as	being	as	being	a	member	of	“the	underclass”,	a	
concept	that	had	gained	greater	political	purchase	in	America	in	the	late	1980s	(see	Wilson,	1987,	1996;	
Sampson	and	Wilson,	1995).	This	segment	of	the	population	was	imagined	as	being	“permanently	
marginal...without	literacy,	without	skills,	and	without	hope:	a	self-perpetuating	and	pathological	segment	of	
society	that	cannot	be	assimilated	into	society,	even	as	a	reserve	labour	pool”	(Feeley	and	Simon,	1994:	467). 
Conceptions	of	the	underclass	span	back	to	nineteenth	fears	about	the	crimogenic	nature	of	the	dangerous	
classes,	referring	to	a	residual	population	of	dysfunctional	individuals,	families	and	communities,	where	this	
dysfunctionality	is	also	a	threat	to	society	as	a	whole	(Young,	2007:	18).	The	underclass	has	been	understood	
as	being	socially	excluded,	as	if	this	was	primarily	a	problem	of	vertical	economic	integration,	a	“hydraulic	
process,	where	the	tides	of	exclusion	have	risen	leaving	behind	the	destitute	and	the	feckless”	(Young,	2007:	
18,	103).		This	conception	of	the	underclass	has	been	deployed	in	the	US,	and	in	the	UK	by	the	Social	Exclusion	
Unit,	in	a	way	that	attributes	exclusion	to	a	“weak”	version	of	agency	as	being	self-imposed	(a	minority	
problem)	rather	than	a	more	active	version	that	regards	agency	as	being	socially	produced	(an	endemic	
structural	problem	of	economic,	cultural,	racial	and	sexual	inequality)	(2007:	102-04).		Lacking	any	
acknowledgement	of	social	antagonism	and	conflict,	including	the	recognition	of	collective	rejection	of	the	
underclass	by	society	(see	Bauman	1998,	Parenti	2000,	Rose	1999,	Young	1999)	this	conservative	account	of	
the	underclass	uses	a	binary	logic	that	divides	society	into	an	inclusive	and	largely	satisfied	majority	and	an	
excluded	and	despondent	minority	(Young,	2007:	18).	
9	Simon	(1993:	259)	comments:	“It	is	distasteful	to	an	extreme	to	use	such	an	expression.	Yet	in	a	culture	for	
which	work	remains	the	overriding	source	of	personal	worth,	the	fate	of	a	class	excluded	from	the	labour	
market	is	to	be	treated	as	a	kind	of	toxic	waste.	The	actuarial	technique	of	containment	of	high-risk	offenders	
are	a	component	of	an	assemblage	of	social	control	techniques	that	Garland	has	coined	“criminologies	of	the	
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Other”	(Garland,	2001:	137,	184-186).	Framed	within	discourses	of	warfare	and	social	defence,	he	describes	
how	the	underclass	have	become	targeted	for	regimes	of	punitive	exclusion	as	they	are	considered	beyond 
reform,	outside	of	the	civil	community	(2001,	185).	In	Garland’s	account	criminologies	of	the	Other	(eg	the	
War	on	drugs,	zero	tolerance	policing)	are	distinctly	different	from	neo-liberal	forms	of	crime	control	that	
consider	crime	to	be	a	routine	fact	of	life	and	deploy	rational	actor	models	for	reducing	crime.	He	depicts	
these	strategies	as	being	anti-modern	and	anti-social	science,	as	they	deploy	moralistic,	retributive	and	
expressive	modes	of	political	discourse	of	sovereign	power	to	punish	the	criminal	being	driven	by	the	interests	
of	political	actors	and	by	the	exigencies,	political	calculations	and	short-term	interests	(2001:	191).		At	the	
same	time,	he	claims	that	these	strategies,	in	adopting	a	war	mentality,	defeat	economic	reasoning.	
10	Simon	identifies	two	transformations	in	the	strategies	of	parole:	a	shift	from	disciplinary	parole	to	clinical	
parole	beginning	in	the	1950’s,	and	a	shift	to	“technologies	of	control”	that	emerged	in	the	period	between	
1970	and	1990	in	many	jurisdictions	in	the	United	States	(1993:	169-201;	see	also	Harcourt,	2007:	47-76;	77-
103).	This	mapping	of	a	technocratically	designed	model	for	the	risk	management	of	offenders	is	at	the	core	of	
Simon	and	Feeley’s	mapping	of	actuarial	justice.		While	clinical	models	for	offender	rehabilitation	provide	
considerable	discretion	involving	the	professional	interpretation	of	the	prospects	of	rehabilitation	for	
individual	offenders,	the	technocratic	model	would	seem	to	establish	a	top-down,	neo-liberal	model	for	
governing	at-a-distance	to	establish	a	prescribed	program	of	risk	management	of	the	offender	population	as	a	
whole	that	is	as	much	concerned	with	the	performance	of	those	responsible	for	regulating	offenders	as	it	is	
with	the	outcomes	for	offenders.		Performance	is	evaluated	upon	system-generated	auditing	criteria	that	
establish	a	“self-contained	‘truth’…that	does	not	require	(professional)	interpretation	(1993:	189).	Ironically,	
as	the	state’s	correctional	systems	were	then	becoming	increasingly	held	to	account	for	the	public	good	of	
community	safety	as	well	as	being	required	to	incorporate	the	concerns	of	the	victims	of	crime,	the	state	
dispositif	responded	by	using	technologies	of	security	that	would	permit	it	to	operate	independently.	Drug	
testing	is	exemplary	in	this	regard	as	establishes	a	systemic	variable	that	efficiently	measures	the	relative	
success	of	a	surveillance	system	that	manages	and	regulates	an	offender’s	time	and	effectively	controls	non-
compliance	by	sending	or	returning	those	offenders	with	persistent	positive	drug	test	results	to	prison.	
11	This	chapter	translates	Foucault’s	lecture	delivered	at	the	College	De	France	on	17	March	1976.	It	is	the	first	
in	a	series	of	lectures	where	he	develops	his	genealogy	of	biopolitics	initially	published	in	The	history	of	
sexuality,	Volume	1	(Foucault,	1976/1978:	133-60).	
12	Feeley	and	Simon’s	cynical	depiction	of	technocratic	managerialism	and	its	emphasis	on	the	efficient	control	
of	internal	system	processes	is	congruent	with	governmentality	studies	that	proliferated	in	the	1990s	in	
relation	to	advanced	liberalism	and	neo-liberalism	(Gordon	1991,	Foucault	1991,	Barry	et	al.	1996,	Dean	1999,	
Rose	1999),	although	there	is	no	reference	made	to	neo-liberalism.	Key	analyses	in	the	field	took	Foucault’s	
lead	in	describing	neo-liberalism	as	a	mode	of	reflexive	government	involving	governmental	probematization,	
and	correlative	forms	of	calculation	about	political	activity,	which	has	its	objective:	the	influence,	
appropriation,	redistribution,	allocation	or	maintenance	of	powers	of	the	government	of	the	state	as	well	as	
other	organizations	(Dean,	1999:	210).	Neo-liberalism	deploys	political	rationalities	that	seek	to	extend	the	
operations	of	the	market	within	the	logic	of	capitalism	to	be	applied	to	all	of	the	apparatuses	of	the	state,	as	
well	as	to	subjects	considered	as	autonomous	individuals	who	were	entrepreneurs	of	the	self	within	the	
“enterprise	society”	(Foucault,	2008).	
13	Technnocratic	managerialism	is	a	form	of	regulatory	power	that	propels	actuarial	justice	within	a	milieu	of	
risk	management,	with	virtually	no	counter-measures	for	due	process	(Citron,	2008)	It	is	codes,	not	rules,	that	
determine	any	particular	criminal	justice	adjudication.	The	more	automated	decisions	become,	procedural	
safeguards	disappear,	as	algorithmic	decision-making	“jeopardize	due	process	norms.	Hearings	are	devalued	
by	the	lack	of	meaningful	notice	and	by	the	hearing	officer’s	tendency	to	presume	a	computer	system’s	
infallibility”	(2008:	1249).	In	cases	where	appeals	are	made	to	a	higher	court,	it	is	likely	that	a	review	of	
decision-making	is	“ill-equipped	to	compare	the	high	fixed	cost	of	deciphering	a	computer	system’s	logic	with	
the	accumulating	variable	benefit	of	correcting	myriad	inaccurate	decisions	based	on	this	logic”	(ibid).	
14	Foucault’s	analysis	(200	8:	284-286)	of	the	physiocrats	reveals	a	concern	with	how	the	population	could	be	
targeted,	however	in	a	paradoxical	way.	The	physiocrats	established	liberal	principles	for	regulating	the	
economy	founded	upon	“the	principle	of	the	necessary	freedom	of	economic	agents”,	coupling	this	with	an	
insistence	that	the	sovereign	must	regulate	the	economy	founded	upon	a	“total	knowledge”	of	the	economy’s	
economic	process	using	the	technology	of	an	economic	table	(2008:	285).	This	obligated	the	sovereign	to	use	
this	knowledge	of	the	overall	operations	of	economy	to	influence	all	subjects	in	ways	that	are	“all	the	more	
despotic	and	unrestrained	by	traditions,	customs,	rules,	and	fundamental	laws	founded	upon	evidence,	a	well-
constructed	economic	knowledge”	(ibid).	The	political	economy	is	intelligible	as	a	science	or	a	mode	of	truth	
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telling	that	must	be	taken	into	account;	however,	economic	science	cannot	be	the	internal	principle	of	that	
governmentalization,	concluding	that	“economics	is	a	science	lateral	to	the	art	of	governing…there	is	no	
question	that	it	can	be	the	governmental	rationality	itself”	(2008:	286).	
15	Under	biopolitical	government,	normalization	is	no	longer	“standardizing”	as	it	was	under	penal	welfarism,	
rather	it	has	“moved	out	of	reach	of	normalization”	as	a	result	of	the	constant	variation	of	variables	within	
environment	that	possess	their	own	autonomy	that	may	at	some	point	in	the	future	pose	a	threat	by	reaching	
crisis	proportions	if	carefully	monitored,	anticipated,	and	targeted	for	security	techniques	of	prevention	
(Massumi,	2007:	155).		
16	This	liberal	conception	is	derived	from	a	version	of	“economic	man	as	a	subject	of	interest,	a	subject	of	
individual	preferences	and	choices”	whose	actions	are	opaque,	dense	and	autonomous	in	character	when	
considered	within	the	context	of	the	aleatory	processes	of	populations	(Gordon,	1991:	20-21).	Biopolitical	
regulations	deploy	a	field	of	regulations	in	an	attempt	to	direct	the	conduct	of	individuals	populated	within	a	
milieu	composed	of	a	“real	density	and	complexity	...to...position	(economic	actors)	to	make	them	adequately	
manageable”	(Foucault,	quoted	in	Gordon	1991:	23).	There	is	always	the	possibility	that	the	object-target	of	
biopolitical	regulation	will	resist	these	regulations,	or	that	innumerable	circumstances	and	modifications,	
accidents,	and	new	developments	within	the	regulatory	environment	generate	tension	within	the	security	
apparatus.	The	object-target	of	this	environmental	governmentality	is	“human	beings	insofar	as	they	are	
species	and	their	environment”	(Foucault,	2003:	245).	In	“compensating	for	variations	within	this	aleatory	
field”,	tactically	biopolitical	governmentality	must	remain	“operationally	‘open	to	unknowns’	(imperceptible	
stirrings)	and	catch	‘transversal	phenomena’	(nonlinear	multiplier	effects)	before	they	amplify	the	stirrings	to	
actual	crisis	proportions”	(Massumi,	2009:	154).		
17	Security	mechanisms	anticipate	and	attempt	to	tactically	manage	a	plurality	of	possible	risk	correlations	and	
probable	events	using	two	major	strategies:	(either)...“to	stop	eruptive	events	before	they	occur,	or	prepare	
for	an	interval	in-between	the	occurrence	of	a	disruptive	event	and	it	damaging	a	valued	life”	(Anderson	2012:	
34).	The	first	preventive	strategy	is	affirmative	in	its	political	affects	as	it	expresses	preventive	governmental	
actions	designed	to	engineer	prosperity;	however,	it	is	equally	expressive	of	more	destructive	pre-emptive	or	
precautionary	measures	within	security	apparatuses	concerned	with	the	war	on	terror	or	other	more	
permanent	threats	single	out	populations	for	neutralisation/destruction.	
18	Deleuze	asserts	that	modulated	control	is	an	ongoing	response	to	perpetual	crises	of	enclosed	spaces	and	
their	inter-relations	with	the	shift	from	industrial	to	post-industrial	capitalism	in	as	corporations	began	to	shift	
to	a	higher-order	production	that	sells	services	and	buys	stocks,	operating	though	dispersive	relations	that	
seeks	to	control	the	market	through	financial	mechanisms	and	marketing	strategies,	effectively	extending	
control	through	stockholder	control	and	debt,	while	generating	extreme	poverty	which	excludes	many	from	
these	circuits	of	money	(Deleuze,	1992:	6).			
19	Deleuze	(1992:	4)	uses	the	terms	“mechanisms”	or	“weapons”.	
20	Penal	welfarism	has	individualizing	effects,	constituting	the	subject	as	possessing	a	molar	identity	with	a	
stable	formation	(Foucault,	1977a;	Deleuze,	1992:	5);	however,	actuarial	techniques	and	their	probabilistic	
statistical	relations	effaces	that	individuality.	Digitalization	and	actuarial	codes	reconstitute	the	individual	as	a	
“data-double”	within	a	databank,	where	bodily-movement	is	modulated	as	an	effect	of	the	computation	of	
dangerousness	that	may	block	further	freedom	of	movement,	or	subject	it	to	further	profiling	based	on	
suspicion	and	uncertainty.	Data	capture	enrols	the	individual	in	the	data	bank,	recoding	risk	information	as	
dviduated	codes.	Pugliese	(2010:	1-2)	argues	that	biometric	techniques	such	actuarial	prediction	authenticate	
and	verify	risk	identity,	effectively	permanently	capturing	them	in	the	network	for	continuous	risk	surveillance	
and	danger	management.	
21	This	contrasts	with	individuation,	the	logic	of	normalization,	where	there	is	an	“external	division	of	a	mass	
into	a	distinct,	numbered	(or	signed)	entities”	(Bogard,	2007:	5).	
22	Each	re-modulation	is	a	phase	shift,	or	an	event,	that	is	empirical	and	trans-historical;	it	is	empirically	
contingent	in	that	intermixes	already-constituted	bodies,	things	and	discursive	elements	in	a	co-
ordinated/regulated	way,	to	bring	about	a	desired	emergent	event	which	is	momentarily	codified	and	rules	
applied	(Massumi,	2002:	76-77).	Any	particular	modulation	can	be	understood	as	a	“directional	
channelling…that	in-gathers	a	heterogeneity	of	substantial	of	substantial	elements	along	with	the	already-
constituted	abstractions	of	language	(‘meaning’)	and	delivers	them	together	to	change”	(2002:	76).	The	effects	
are	analogous	to	a	collective	becoming,	“common	to	the	proto-game,	the	official	game”,	where	each	
modulation,	has	local	modifications	of	co-ordinated,	global	affects	–	where,	within	the	criminal	justice	milieu,	
there	are	official	modifications	as	well	as	unofficial	versions,	that	co-exist	as	the	effects	of	a	new	event	begins	
to	re-configure	the	dispositif	in	an	open-ended	way.	
	 139	
																																																																																																																																																																								
23	Galloway’s	(2004:	38)	abstract	diagram	is	that	of	a	distributed	network	of	autonomous	agents	who	operate	
“according	to	certain	pre-agreed	‘scientific’	rules	of	the	system”.	Protocollary	power	operates	within	the	
Internet’s	network,	regulated	by	its	technical	protocol.	Packet-switching	gateway	host	servers	send	and	
receive	information	that	is	transported	within	the	Internet’s	networks	using	a	technical	protocol	consisting	of	
four	layers:	a	semantic	layer	responsible	for	the	content	of	the	specific	technology	(eg	emails)	is	applied;	a	
transport	layer	makes	sure	that	the	data	arrives	at	its	destination;	the	internet	layer	moves	the	data	between	
locations;	and,	data	is	transferred	using	a	particular	hardware	technology.	The	ultimate	goal	of	the	Internet	is	
“totality”	of	control:	“robustness,	contingency,	interoperability,	flexibility,	heterogeneity,	pantheism”	(2004:	
42;	see	42-53	for	technical	details	of	these	protocols	that	use	TCP/IP	and	DNS	computer	protocols).	At	the	
material	substrate	of	these	protocols	there	are	two	tersed	protocols	concerned	with	the	systems	
administration	for	communicating	and	exchanging	information:	one	that	“radically	distributes	control	into	
autonomous	agents”	along	a	horizontal	axis	for	enabling	participation	within	the	network,	and	another	that	
“rigidly	organizes	control”	in	a	quite	hierarchical	way	along	a	vertical	axis	(2004:	53).	
24	Galloway	and	Thacker’s	mapping	of	protocol	is	inspired	from	Deleuze’s	diagnosis	about	the	control	society	
(Galloway,	2004:	3-4,	86-87;	Galloway	and	Thacker,	2007:	35-42).	They	do	not	view	control	as	being	anything	
like	a	centralized	control	room	or	a	form	of	manipulation	or	remote	control.	Rather,	it	is	a	series	of	continuous	
modulations	within	the	distributed	network	in	between	the	many	participating	nodes	(2007:	35).	Informatic	
networks	are	continually	modulated	because	they	are	statistical	and	probabilistic	(2007:	38).	In	reading	
protocol	in	this	way,	they	are	able	to	develop	an	abstract	diagram	of	the	“functioning	of	bodies	within	social	
space”,	the	biopolitical	“creation	of	bodies	into	artificial	life	that	are	dividuated,	sampled,	and	coded”	
(Galloway,	2004:	12),	and	of	the	commands	and	controls	that	enable	and	manage	individual’s	participation	in	
particular	informational	networks	as	well	as	the	forms	of	resistance	or	counter-protocollary	forces	that	these	
controls	spawn	within	the	protocollary	field	(Galloway,	2004:15-17).	Foucault’s	conception	of	biopolitics,	or	
the	“statistical	coding	of	the	population	as	a	living	mass”	(2004:	87)	is	more	precisely	mapped	through	the	
digital	language	of	control,	the	protocol	of	particular	“species-knowledge	for	life	forms”	(2004:	17). 	
25	O’Malley (2004:	8)	describes	risk	programs	as	being	a	“fluid,	inclusive,	heterogeneous	array	of	practices	with	
diverse	effects	and	implications”,	not	all	of	which	fit	the	actuarial	framework.	He,	like	many	others,	illustrate	
the	existence	of	mixed	models	of	governance,	where	actuarial	programs	operate	alongside	other	justice	
programs	such	as	restorative	justice	(O’Malley:	1998,	2000,	2010).	He	commented	(that	at	the	start	of	the	
twenty	first	century)	when	risk	programs	were	on	the	rise:	“we	have	witnessed	the	emergence	not	simply	of	
an	actuarial	criminology,	but	of	oscillating	criminologies.	On	the	one	side	is	a	neo-liberal	criminology	of	the	
‘self’	primarily	envisaging	a	rational	choice	offender,	who,	in	a	sense,	could	be	anyone…On	the	other…is	a 
‘criminology	of	the	other’,	associated	with	what	Rose	(1998:	35)	refers	to	as	the	spectre	of	the	monstrous:	an	
image	of	evil	that	could	possibly	be	‘us’	and	that	is	beyond	the	rational…such	contradictory	trends	seem	
unintelligible	solely	in	terms	of	the	monolithic	‘risk	society’”.		
26		See	Lynch	(1998),	Hanna-Moffatt	(1999,	2001,	2005),	Kemshall	(1998,	2002,	2003),	Kemshall	and	Maguire	
(2001),	Miller	(2001),	Leacock	and	Sparks	(2002),	Robinson	(2008),	Bullock	(2011),	Kazemian	et	al.	(2012).	This	
research	has	been	largely	conducted	in	Western	adult	criminal	justice	jurisdictions,	mostly	in	state	jurisdictions	
in	the	United	States,	Canada	and	the	United	Kingdom.	
27	In	finding	rehabilitative	practices	within	the	risk	case	management,	a	number	of	studies	have	supported	the	
narrative	that	there	has	been	a	revival	of	confidence	in	rehabilitation,	which	has	been	coined	in	a	variety	of	
ways:	“late-modern	rehabilitation”	(Robinson,	2008),	or	the	“rehabilitation	of	rehabilitation”	(Cuneen	et	al.,	
2013).	Robinson	argues	that	in	England	and	Wales	rehabilitation	has	survived	by	adapting	and	surviving	over	
the	first	decade	of	the	twenty	first	century	by	reconfiguring	its	practices	and	marketing	itself	by	appealing	to	
dominant	penal	narratives:	utilitarian,	managerial	and	expressive.		She	characterizes	this	as	being	a	punitive	
form	of	rehabilitation,	where	its	regime	of	practices	must	demonstrate	that	it	can	generate	crime	reduction	
outcomes	in	the	light	of	its	accountabilities	to	community	safety.	There	are	a	number	of	Western	jurisdictions	
that	have	remained	largely	welfarist	in	their	approach,	including	the	Netherlands,	the	Nordic	countries,	
Scotland,	and	some	states	in	America	(Feeley,	2013:	77).			
28	These	studies	support	the	general	line	of	critique	made	by	Loader	and	Sparks	(2002)	that	‘pure’	forms	of	
actuarial	justice	are	re-worked,	or	challenged,	or	re-negotiated	and	subsequently	re-configured,	in	part	by	
practitioner’s	resistance	as	well	as	contextual	contingencies,	these	often	being	an	amalgam	of	central	policy	
demands,	legislative	requirements,	political	priorities,	individual	case	circumstances,	and	practitioner	
subjective	conceptions	of	what	is	a	risk,	including	the	ways	in	which	discretion	is	used	in	order	to	manipulate	
risk	scoring	(Kemshall,	1998,	2000,	2003).	
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29	In	Pratt’s	mapping,	the	conceptualization	of	‘dangerousness’	that	was	evident	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	
and	twentieth	century	until	the	1960s,	justified	lengthy	or	indefinite	periods	of	incarceration	founded	upon	a	
concern	with	the	incorrigibility	of	habitual	criminals	(petty	and	professional,	usually	involving	offences	against	
property)	(1995:	4-11).	As	early	as	1948,	dangerousness	became	more	concerned	with	social	defence,	with	
protecting	the	public	(1995:	11),	shifting	in	the	1970s	towards	a	concern	with	violent/sexual	offending	and	the	
probability	of	serious	harm	that	is	likely	in	future	offences	(1995:	13-15).	
30	Pratt	maps	this	new	knowledge/power	formation	along	two	poles:	a	pole	where	actuarial		prediction	is	
interpolated	into	sentencing	this	serious	offender,		establishing	a	systemic	role	for	actuarial	prediction	within	
the	criminal	justice	system	as	a	whole;	and,	a	pole	involving	a	far	more	localized	form	of	situational	crime	
prevention,	where	responsibility	for	social	insurance	against	the	quite	substantial	risks	of	crime	has	been	
redistributed	to	be	managed	by	local	authorities	and	citizens,	who	are	required	to	actively	govern	themselves	
in	order	to	manage	these	risks	that	everyone	is	vulnerable	to	(Pratt,	1995:	18-20;	see	O’Malley,	1992). 	
31	This	is	an	oblique	reference	to	biopower	(Foucault,	1978);	however,	Pratt	does	not	formally	define	it	in	this	
way	not	does	he	use	the	concept	of	security	in	his	paper.	
32	Pratt’s mapping	focuses	on	the	prediction	of	a	sub-population	of	offenders	where	clinical	judgement	had	
been	unable	to	reliably	predict	future	danger,	presenting	it	as	being	made	calculable	by	actuarial	prediction	
(1995:	20-24).	His	archival	analysis	does	not	demonstrate	the	implementation	of	these	instruments	in	New	
Zealand	or	Australia	(1995:	24).		He	refers	to	the	US	actuarial	archive	of	the	1980s,	providing	scanty	details	
that	new	developments	in	computer	technology	and	statistical	analysis	had	improved	actuarial	prediction;	
however,	he	does	not	interrogate	these	instruments	any	further.	He,	like	many	others	who	consider	‘actuarial	
power’,	take-for-granted	statements	made	by	researchers	invested	in	research	protocols	devoted	to	actuarial	
control	that	assert	that	methods	used	to	make	actuarial	prediction	were	‘improving’.	Actuarial	instruments	are	
interpreted	as	a	penal	strategy;	the	materiality	of	how	they	are	constructed,	and	the	contingency	of	these	
truth	claims	are	occluded.	If	one	looks	closely	at	the	archive	Pratt	briefly	alludes	to,	it	is	focused	upon	the	
selective	incapacitation	of	high-rate	offenders	rather	than	the	preventive	detention	of	the	serious	offender	
that	Pratt	was	interrogating.		
33	In	their	conception	technocratic	management	of	internal	system	parameters,	“lowers	one’s	expectations	
about	the	criminal	sanction”,	where	management	is	more	concerned	with	“making	crime	tolerable	rather	than	
eliminated	it”	(Feeley	and	Simon,	1992:	455).	In	this	way,	they	consider	the	biopolitical	management	of	
recidivism	as	having	no	privileged	space	in	the	establishment	of	managerial	objectives	for	governing	crime,	
auditing	performance	and	guiding	action	within	the	system	of	actuarial	justice	(1994:	179).	
34	In	Foucault’s	genealogical	method,	events	are	contingent.	This	contingency	helps	us	to	appreciate	“why	and	
how	that-which-is	might	no	longer	be	that-which-is”,	opening	up	“a	space	of	freedom	understood	as	a	space	of	
concrete	freedom,	that	is,	of	possible	transformation”	(Foucault,1988:	36).	Eventalisation	fragments	unities,	
revealing	an	unstable	assemblage	of	“faults,	fissures	and	heterogeneous	layers”	(1977b:	146).	By	de-
naturalizing	the	present,	and	demonstrating	how	precariously	or	accidently	a	problematization	came	into	
being,	contingency	demonstrates,	how	it	might	have	been	(and	can	be)	otherwise,	history	is	cast	as	a	“field	of	
openings”,	with	the	potential	to	incite	possible	futures	(Brown,	1998:	37).	
35	Emergence	refers	to	a	particular	moment	of	arising	or	apparition	of	a	singular	event,	where	genealogical	
inquiry	takes	the	contents	of	its	discourse	analysis	to	rediscover	the	“connections,	encounters,	supports,	
blockages,	play	of	forces,	strategies	and	so	on	which	at	a	given	moment	establish	what	subsequently	counts	as	
being	self-evident,	universal	and	necessary”	(Foucault,	1981:	6).	An	event	emerges	within	a	struggle	between	
contested	forces	(power-knowledge	networks,	practices,	relations),	where	there	is	a	reversal	of	a	relationship	
of	forces,	as	a	‘rupture’	within	a	particular	series	(Foucault,	1984:	88).	This	moment	of	reversal	is	described	by	
Deleuze	(1988:	21)	as	“a	point	or	space	in	time	when	series	begin	to	diverge	and	become	redistributed	in	a	
new	space”	(Deleuze,	1988:	21).	A	mapping	of	the	lines	of	emergence	enables	the	genealogist	to	discern	the	
heterogeneous	“little	lines	of	mutation	which,	acting	successively	or	simultaneously,	go	to	form	a	contour	or	
surface,	a	characteristic	feature”	(Deleuze,	1997:	x)	of	a	new	event.	These	lines	are	multiple,	belonging	to	
multiple	thresholds	and	registers,	which	have	a	coherent	identity	that	“lacks	a	common	denominator	and	
cannot	be	reduced	or	made	equivalent	in	any	discursive	way”	(Deleuze,	1988:	20).		
36	A	register	can	be	defined	as	a	particular	enunciative	modality,	or	a	grid	of	specification,	which	divides	and	
classifies	the	object	of	discourse	in	a	particular	way	-	such	as	the	rule	of	law	connected	to	the	legal	register,	
and,	the	various	social	work,	administrative,	medical	and	religious	registers	connected	with	particular	modes	
of	producing	truth	and	its	collateral	authorities.	
37	The	genealogical	approach	considers	this	embattled	will-to-knowledge	as	being	constituted	by	a	“myriad	of	
events…in	their	proper	dispersion”	that	establishes	anticipatory	forces	that	struggle	against	opposing	
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conceptions	and	practices	and	began	to	re-configure	this	network	of	relations	(Foucault,	1977b:	146,	149).	His	
mode	of	interrogation	requires	that	“passing	events	(are	maintained)	in	their	proper	dispersion;	identify(ing)	
the	accidents,	the	minute	deviations	-	or	conversely,	the	complete	reversals	-	the	errors,	the	false	appraisals,	
and	the	faulty	calculations	that	gave	birth	to	those	things	that	continue	to	exist	and	have	value	for	us”	
(Foucault,	1984:	81).	
38	Foucault	defines	archive	as	the	“general	system	of	the	formation	and	transformation	of	statements”	(1972:	
130).	In	his	conceptualisation,	a	discourse	analysis	is	more	concretely	an	archaeology	of	particular	archives	
that	“organizes	the	document,	divides	it	up,	distributes	it,	arranges	it	in	levels,	establishes	series,	distinguishes	
what	is	relevant	from	what	is	not,	discovers	elements,	defines	unities,	describes	relations”	(1972:	6-7).	
39	“For	a	body	to	act	in	a	place	it	must	be	there”,	if	that	body	is	prevented	from	moving	about	or	circulating	
within	the	community	for	a	sufficient	amount	of	time,	“he	will	neither	pick	a	pocket,	nor	break	into	a	house,	
nor	present	a	pistol	to	a	passenger…within	that	time”	(Bentham,	1843:	183,	cited	in	Zimring	and	Hawkins,	
1995:	44).	
40	All	other	longitudinal	efforts	until	then	in	the	United	States	had	used	retrospective	cross-sectional	designs	
that	looked	back	on	a	group	of	known	delinquents	of	varying	ages,	or	that	used	prospective	cross-sectional	
designs	to	look	forward	in	time	from	the	time	of	the	first	recorded	offence	to	analyse	patterns	of	offending.	
The	Gluecks	had	published	volumes	of	data	between	1930	and	1970	using	a	retrospective	cross-sectional	
design	to	determine	the	age	of	onset	of	offending	and	to	tabulate	significant	correlations	in	the	patterns	of	
offenders	compared	to	non-offenders	(Glueck	and	Glueck,	1930;	1940;	1950;	1968).	Around	the	time	of	
Wolfgang	et	al.’s	publication,	the	Gluecks’	Unravelling	juvenile	delinquency	(1950)	was	the	most	heavily	cited	
book	in	American	criminology	(Gottfredson	and	Hirschi,	1987:	582).		
41	See	Sellin	and	Wolfgang	(1964).	This	estimate	was	based	on	a	qualitative	measure	of	the	social	harm	of	
criminal	events	using	weighted	codes	about	the	severity	of	personal	injury	to	victims,	and	the	loss	or	damage	
to	property	caused	by	different	types	of	criminal	offence.		
42	Wolfgang	et	al.	(1972:	158)	comment:	“our	review	indicates	this	lack	of	fit	to	be	the	general	condition	of	
attempts	to	utilize	the	Markov	chain	model	in	the	analysis	of	demographic	characteristics,	and	reflects	the	
general	lack	of	congruence	between	first-order	Markov	chain	models	and	data	in	the	social	sciences”.	
43	See	Blumen	et	al.,	1955;	McGinnis,	1968;	Cohen,	1963;	Haray	and	Lipstein,	1962;	Perrin	and	Sheps,	1964.	
44	Each	successive	computation	is	a	logical	construction	that	brackets	the	sequence	already	enacted	in	the	
previous	step:	0,	{0},	then	{0,	{0},	and	then	{0,{0}}}	and	so	on,	recursively	repeating	the	same	operation	
premised	on	an	intuitive	image	of	“an	operation	that	operates	on	itself”	(Totaro	and	Ninno,	2014:	31).	
45	See	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(2002:	424-473).	The	longitudinal	tracking	of	offenders	is	a	machinic	force,	where	
the	technology	of	tracking	patterns	of	re-offending	is	central	to	control	in	the	security	dispositif.	It	captures	
heterogeneous	elements	within	the	criminal	justice	milieu,	and	establishes	the	circuits	or	networks	of	actuarial	
justice	where	all	of	these	elements	must	flow	through	at	some	point	or	other,	generating	a	line	of	
“transconsistency”	as	diverse	sites	of	penal	practice	resonate	and	communicate	together,	and	become	
controlled	by	the	inter-relations	of	actuarial	calculation	and	risk	management	(2002:	432-33).	As	an	apparatus	
of	capture,	this	operates	using	modulation	as	“potentials	of	very	different	orders”	are	brought	together,	and	
where	information	captured	from	the	tracking	of	offenders	assures	isomorphy	between	the	heterogeneous	
formations	of	actuarial	justice	(2002:	435-36).	
46	The	National	Council	on	Crime	and	Delinquency	(1973:	449)	felt	that	“only	a	small	percentage	of	offenders	in	
penal	institutions	today	required	imprisonment”.	In	Zimring	and	Hawkin’s	(1995:	12)	view	the	Council	failed	to	
provide	criteria	that	would	assist	in	identifying	what	dangerous	offenders	should	be	targeted	for	prison.	
47	This	research	was	conducted	by	Avi-Tizhak	and	Shinnar	(1973),	Clarke	(1974),	Ehrlich	(1973),	Greenberg	
(1975),	Marsh	and	Singer	(1972),	Shinnar	and	Shinnar	(1975),	and	Van	Dine	et	al.	(1977,	1979),	all	of	who	
worked	in	isolation	from	one	another.	They	worked	in	diverse	fields	(engineering,	economics,	government),	
only	one	of	them	being	a	criminologist,	who	would	be	best	described	as	a	mathematical	criminologist	
(Greenberg).	Often	distanced	from	criminological	investments,	these	researchers	were	adept	in	quickly	
dismissing	or	ignoring	an	objective	review	of	criminological	literature	and	empirical	support	for	its	theories.	
Ehrlich	(1973:	522)	comments:	“A	reliance	on	a	motivation	unique	to	the	offender	as	a	major	explanation	of	
actual	crime	does	not,	in	general,	render	possible	predictions	regarding	the	outcome	of	objective	
circumstances.	We	are	also	unaware	of	any	persuasive	empirical	evidence	reported	in	the	literature	in	support	
of	theories	using	this	approach”.		
48	Index	crimes	are	defined	by	the	FBI	as	including	homicide,	rape,	robbery,	aggravated	assault,	burglary,	
larceny	and	auto	theft.	
49	These	reductions	are	as	low	as	0.6-	4%	(Greenberg,	1975)	and	1-4%	(Clarke,	1974).	
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50	The	system	parameters	that	are	operationalized	in	their	model	include:	the	number	of	crime	and	individual	
commits,	the	length	of	a	sentence,	the	number	of	convictions	per	criminal,	the	number	of	times	an	offender	
gets	sent	to	prison,	the	crime	rate	per	year	(assumed	to	be	constant),	the	expected	number	of	convictions	
during	a	criminal	career	having	been	convicted	once,	the	probability	of	getting	convicted	for	a	future	crime	
(after	being	convicted	once),	the	probability	of	future	arrest	(after	being	convicted	once),	the	probability	of	
being	committed	to	prison	after	committing	a	crime,	the	probability	to	prison	having	being	arrested,	the	
probability	of	recidivism	after	release	from	prison,	,	the	probability	of	never	being	arrested	again,	of	never	
being	convicted	again,	of	never	being	sent	to	prison	again,	and	the	probability	of	a	convicted	criminal	being	
reconvicted	with	a	specified	time	interval	(Shinnar	and	Shinnar,	1975:	587).	
51	Offenders	are	understood	as	committing	crimes	at	random	intervals	based	on	this	average	rate	while	being	
independent	of	the	time	since	the	last	event.	Poisson	models	are	useful	for	predicting	events	like	the	number	
of	patients	arriving	in	an	emergency	room	at	a	particular	interval	of	time,	or	the	average	probability	of	a	river	
flooding	over	a	100-year	period.		Poisson	models	are	well-suited	to	projecting	possible	criminal	justice	futures	
premised	upon	the	aggregate	effects	of	trajectories	of	criminal	offending	(that	is,	an	expected	volume	of	
crime),	if	they	were	not	regulated	in	some	way	by	a	shift	in	policy.		
52	The	model	assumes	that	the	criminal	population	is	constant	in	time	(N)	and	that	an	equal	number	of	
criminals	enter	and	leave	the	system.	The	model	assumes	that	the	length	of	criminal	career	can	be	measured	
(L)	and	that	career	lengths	are	exponentially	distributed	(Shinnar	and	Shinnar,	1975:	586).	Shinnar	and	
Shinnar’s	estimates	assume	that	the	number	of	crimes	committed	by	an	individual	is	fixed	(x),	that	the	number	
of	criminals	is	unaffected	by	crime	policy	(1975:	587),	that	there	is	a	category	of	offenders	who	commit	a	high	
rate	of	recidivism	and	who	are	responsible	for	a	high	fraction	of	total	crimes	committed	(1975:	590);	that	
prison	has	no	crimogenic	effect,	or	that	the	average	length	of	a	criminal	career	or	the	annual	crime	rate		are	
not	increased	by	prison	stay;	and,	the	chance	of	being	convicted	is	equal	to	the	fraction	of	times	solved	(70%	
of	crime	remained	unsolved	at	that	time),	where	they	assume	that	unsolved	crimes	are	committed	by	
offenders	who	are	convicted	at	least	once	(1975:	591-592).	
53	Feeley	and	Simon	(1994:	175)	describe	selective	incapacitation	as	a	sentencing	scheme	whereby	the	lengths	
of	sentence	are	guided	by	a	form	of	decision-making	that	utilizes	actuarial	prediction	instruments	that	aim	to	
identifying	high-rate	(/risk)	offenders	“to	maintain	long-term	control	over	them	while	investing	in	shorter	
terms	and	less	intrusive	control	and	surveillance	over	lower	risk	offenders”.	
54		Blumstein	(1978:	76)	comments:	“While	selective	imprisonment	does	not	now	explicitly	involve	explicit	
prediction	of	future	criminality,	a	policy	of	selectively	imprisoning	the	worst	offenders	(those	who	commit	the	
most	serious	crimes	and	that	have	a	higher	rate	of	committing	crimes)	has	the	potential	for	increasing	the	
incapacitative	effect”.	
55	In	the	same	year	Greenberg	(1975:	542)	formally	gave	name	to	this	strategy.	He	suggested	that	selective	
incapacitation	was	“at	the	centre	of	many	recent	proposals	for	criminal	justice	reform”	He	locates	investment	
in	such	a	strategy	with	the	liberal	pole	of	penal	reform,	in	particular	the	National	Council	on	Crime	and	
Delinquency.	His	definition	is	imprecise	-	he	describes	it	as	a	strategy	where	the	10-15%	of	the	offender	
population	who	posed	the	greatest	danger	to	community	safety	could	be	identified	using	actuarial	prediction,	
so	that	the	vast	majority	of	low	risk	offenders	could	be	released	into	the	community.	His	focus	is	not	on	
sentencing	but	rather	the	use	of	actuarial	prediction	in	parole	that	would	facilitate	a	penal	policy	of	
decarceration,	while	affording	political	and	technical	assurance	that	the	community	would	indeed	be	safe	if	
such	a	policy	was	implemented.	His	account	clearly	indicates	that,	on	technical	grounds	alone,	such	a	policy	
would	fail	as	the	predictive	accuracy	of	available	actuarial	instruments	at	that	time	were	so	poor	unless	policy	
makers	were	willing	to	accept	very	high	rates	of	error,	or	imprisoned	a	significant	number	of	offenders	who	
were	not	recidivists	for	precautionary	reasons.	Finding	such	a	strategy	untenable,	he	then	returns	to	the	
possibility	that	incapacitation	(which	he	coins	collective	incapacitation)	may	be	a	more	effective	crime	
reduction	strategy,	however	his	estimates	are	as	low	as	1.2	to	8%	based	on	the	present	population	of	
offenders,	and	of	a	4%	reduction	if	the	sentence	length	imposed	was	increased	to	3	years	(1975:	567;	572).	
56	This	research	was	conducted	by	the	UK	Home	Office,	indicating	the	intensified	use	of	actuarial	forms	of	
justice	in	the	criminal	justice	milieu	and	its	globalization.	1996	the	Home	Office	launched	its	use	of	an	Offender	
Group	Reconviction	Scale	(OGRS)	for	use	in	probation	to	calculate	a	risk	score	that	estimates	“the	probability	
score	that	a	convicted	offender	will	be	reconvicted	at	least	once	within	a	subsequent	period	of	two	years” 
(Copas	and	Marshall,	1998:	159).	In	a	quite	detailed	note	of	cautioning	about	the	interpretation	of	risk	scores,	
the	researchers	assert	that	the	major	use	of	the	scale	is	as	“a	benchmark	against	which	probation	officers	can	
check	the	subjective	assessment	that	they	have	made	in	any	particular	case”	(1998:	170).	The	instrument	was	
considered	not	to	be	a	prediction	about	an	individual,	“…but	an	estimate	of	what	the	rate	of	reconviction	
might	be	expected	of	a	group	of	offenders	who	match	that	individual	on	the	set	of	covariates	used	by	the	
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score”.	As	an	instrument	of	managerialism,	the	actuarial	grid	functions	as	an	auditing	device	that	can	both	
evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	professional	decision-making	as	well	as	guide	this	decision-making.	
57	In	McCulloch	and	Wilson’s	typology	(see	2015:	8-9)	actuarialism	would	be	subsumed	within	their	codification	
of	“crime	risk”	which	identifies	crime threats	and	seeks	to	prevent	their	realization	in	the	future.	In	their	
typology,	precaution	and	pre-emption	are	pre-crime	measures	that	address	unidentified	crime	threats	that	
anticipate	crime	by	means	of	speculative	intelligence	founded	upon	processes	of	suspicion	to	prevent	
potentially	criminal	non-imminent	acts	that	are	deemed	as	likely	to	occur	within	a	landscape	of	uncertainty.	
They	acknowledge	that	these	competing	diagrams	of	power	may	at	times	“reside	along	a	spectrum	rather	than	
sit	in	(opposition)	(2015:	8).	On	their	own	admission,	the	integration	of	security	and	risk	into	the	criminal	
justice	system	in	the	last	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	“set	the	stage	for	the	emergence	of	pre-crime”	
(2015:	8,9).	
58	In	1976,	for	example,	California	enacted	the	Determinate	Sentence	Law	which	established	low,	medium,	and	
high	terms	with	narrow	ranges	for	each	offence,	with	the	middle	term	presumptive	unless	the	judge	
determined	that	there	were	aggravating	or	mitigating	factors	in	the	case	(Simon,	1993:	127).	In	addition,	the	
legislation	eliminated	discretionary	parole	release,	which	subsequently	resulted	in	a	re-organization	of	parole	
so	that	local	decision-making	was	placed	under	a	more	centralized	control	in	decisions	to	arrest,	detain,	
revoke,	rescind,	or	grant	parole	(1993:	114-22).	
59	He	quotes	Foote	(1970:	52-53)	to	make	this	argument.	Foote	had	argued	that	the	rationale	behind	
preventive	detention	is	embedded	in	this	strategic	perspective,	relegating	individuals	to	the	subjugated	
position	of	being	second-class	citizens	who	were	expendable.	
60	Greenberg	(1975:	545)	initially	suggests	that	“the	consequences	of	ignoring	false-positives	are	clearly	much	
more	serious	-	possible	long-term	erroneous	confinement	and	stigmatization	(compared	to	inoculating	
children	to	prevent	polio	infection	and	infantile	paralysis);	however,	his	precautionary	reasoning	that	“it	is	
better	to	be	safe	than	sorry”,	then	erases	this	concern. 	
61	In	the	1970s	the	focus	for	developing	effective	actuarial	instruments	was	on	identifying	violence-prone	
individuals	at	multiple	sites	of	criminal	justice	decision-making	(bail,	transferring	a	juvenile	offender	to	the	
adult	court	for	criminal	adjudication,	sentencing,	determining	the	length	of	imprisonment,	parole,	the	
invocation	of	special	statutes	for	dealing	with	dangerous	sex	offenders	(Monahan,	1978:	245).	The	categorical	
distinction	between	violence	and	dangerousness	had	not	been	made,	and	the	trends	in	promoting	actuarial	
decision-making	were	contradictory:	an	increasing	reliance	upon	a	“dangerous	standard”	for	justifying	civil	
commitment	in	the	mental	health	system,	and	a	decreasing	reliance	upon	predictions	of	violence	in	
determining	release	from	prison	as	part	of	the	escalating	shift	in	penal	policy	towards	abolishing	
indeterminate	sentences	(ibid).	Predictive	efforts	remained	largely	experimental	and	developmental	given	low	
levels	of	scientific	certainty	that	accurate	predictions	of	dangerous	could	be	made	(predictive	error	was	found	
to	be	anywhere	between	50	and	99	%)	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	77).	In	the	face	of	this	poor	predictive	power,	
Monahan	made	optimistic	recommendations	about	how	to	conduct	further	research	to	improve	this	situation:	
clearly	define	violence	in	multiple	ways;	ensure	that	validation	of	actuarial	instruments	tracks	offenders	over	
multiple	time-periods	into	the	future,	and	that	this	tracking	uses	multiple	measures	for	verifying	recidivism;	
that	a	principle	be	established	that	prediction	is	based	upon	actuarial	rather	than	clinical	methods	(based	upon	
the	seemingly	contradictory	finding	that	these	methods	are	superior	[see	Meehl,	1954]);	and,	include	predictor	
items	that	are	both	situational	and	dispositional	risks	of	violence-proneness	(Monahan,	1978:	251-265).	
62	This	psychologist-driven	revival	of	rehabilitation	in	North	America	(Andrews,	1982,	1991;	Andrews	et	al.,	
1990)	was	made	possible	by	modulating	itself	within	the	prevailing	discourses	and	protocols	of	actuarial	risk	
management,	augmented	by	a	meta-analytic	evidence-based	discourse	about	“what	works”.	As	noted	by	
Cuneen	et	al.	(2013:	70),	by	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s	correctional	authorities	in	North	America	had	re-
modulated	their	professional	practices	by	tunnelling	in	on	recidivism;	subsequently,	rehabilitation	could	only	
be	conceived	as	“those	activities	that	would	contribute	to	a	reduction	in	offending”	(Cavadino	et	al.,	1999,	
cited	in	Cuneen	et	al.,	2013:	70).	Differentiating	between	“crimogenic	and	non-crimogenic	‘needs’	helped	to	
sweep	out	the	old,	generalist,	welfarist,	undifferentiated	treatment	approaches”;	and,	it	helped	to	lower	costs	
by	regulating	correctional	workloads,	as	professionals	needed	to	use	risk	assessment	to	prioritize	“core”	and	
“discretionary”	business	practices	(2013:	ibid).	Andrews	developed	the	Level	of	Service	Inventory	in	1982	for	
use	in	parole.	In	the	early	stages	of	its	development	a	team	of	researchers	led	by	Gendreau	at	the	Ontario	
Ministry	of	Correctional	Services	investigated	whether	an	actuarial	instrument	that	used	social	history	codes	
was	more	effective	in	predicting	recidivism	rather	than	psychometric	data	(where	correctional	psychologists	
were	then	using	the	Minnesota	Multiphasic	Personality	Inventory	(MMPI)	to	inform	parole	decisions	
(Gendreau	et	al.,	1980).	It	used	the	protocol	described	in	Chapter	3,	section,3.4	to	develop	and	validate	its	
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prediction	instrument	that	used	social	history	predictors,	prospectively	tracking	802	offenders	for	two	years	to	
measure	recidivism.	In	the	next	phase	of	development	parole	officers	were	interviewed	in	Canada	and	the	US	
to	refine	the	instrument	to	include	practitioner-informed	risk	items	that	were	demonstrated	to	be	linked	to	
recidivism,	establishing	a	justification	for	their	inclusion	in	the	instrument	(Andrews,	1982).	The	first	version	
consisted	of	58	quantified	items,	scored	using	the	Burgess	method,	that	spanned	11	risk	domains:	criminal	
history,	education/employment,	financial,	family/marital,	accommodation,	leisure/recreation,	companions,	
alcohol/drug	problems,	emotional/personal,	probation	conditions,	and	attitudes/orientation.	In	this	way,	a	
legitimate	space	for	correctional	intervention	was	recuperated	for	practitioner-driven	concerns	with	
rehabilitation	and	control;	however,	these	interventions	were	endorsed	by	complying	with	meta-analyses	
about	which	risks	had	the	strongest	correlations	with	recidivism.	The	success	of	these	interventions	in	
reducing	recidivism,	would	determine	their	eventual	fate,	as	offenders	were	tracked	over	time.	In	1995	
Andrews	and	Bonta	marketed	the	LSI-R,	a	revised	version	of	this	instrument,	that	became	the	the	most	
popular	prediction	instrument	used	in	the	United	States,	the	United	Kingdom,	Canada	and	Australia	in	the	first	
decade	of	the	twenty	first	century	(Harcourt,	2007:	78).	LSI-R	has	10	multi-factorial	risk	domains,	all	of	those	
listed	above	with	the	exception	of	probation	conditions,	which	signals	its	marketability	and	portability	for	use	
in	multiple	criminal	justice	decision-making	arenas.	The	appearance	of	this	instrument,	reverses	the	trend	that	
Harcourt	identifies	in	his	tracing	of	parole	between	the	1920s	and	the	1980s:	to	reduce	the	size	of	the	pool	of	
potential,	multifactorial	predictors	included	in	these	instruments	(2007:	70-76).	Harcourt	identifies	this	trend	
as	being	the	most	dramatic	in	federal	parole	instruments	used	in	the	1970’s	and	adopted	by	the	US	Sentencing	
Commission	in	1987,	where	there	was	an	over-reliance	on	the	use	of	criminal	history.	His	account	provides	no	
explanation	of	the	re-appearance	of	multi-factorial	actuarial	instruments.	
63	See	Bailey	(1966),	Berlman	and	Steinman	(1969),	Cressey	(1958),	Gold	(1974),	Kirby	(1954),	Robinson	and	
Smith	(1971),	Wootton	(1959	(cited	in	Cullen,	2005:	6).	
64	In	Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy’s	(2015:	164)	conceptualization	an	“archon”	refers	to	the	role	of	Greek	rulers,	
regulators,	or	governors	who	in	Ancient	Greece,	were	used	to	disseminate	political,	economic	and	ideological	
information,	often	by	working	in	pairs	to	carry	the	same	message	or,	under	particular	circumstances,	only	part	
of	the	message	(Rassmussen,	1981:	2,	cited	in	Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy	(ibid).	
65	President	Johnson	remarked	that	he	hoped	that	1965	“would	be	the	year	when	this	country	began	a	
thorough,	intelligent,	and	effective	war	against	crime” (cited	in	Hinton,	2016:1).	
66	President	Lyndon	B.	Johnson,	Special	message	to	the	116	Congress	on	Crime	and	Law	Enforcement,	
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27478	,	Accessed	14	August	2017.	
67	Johnson	rejected	the	wiretapping	and	police	interrogation	portions	of	the	legislation	(Simon,	2007:	94).	
68	See	Hinton	(2016:	113-23)	for	a	detailed	account.		
69	The	Juvenile	Delinquency	Prevention	and	Control	Act,	1968	defined	“those	youth	in	danger	of	becoming	
delinquent”	as	the	Youth	Service	Bureau’s	“primary	target	group”	(Hinton,	2016:	119).	
70	Feeley	(2007:	159)	comments:	“We	can	see	mass	imprisonment	not	as	a	social	strategy	to	reconfigure	
domination	of	African	Americans	or	discipline	the	margins	of	the	labour	force	to	exploit	the	increasing	
demands	for	exploitation	of	the	neoliberal	economic	order,	although	it	may	well	have	these	effects,	but	as	a	
policy	solution	to	the	political	dilemmas	of	governing	through	crime.	Mass	imprisonment	allows	the	political	
order	to	address	its	most	vulnerable	problem,	crime,	with	a	solution	that	is	solvable	precisely	at	the	process	
level…”.	
71	President	Lyndon	B.	Johnson,	Special	message	to	the	116	Congress	on	Crime	and	Law	Enforcement,	
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27478	,	Accessed	14	August	2017.	
72	The	panel	was	constituted	by	a	group	of	academic	specialists	who	had	the	techno-scientific	expertise	to	
conduct	the	necessary	literature	reviews	and	assess	the	current	state	of	knowledge,	most	of	whom	were	
actively	invested	in	conducting	research	within	the	field	of	inquiry.	It	was	interdisciplinary,	recruiting	expertise	
from	criminology,	economics,	biostatistics,	psychology,	government	and	law.	Its	members	included:	Alfred	
Blumstein	(chairman),	Franklin	Fisher,	Gary	Koch,	Paul	Meehl,	Albert	Riess,	James	Q	Wilson,	Marvin	Wolfgang,	
Franklin	Zimring	and	Samuel	Krislov.	Some	of	these	academics	had	histories	of	collaborative	research	-	for	
example,	Blumstein	and	Cohen	were,	at	the	time	of	the	panel’s	publication	of	its	report,	working	on	
developing	a	probability	model	that	estimates	the	individual	rate	of	crime	using	FBI	cross-sectional	data.	They	
were	involved	in	the	pioneering	of	a	then	fledgling	criminal	career	paradigm,	where	Blumstein	became	a	
strong	advocate	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	(see	Blumstein	and	Cohen,	1979).	
73	Cohen	(1978:	230-231)	frames	the	direction	that	this	research	should	adopt:	estimate	the	crime	rate	using	a	
probability	model	that	assumes	population	heterogeneity;	estimates	of	the	probabilities	of	arrest,	conviction,	
and	imprisonment,	that	distributes	the	individual	rate	of	offending	by	crime	type;	experiment	with	identifying	
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the	variables	that	best	predict	the	distribution	of	lambda	within	the	population	and	validate	these	measures;	
determine	the	dependent	relationships	between	a	criminal	career	and	variations	in	criminal	justice	parameters	
in	particular	the	probabilities	of	being	arrested	and	convicted,	of	being	sentenced	to	prison,	and	the	amount	of	
time	spent	in	prison;	ensure	that	ongoing	research	recognises	and	accounts	for	variations	in	the	crime	rate	
over	time,	which	would	require	that	forecasts	and	benchmarks	would	need	to	be	revised	at	regular	intervals;	
begin	an	evaluative	process	that	assesses	the	effects	of	alternative	penal	strategies.	Shinnar	and	Shinnar’s	
(1975)	probability	model	came	closest	to	achieving	this,	and	even	though	it	had	the	most	explicit	discursive	
articulation	of	a	criminal	career,	it	fell	short	in	the	panel’s	evaluation	as	it	did	not	incorporate	assumptions	
about	population	heterogeneity	(1978:	230).	
74	See	Kitchen	(2014:	54-56).	
75	Even	in	prison,	researchers	were	aware	that	offenders	would	not	only	commit	crimes	there,	but	their	
involvement	in	criminal	networks,	may	mean	that	they	are	implicated	in	crimes	outside	of	the	prison	(see	
Blumstein	et	al.,	1978:	64-65).	
76	This	tracking	technology	possesses	a	high	degree	of	non-territoriality	as	observational	calculations	of	risk	
cannot	be	arrived	at	from	one	particular	position	or	perspective,	rather	they	require	a	more	mobile	multi-
perspectival	tracking	of	the	transversal,	uncertain	flows	of	risk	across	diverse	governmental	fields.		
77	This	reform	is	part	of	a	suite	of	far	more	widespread	crime	control	measures	enacted	in	the	Comprehensive	
Crime	Control	Act	in	the	same	year.	Wilkins	et	al.	(1987b:	1-2)	situate	these	reforms	in	a	historical	trajectory	
that	began	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	premised	upon	the	objective	to	achieve	consistency	in	penal	legislation	
which	was	understood	as	necessitating	the	following	procedures:	to	logically	group	and	grade	the	vast	number	
of	federal	criminal	offences	into	a	smaller	number	of	categories;	to	establish	one	code	of	rules	for	sentencing	
these	crimes	that	standardised	penalties	for	imprisonment;	and,	to	establish	a	proportional	sentencing	
structure.	In	1971	the	Brown	Commission	tabled	its	report	that	recommended	“the	standard	classification	and	
grading	of	offences,	a	concise	listing	of	the	authorised	offences,	limits	to	the	accumulation	of	punishments	for	
multiple	offense,	a	parole	component	following	longer	periods	of	imprisonment,	and	limited	appellate	review	
of	sentences”	(1987b:	2).	In	1972	the	federal	Parole	board	piloted	the	use	of	guidelines	to	guide	parole	
decision-making	to	more	effectively	guarantee	certainty	in	the	length	of	imprisonment;	this	program	was	
expanded	in	1974	and	inscribed	into	law	in	1976(1987b:	3).	In	the	mid-1970s	arguments	for	instituting	
guidelines	in	judicial	decision-making	promoted	von	Hirsch’s	(1976)	model	that	focused	on	the	seriousness	of	
the	offence	rather	than	the	hybrid	crime	control	model	that	was	eventually	adopted.		
78	Between	1987	and	2017	these	guidelines	have	been	published	23	times	with	amendments;	in	1995	and	2015	
concerted	review	resulted	in	substantive	changes	in	these	guidelines.	In	1994	Congress	enacted	legislation	that	
provided	federal	funding	to	the	states	to	establish	sentencing	guidelines,	eliminate	parole,	and	to	guarantee	
that	individuals	served	at	least	85%	of	their	sentence	(Harcourt,	2003:	105).	
79	See	Wilkins	et	al.,	(1987:	21-40).	Federal	Court	data	of	11,000	convictions	between	1985	and	1985,	along	
with	presentence	information	of	10,500	captured	from	Probation	division	to	identify	the	average	time	served	
in	prison	by	convicted	federal	defendants,	including	an	analysis	of	variations	according	to	offence	type,	the	
background	and	criminal	history	of	the	offender,	and	the	method	of	disposition.	
80	A	“career	criminal”	is	defined	in	the	guidelines	as	a	defendant	who	is	an	adult	offender	at	the	time	of	the	
offence,	where	the	offence	is	a	crime	of	violence	or	trafficking	in	a	controlled	substance,	and	the	offender	has	
two	or	more	prior	felony	convictions	involving	violence	or	drug-related	offences	(Wilkins	et	al.,	1987a:	Chapter	
four,	page	4.11).	
81	The	Commission	asserted	that	its	over-riding	objective	was	concerned	with	eliminating	disparity	in	
sentencing	by	concentrating	on	establishing	a	standardised	sentencing	grid	that	established	the	length	of	the	
sentence	according	to	particular	categories	of	offence	(eg	drug	trafficking	offences,	crimes	of	violence,	career	
offenders	(Wilkins	et	al,	1987b:	8;	see	Baron-Evans	et	al.,	2010).	The	Sentencing	Reform	Act	directed	the	
Commission	to:	“assure	that	the	guidelines	specify	a	sentence	to	a	term	of	imprisonment	at	or	near	the	
maximum	term	authorised	for	categories	of	defendants	in	which	the	defendant	is	eighteen	years	and	older	
and:	(1)	has	been	convicted	of	a	felony	that	is	(A)	a	crime	of	violence,	or	(B)	(other	proscribed	offence)…and	
(2)	has	previously	been	convicted	of	two	or	more	prior	felonies,	each	of	which	is	(the	same	as	(1)	above)	
(Baron-Evans,	2010:	44).	
82	“Crime	is	a	national	defence	problem.	You	are	as	much	in	as	much	jeopardy	in	the	streets	as	you	are	in	a	
Soviet	missile.	We	in	the	democratic	Party	realize	that	the	war	on	drugs	has	to	be	fought	like	World	War	II	–	a	
complete	and	thorough	effort,	one	dedicated	to	victory	at	any	cost”	(Senator	Joe	Biden,	cited	in	Hinton	2016:	
310).	
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83	This	was	engineered	under	the	Military	Cooperation	with	Civilian	Law	Enforcement	Agencies	Act,	1981.	
Within	a	year	of	implementation,	the	provisions	under	this	Act	were	expanded	to	include	exchange	of	
information,	equipment,	facilities	and	manpower.	This	enabled	the	air	force	to	lend	aircraft	and	helicopters	to	
customs	and	the	Drug	Enforcement	Agency	for	stricter	border	control	of	transnational	drug	networks	(Hinton,	
2016:	311).	
84	The	neo-conservative	and	racialialized	stance	of	the	Reagan	administration	deployed	a	“pathological	
understanding	of	black	poverty”,	and	promoted	“racial	profiling,	prison	overcrowding,	and	new	discourses	
about	‘black	youth	gangs’”	(Hinton,	2016:	310;	321-32).	During	the	war	on	poverty,	black	Americans	
constituted	approximately	one-third	of	the	prison	population;	by	1988	as	a	result	of	the	war	on	crime	and	the	
war	on	drugs,	this	figure	had	risen	to	50%,	expanding	fivefold	(Hinton,	2016:	310).	The	war	on	drugs	was	highly	
racialized	by	targeting	crack	cocaine,	and	linking	federal	funding	to	local	drug-related	offences	and	offering	
patrol	officers	training	in	narcotics	investigations	to	assist	in	this	(2016:	318).	By	2000	two-thirds	of	prisoners	
serving	time	in	prison	for	drug	possession	were	black	Americans.	
85	See	also	Van	Dine	et	al.,	1977;	1979)	who	used	a	focused	empirical	approach	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	
incapacitation	by	examining	the	prior	criminal	records	of	offenders	convicted	of	violent	felonies.	This	research	
is	summarized	in	Zimring	and	Hawkins	(1995:	30-31).	
86	Some	of	these	objections	were	moral	or	retributivist	objections	that	it	is	wrong	to	impose	criminal	liabilities	
on	the	basis	of	predictions	based	on	fairness	and	justice	principles	(von	Hirsch,	1976;	Morris	and	Miller,	1985).	
In	a	similar	but	more	pragmatic	line,	it	was	also	argued	that	the	high	rates	of	false-positives	in	making	these	
predictions	(at	least	a	60%	chance	of	error)	exposed	the	criminal	justice	system	to	unwarranted	penalties	and	
liabilities	(Morris	and	Miller,	1985,	von	Hirsch,	1984;	von	Hirsch	and	Gottfredson,	1983).	
87	This	was	considered	to	be	a	2:1	probability	in	that	report.	
88	This	position	justifies	the	liability	of	the	prediction	on	the	rationale	of	the	Floud	report:	“A	prediction	of	
dangerousness…is	a	statement	of	a	condition	(membership	in	a	defined	group	with	certain	attributes)	and	not	
the	prediction	of	a	result	(of	future	violent	acts	in	each	individual	case)”	(Morris	and	Miller,	1985:	24,	cited	in	
Moore,	1986:	326).	This	position	effectively	does	away	with	worries	about	prediction	(1986:	326).	
89	Others	argued	that	prediction	and	just	deserts	could	overlap	or	coincide	with	selective	incapacitation	
(Moore	et	al.,	1984),	or	be	implemented	within	a	modified	just	deserts	model	within	stated	desert	limits	
(Morris	and	Miller,	1985).		
90	See	Chaiken	and	Chaiken	(1982).	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	used	the	Rand	Corporation’s	second	round	of	
self-report	data	captured	from	2,100	male	prison	and	jail	inmates	in	California,	Michigan	and	Texas	in	1977.	
This	research	retrospectively	tracked	these	offenders’	criminal	history	and	other	biographical	details	over	a	
two-year	period.	The	researchers	attempted	to	test	the	effects	of	sentencing	policies	by	comparing	this	sample	
with	a	sample	that	simulated	a	cohort	of	incoming	prisoners.	Both	surveys	found	that	re-offending	was	highly	
skewed	with	most	offenders	reporting	none	or	a	small	number	of	offences,	and	a	small	percentage	reporting	
very	high	frequencies,	these	frequencies	being	much	higher	in	the	second	survey.	In	the	second	survey,	official	
criminal	records	were	unable	to	distinguish	the	violent	offender	from	other	offenders.	The	researchers	found	
that	self-report	data	was	able	to	identify	clusters	of	offenders	by	offence	type.	Versatile	offenders,	who	
committed	multiple	types	of	offence,	were	found	to	be	high	rate	offenders.	Efforts	were	made	to	distinguish	
violent	from	non-violent	offenders,	where	youthfulness,	self-reported	juvenile	criminal	activity	and	drug	use,	
irregular	employment,	use	of	multiple	drug	use	as	an	adult	and	lack	of	family	obligations	were	found	as	
statistically	significant	correlates.	
91	They	stated:	“The	selection	of	these	variables	was	based	on	the	strength	of	their	association	with	the	
individual	crime	rates	and	their	suitability	for	sentencing	purposes”	(Greenwood	and	Abrahamse,	1982:	50,	my	
emphasis).	Their	instrument	had	four	static	factors	readily	available	from	criminal	justice	databanks,	and	three	
more	dynamic	factors	that	the	researchers	recommend	could	easily	be	recorded.	
92	This	measure	used	official	crime	records,	however	the	data	was	drawn	from	prison	databases	rather	than	jail	
records.	
93	The	remaining	variables	were	self-report	data	from	the	survey.	
94	The	initial	scale	classified	50%	of	their	sample	as	low	rate	offenders	and	25%	as	high	rate	offenders,	however	
the	developers	recalibrated	the	scoring	system	for	“analytical	purposes”	to	predict	low-,	medium-	and	high-
rate	offenders.	This	re-classified	27%	of	offenders	as	low-rate,	44%	as	medium-rate,	and	29%	as	high-rate.	In	
discussing	the	efficacy	of	their	instrument,	they	admitted	that	it	worked	better	to	identify	high-rate	offenders	
in	California	compared	to	the	other	two	states	(Greenwood	and	Abrahamse,	1982:	57).		In	terms	of	accuracy,	
51%	of	offenders	were	correctly	labelled,	however	when	considering	their	classification	rule	to	identify	three	
risk	categories,	only	42%	were	correctly	categorized	(1982:	59-60).	They	proudly	asserted	that	“our	prediction	
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scale	does	discriminate	between	low-rate	and	high-rate	offenders”	claiming	that	their	final	instrument	
increases	the	fraction	of	offenders	accurately	labelled	by	“about	20	percent”	and	decreases	the	false-positives	
by	“almost	half”	(1982:	61).		
95	Greenwood	and	Abrahamse	attempted	to	distribute	lambda	estimates	(as	recommended	by	Blumstein	et	
al.,	1978)	by	partitioning	the	sample	into	its	three	risk	classification	categories.	They	then	applied	the	model	to	
six	possible	sentencing	policies	to	estimate	the	overall	crime	rate	if	different	selective	and	non-selective	
changes	were	made	to	the	rate	of	imprisonment	and	the	length	of	imprisonment.	
96	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	this	last	policy	does	not	release	low-	or	medium-rate	offenders	into	the	
community	but	rather	sentences	them	to	state	jails	rather	than	the	prison	system	(Greenwood	and	
Abrahamse,	1982:	74).	In	the	other	two	variations	of	selective	incapacitation,	it	is	either	not	necessary	to	
consider	any	change	to	existing	sentencing	policy	and	practice	for	low-	and	medium-rate	offenders,	or	to	
adjust	policy	and	practice	so	that	the	prison	term	for	medium-rate	offenders	is	reduced	by	50%	(1982:	73).	In	
concluding	about	the	utility	of	their	model	for	predicting	high-rate	offenders	and	estimating	the	cost	benefits	
of	its	implementation	in	sentencing,	the	authors	are	optimistic,	although	more	modest	in	their	claims:	“this	
study	does	not	attempt	to	prove	the	case	for	selective	incapacitation	or	to	provide	unequivocal	guidance	for	
future	sentencing	policies.	These	results	do,	however	pose	a	serious	challenge	to	the	belief	that	sentencing	
policies	have	no	effect	on	crime	rates”	(1982:	94).	
97		The	final	element	that	is	introduced	into	this	quasi-actuarial	system,	is	the	principle	of	an	infinite,	recursive	
system	of	probability	modelling,	that	pauses	and	engages	in	a	form	of	reflexive	government	“one	such	cycle	of	
estimates”	in	order	to	“go	back	and	revise	the	minimum	terms	in	order	to	provide	more	or	less	capacity	for	
incapacitation”	(Greenwood	and	Abrahamse,	1982:	87).	They	continue:	“Although	the	current	system	does	not	
have	accurate	information	on	these	variables	(predictors),	it	might	have	better	information	in	the	future”	
(1982:	93).	At	the	same	time,	it	is	inevitable	that	some	offenders	will	be	incorrectly	assigned	to	the	high-rate	
group,	the	model	should	be	“properly	tested	not	against	completely	accurate	predictions,	which	we	can	never	
have,	but	against	the	current	system”	(1982:	92).	In	this	imaginary,	selective	incapacitation	can	be	eventually	
realized,	in	a	series	of	steps	that	propel	it	forward	into	the	future,	chipping	away	at	every	imaginable	element	
that	obstructs	its	movement.	Its	degree	of	unrealized	potential,	becomes	a	machinic	force	that	inspires	the	
spirit	of	invention	and	that	is	always	on	the	lookout	for	new	fields	of	possibility.		
98	Greenwood,	in	his	enthusiasm	stated:	“we	knew	that	the	intensives	were	out	there.	We	knew	that	(high-rate	
offending)	was	correlated	with	juvenile	records	and	drug	use,	but	we	had	no	idea	how	strong	these	
correlations	were…once	we	saw	how	well	the	predictor	variables	distinguished	among	offenders,	selective	
incapacitation	was	something	that	just	leaped	out	at	us”	(cited	in	Blackmore	and	Welsh,	1983:	507).	
99	Even	other	researchers	involved	in	the	second	survey	at	the	Rand	Corporation	criticized	his	method:	“We	
think	it	is	outrageous	what	he	did	with	the	self-report	data”	(Chaiken,	cited	in	Blackmore	and	Welsh,	1983:	
511).	
100	This	time	the	Panel	recruited	36	social	scientists	and	correctional	workers	across	a	much	wider	disciplinary	
base	so	that	it	could	more	effectively	de-politicize	objections	to	the	scheme.	A	trace	of	the	Panel’s	divergent	
views	is	evident	in	the	Panels	preface	to	the	final	report	(1986a:	x).	“The	panel	benefited	particularly	from	the	
sensitivity,	sophistication,	and	challenges	offered	by	the	practitioners,	who	conveyed	insights	about	the	
current	state	of	their	professions	-	needs,	strengths,	shortcomings	-	and	the	operational	constraints	that	limit	
the	application	of	research	findings”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	xii).	And,	the	neutralization	of	divergent	views:	
“Discussions	at	panel	meetings	were	always	lively,	full	of	interesting	ideas;	disagreements	were	consistently	
isolated	out	and	dealt	with	directly.	It	was	indeed	a	pleasure	working	with	so	able	and	committed	a	group)	
(ibid).	Members’	ethical	objections	to	selective	incapacitation	were	described	as	an	extreme	pole,	while	on	the	
other	pole,	there	were	members	who	“desire	to	see	even	weak	results	put	to	use	as	quickly	as	possible”	(ibid).	
The	reasonable	stance	of	the	Panel	was	very	little	different	from	the	later	pole,	it	felt	that	prediction	
instruments	needed	to	be	used,	justifying	it	as	present	criminal	justice	decision-making	already	takes	into	
account	an	individual’s	prior	criminal	record. 	
101	Visher	(1986:	162-63)	comments:	“Criticism	of	the	Rand	results	has	been	stimulated	by	the	extensive	public	
attention	the	seven-point	scale	has	received”.	Because	of	the	technical	flaws	that	have	been	identified	(eg	
Cohen,	1983),	the	panel	was	concerned	that	the	State	of	Illinois	had	rushed	in	and	began	using	the	instrument	
before	it	had	been	legitimated	by	the	research	protocol	for	validating	its	predictive	power,	which	obligated	
that	the	instrument	be	subjected	to	both	an	internal	and	external	validation.	Visher	obtained	a	machine-
readable	archived	record	of	the	Rand	Project’s	second	survey	and	conducted	the	first	internal	validation	of	the	
data,	presumably	to	validate	its	findings,	however	her	methodology	tested	the	“robustness”	of	the	findings	by	
experimenting	with	the	data	by	varying	analytical	procedures	(1986:	163).	At	the	same	time,	she	tested	the	
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sensitivity	of	the	lambda	estimates	used	to	estimate	the	rate	of	offending	by	exploring	the	way	in	which	
incomplete	survey	questions	were	handled	by	researchers,	as	well	as	other	“arbitrary”	research	decision-
making	that	may	have	impacted	on	constructing	particular	variables,	how	missing	data	was	handled	and	with	
what	consequences,	or	how	decisions	about	scale	development	affected	results.	She	did	not	test	the	validity	
using	an	external	protocol;	however,	she	did	test	the	predictive	accuracy	of	the	seven-point	scale,	as	well	as	
re-calculating	the	selective	incapacitation	effects	in	the	light	of	her	re-configuration	and	re-analysis	of	the	
data.	
102	There	were	also	found	to	be	cross-state	variations	in	predictive	power	being	as	high	as	a	60%	false-positive	
rate	in	California	and	48%	in	Michigan	and	Texas.	Given	selective	incapacitation’s	targeting	of	high-rate	
offenders,	the	predictive	power	was	a	57%	relative	improvement	over	chance	in	California	but	only	21%	and	
38%	in	Michigan	and	Texas	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	180).	
103	When	these	controversial	predictors	were	removed	from	the	instrument	the	Panel	found	that	it	did	not	
alter	the	false-positive	rate	or	the	overall	predictive	accuracy	of	the	scale,	however	these	exclusions	did	
weaken	its	capacity	to	accurately	identify	high-rate	offenders.	
104	While	the	Panel	spent	a	considerable	amount	of	energy	critiquing	the	predictive	efforts	of	the	Habitual	
Offenders	Project,	they	could	not	rule	out	Greenwood’s	(1982)	identification	of	a	history	of	drug	use	and	
significant	periods	of	unemployment	as	being	important	predictors	of	high	rate	offenders	(1986a:	194-95).	
105	These	included:	gender,	race	(excluded),	age	(partially	excluded),	family,	parenting,	parental	criminality,	
familial	disruption,	family	size	and	structure,	early	anti-social	behavior,	social	class	(excluded),	school	
performance,	intelligence,	employment	(excluded),	and	peer	group	influence.	
106	“In	selecting	elements	for	the	criminal	history	score,	the	Commission	examined	a	number	of	prediction	
instruments,	with	attention	to	the	four	prediction	instruments	recently	reviewed	by	the	National	Academy	of	
Sciences	Panel	on	Criminal	Careers”	(Wilkins	et	al.,	1987b:	43).	Rappaport	(1997:	185)	comments;	“The	
influence	of	the	Salient	Factor	Score	on	Chapter	Four	(the	Commission’s	Sentencing	Guideline’s	chapter	on	
using	criminal	history	to	predict	the	risk	of	recidivism)	is	not	disputed.	The	Sentencing	Commission	cited	the	
(SFS)	as	prototype	for	the	criminal	history	guidelines,	and	the	two	tests	share	many	of	the	same	factors	and	
structural	features” (see	Beck	and	Hoffman,	1997).	Hoffman,	one	of	the	principal	developers	of	the	SFS,	was	
employed	by	the	Commission	as	its	principal	technical	officer.	Rhodes,	one	of	the	developers	of	the	Inslaw	
scale,	was	the	Commission’s	research	director.	
107	This	emphasis	was	legitimated,	by	directly	referencing	the	panel’s	protocollary	maxim:	“One	of	the	best	
predictors	of	future	conduct	is	past	criminal	conduct,	and	the	parole-prediction	literature	supports	this	fact”	
(Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson,	1986:	239).		
108	The	developers	of	the	Iowa	Risk	Assessment	Instrument	initially	claimed	that	it	was	more	than	80%	
accurate	in	identifying	poor	parole	risks,	which	stimulated	a	great	deal	of	interest	as	others	began	using	the	
scale	in	an	attempt	to	replicate	its	results	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	184). Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson	re-
analysed	the	data	from	Iowa	Statistical	Analysis	Centre’s	construction	and	validation	samples,	finding	that	the	
original	scale’s	accuracy	levels	were	highly	inflated	and	that	its	validation	procedures	were	problematic.	The	
scale	was	subsequently	revised	and	re-validated,	coming	to	more	closely	resemble	the	SFS.	Originally	the	scale	
had	a	much	higher	number	of	predictor	variables,	however	its	1984	revised	version	excluded	a	number	of	
variables	that	“might	be	ethically	objectionable”	(marital	status,	employment	status,	job	skill	level,	age	at	first	
arrest	and	other	items	concerned	with	a	juvenile	record)	(1986a:	185-86).	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson’s	re-
analysis	of	the	data	was	influential	in	re-configuring	the	research	protocol	of	the	Iowa	Statistical	Analysis	
Centre	research	team	so	that	it	was	in	alignment	with	the	protocol	recommended	by	the	panel.	The	new	
approved	instrument	has	“a	relative	improvement	over	chance”,	demonstrating	a	54.1%	accuracy	in	the	
construction	sample	and	58.8%	in	the	validation	sample	(1986:	186).	In	practice	then,	the	Implementation	
Panel’s	endorsed	scales	had	just	a	little	less	than	a	10%	improvement	on	chance	in	predicting	high	rate	
offenders,	with	the	Iowa	scale	“perhaps	being	somewhat	more	accurate	than	other	prediction	devices”	(1986:	
186).	
109	Inslaw	Inc.	won	a	$9.6	million	contract	from	the	Department	of	Justice	to	install	a	public	domain	version	of	
PRMIS	into	20	US	Attorney’s	offices	as	a	pilot	project	(Fricker,	1993).	This	was	a	substantive	profit	venture	as	
the	company	stood	to	make	as	much	as	$3	billion,	if	PROMIS	was	installed	in	the	remaining	74	federal	
prosecutors’	offices.		
110	“Every	use	of	PRMIS	in	the	court	system	is	tracking	people…You	can	rotate	the	file	by	case,	defendant,	
arresting	officer,	judge,	defense	lawyer,	and	its	tracking	all	the	names	of	all	the	people	in	all	the	cases”	
(Hamilton,	quoted	in	Fricker,	1993).	
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111	The	Inslaw	Scale	did	not	complete	the	protocol	for	validating	the	predictive	accuracy	of	its	construction	
instrument.	The	only	report	published	about	the	instrument	asserted	that	its	instrument	substantially	
improved	on	any	other	existing	instrument,	improving	the	identification	of	high-risk	offenders	to	74	percent	
(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	188).	As	the	panel	was	so	effective	in	modulating	the	research	decisions	of	other	
developers	of	actuarial	instrument	over	the	course	of	their	establishment	of	protocol,	this	is	noteworthy.	
Inslaw	Inc.’s	contract	was	abruptly	withdrawn	in	1983.	Inslaw	did	not	own	the	property	rights	to	its	PROMIS	
software	as	it	had	developed	the	program	in	the	1970s	under	a	federal	grant	provided	by	the	Law	Enforcement	
Assistance	Administration	(Fricker,	1993).	After	winning	the	contract,	Inslaw	invested	a	considerable	amount	
of	capital	in	enhancing	PROMIS,	and	in	the	same	year,	claimed	propriety	rights	on	the	improved	software.	In	
1983,	it	was	alleged	by	Inslaw	that	the	Department	of	Justice	stole	or	misappropriated	the	software,	as	well	as	
used	it	for	political	and	security	purposes	both	within	federal	security	networks,	and	possibly	internationally	
(Fricker,	1993;	Constitution	Society,	n.d.).	In	1987,	a	US	Bankruptcy	judge	ruled	in	favor	of	Inslaw	awarding	
Hamilton,	its	director,	$6.8	million,	stating	that	administrators	within	the	Department	of	Justice	“took,	
converted	and	stole”	PROMIS	through	“trickery,	fraud	and	deceit”	(Bason,	cited	in	Constitution	Society,	n.d.);	
however,	this	ruling	was	reversed	on	technical	grounds	in	1991.	Allegations	surrounding	the	case	have	never	
been	definitively	proved;	they	include	accusations	that	the	Justice	Department	started	sharing	PROMIS	with	
other	agencies,	including	security	agencies.	Michael	Rinonsciuto,	who	worked	for	Wakenhut	security,	testified	
that	he	was	contracted	to	install	a	trap	door	into	the	software	to	enable	the	CIA	to	tap	into	PROMIS	software	
worldwide	(ibid).	A	Senate	inquiry	in	1992	investigated	the	allegations,	including	testimony	that	the	
Department	of	Justice	“secretly	converted	(PROMIS)	so	that	it	could	be	used	by	domestic	and	foreign	
intelligence	services	(ibid).	The	Bua	Report	was	released	in	1993,	clearing	justice	officials	of	any	wrong-doing	in	
the	case.	
112	He	considers	that	other	measures	-	victimization,	observation,	and	informant	measures	of	crime	-	are	“more	
indirect	in	their	generation	of	estimates	than	the	two	other	measures	and	have	limited	application	in	criminal	
career	research”	(Weis,	1986:	3).	
113	At	that	time,	the	major	discrepancies	between	the	different	sources	were:	race,	social	class,	and	pulse	rate	
(see	Weis,	1986:	4-11).	
114	Weis	considers	the	criminal	career	paradigm	as	ideally	being	“a	prospective	longitudinal	study	designed	to	
observe	changes	in	behaviour	and	correlates	in	a	cohort”	(1986:	42).	It	necessarily	requires	different	measures	
of	these	correlates	at	different	stages	of	career	development,	however	he	considers	these	measures	as	being	
rudimentary	and	handicapped	by	insufficient	attention	to	instrument	development	and	validity-reliability	
verification,	in	particular	within	the	context	of	measuring	change	over	time.	He	singles	out	the	developmental	
period	of	childhood	here	as	absolutely	critical	to	advancing	this	knowledge,	suggesting	that	survey	methods	
were	essential	and	that	scientific	attention	needed	to	modify	and	refine	its	instrumentation	over	time	to	
improve	its	internal	consistency,	variance	on	terms	and	efficiency	of	administration.		
115	Meta-analytic	evaluation	identifies	the	relative	“effect	size”	of	interventions	derived	from	estimates	of	
aggregated	effects	that	are	computed	by	disaggregating	the	data	codes	of	the	original	study,	re-coding	it	using	
new	meta-codes,	aggregating	all	data	together	across	studies	and	then	recalculating	the	overall	effects	of	the	
intervention	as	a	whole	(Wells,	2009;	Lipsey	et	al.,	2010).	Effect	size	measures	the	degree	to	which	a	program	
has	been	shown	to	change	an	outcome	program	for	its	participants	compared	to	a	comparison	group.	
Generally,	these	meta-analyses	calculate	this	in	two	ways:	the	statistical	calculation	of	the	mean	difference	
effect	size	found	across	all	evaluations	of	that	particular	program	type	(the	percentage	rate	of	re-offending);	
and/or	the	calculation	of	the	mean	odds-ratio	effect	size	(the	difference	between	means	of	the	treatment	
versus	control	groups)	across	all	of	the	studies	for	that	program	(see	Lipsey	and	Wilson	2001).	They	are	
considered	to	be	superior	for	assisting	decision-making	in	an	evidence-based	environment	as	they	are	capable	
of	adopting	a	synoptic	view	that	can	more	comprehensively	analyse	the	effectiveness	of	different	kinds	of	
intervention	in	reducing	recidivism	as	well	as	identifying	the	program	features	that	are	linked	with	effective	
interventions.	At	the	same	time,	by	establishing	selection	criteria	for	inclusion	and	exclusion	of	any	particular	
evaluation	study,	a	great	deal	of	published	and	unpublished	research	becomes	subjugated	and	erased	from	
wider	circulation,	skewing	the	effect	sizes	of	the	more	favourable	predictors	in	these	meta-analyses	while	
erasing	the	local	variations	across	populations	and	jurisdictions	(Rosenthal,	1991).	Meta-analytic	evaluations	of	
single	studies	of	treatment	effectiveness	are	primarily	concerned	with	the	issues	of	weak	research	design,	in	
particular	in	relation	to	sampling	biases,	the	durability	and	transportability	of	a	justice	program	across	space	
(replicability	of	results),	and	comparability	of	treatment	effects.	Meta	analyses	claim	to	be	able	compare	the	
kinds	of	program	used	to	reduce	crime.	Greenwood	(2008:	189)	comments:	“a	meta-analysis	should	be	the	
best	way	to	determine	what	to	expect	in	the	way	of	effectiveness,	particularly	if	it	tests	for	any	effect	of	
timing,	thus	giving	more	weight	to	more	recent	evaluations.	Once	the	developers	of	a	program	have	
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demonstrated	that	they	can	achieve	similar	results,	the	next	test	is	whether	others	can	achieve	similar	results.	
The	best	estimate	of	the	effect	size	that	a	new	adopter	can	expect	to	achieve	is	some	average	of	that	achieved	
by	others	in	recent	replications.	Meta-analysis	is	the	best	method	for	sorting	this	out”.		
116	In	describing	the	use	of	these	parole	guidelines	in	the	1980s	and	1990’s,	Harcourt	(2007:	84-86)	identifies	
two	ways	in	which	these	were	constructed	to	channel	risk	classification	and	control:	Either,	the	guidelines	used	
a	matrix	model	described	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	in	relation	to	sentencing	that	uses	a	two-
dimensional	grid	that	uses	an	actuarial	instrument	along	one	axis	to	predict	the	level	of	risk,	and	estimates	
dangerousness	on	the	other	axis	as	measured	by	the	severity	or	length	of	the	sentenced	imposed.	By	
combining	the	two	scores	to	establish	a	classification	rule	that	specifies	the	minimum	number	of	months	that	
an	offender	must	serve	before	being	considered	for	release	given	the	overall	risk	score,	the	guidelines	align	
state	parole	decision-making	with	federal	sentencing	at	an	interval	of	time	when	there	was	still	considerable	
flux	in	sentencing	penal	policy.	Or,	the	guidelines	use	a	“sequential	or	decision	tree	model”	where	the	parole	
officer	is	required	undertake	a	number	of	separate	but	related	risk	assessments	to	refine	risk	classification	and	
control	–	what	was	the	risk	score	using	the	SFS?	If	the	offender	committed	a	sex	offence,	what	is	the	Sex	
Offender	Risk	Assessment	score?	How	has	the	inmate	adjusted	to	prison?	What	institutional	behaviors	are	
evident?	Then,	a	total	score	is	tallied	that	provides	a	risk	score	about	whether	parole	is	too	great	a	risk	at	a	
particular	classification	rule	(2007:	86).	
117	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson	(1986:	251)	characterize	the	Philadelphia	Project	as	a	“policy	experiment”	
where	judges	were	enlisted	as	partners	in	order	to	develop	the	guidelines	in	an	attempt	to	minimize	their	
resistance	to	implementing	the	guidelines	and	to	guarantee	that	the	project	could	later	be	evaluated.	Judges	
were	randomly	assigned	to	either	a	‘guidelines’	or	a	‘no	guidelines’	group	to	evaluate	the	project’s	
effectiveness.	It	was	demonstrated	that	the	guidelines	dramatically	improved	compliance	to	the	desired	
objectives	of	the	guidelines,	although	no	real	differences	were	found	in	terms	of	criminal	justice	outcomes	
including	the	actual	decision	made	in	relation	to	bail,	failure	to	appear	or	arrests	while	on	release.	The	
rationale	of	evidence-based	policy	was	nonetheless	firmly	implanted	with	the	research:	“If	the	innovation	is	
used,	and	if	it	‘works’,	effectiveness	may	be	demonstrated.	If	it	is	not	used,	it	cannot	be	found	to	be	effective;	
if	it	does	not	‘work’,	it	cannot	be	found	effective	even	if	used”	(Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson,	1985:	253).	
118	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson	(1986:	260)	acknowledge	that	the	grid	used	was	not	intended	to	be	
predictive,	as	the	Minnesota	Sentencing	Guidelines	Commission	had	insisted	that	its	guidelines	be	neutral	in	
regards	race,	gender,	or	socioeconomic	status.	However,	in	their	view	the	grid	was	clearly	informed	by	
correlates	that	were	by	then	considered	as	good	predictors	of	recidivism,	in	particular	along	the	axis	of	the	
criminal	history	score	(prior	felony	sentence,	prior	felony-type	juvenile	record,	and	prior	nontraffic	
misdemeanor	or	gross	misdemeanor).	Given	the	Commission’s	intent,	no	evaluation	of	its	predictive	power	
had	been	undertaken	at	the	time	of	their	review	for	the	Panel.	The	guidelines	were	found	to	standardise	
decision-making;	however,	predictive	ability	was	ineffective,	this	attributed	to	research	design	difficulties	and	
the	overreliance/heavy	weighting	on	offence	seriousness	in	its	grid	as	a	result	of	the	input	of	judges.	Protocol	
is	not	defeated	by	these	findings,	it	is	an	impetus	for	further	research:	“It	is	therefore	appropriate	to	note	that,	
despite	these	limitations,	and	in	addition	to	achieving	the	goal	of	increased	equity,	the	guidelines-based	
decisions	were	no	worse	than	unguided	decisions	relative	to	the	risk	considerations”	(1986:	254).	
119	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson	(1986:	262)	comment:	“It	is	not	known	to	us	that	the	parole	board	claimed	
this	(reducing	recidivism)	as	an	objective”. They	suggested	that	at	that	time	most	offenders	are	eventually	
released	from	prison,	with	the	majority	doing	so	as	a	result	of	parole.	However,	a	review	of	the	literature	
clearly	indicates	that	time	spent	in	prison	has	no	appreciable	impact	on	reducing	the	probability	of	re-
offending	(citing	their	own	earlier	review	to	support	their	reasoning	-	Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson,	1980).	
Rather,	penal	administrators	would	need	to	structure	decision-making	by	setting	the	reduction	of	re-offending	
as	the	chief	objective	of	decision-making	and	then	establish	a	program	of	research	for	evaluating	the	
effectiveness	of	its	decision-making/classification	rules	on	the	basis	of	a	new	program	aimed	at	the	targeting	
of	high-rate	offenders	
120	The	interval	for	interviewing	individuals	would	need	to	be	frequent	enough	to	capture	any	discernible	
change	in	the	individual’s	movement	along	a	developing	criminal	career	trajectory,	yet	not	too	frequent	as	to	
influence	behaviour.	In	spite	of	the	panel’s	antagonism	to	self-report	data	(it	considered	that	as	it	was	subject	
to	distorting	the	truth	as	a	result	of	the	respondent’s	memory	decay	and	errors	in	the	recollection	of	events	
and	their	sequencing),	it	would	be	necessary	to	use	it	if	one	was	to	obtain	the	necessary	risk	information.	It	
could	then	triangulate	the	data	for	verification	using	information	gathered	from	local	sites	either	by	
conducting	interviews	with	parents,	child	protection	authorities,	police,	juvenile	justice	authorities	and	so	on,	
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or,	it	could	capture	this	data	using	data	linkage	methods	for	obtaining	this	information	from	the	relevant	
governmental	administrative	data	repositories	under	a	federated	repository.	
121	The	space	shuttle	is	analogous	to	“the	large	overhead	with	creating	and	flying	the	space	shuttle”	(Blumstein	
et	al.,	1986a:	201).	
122	MacBride	(1967:	82)	comments:	“if	enough	people	are	doing	it,	it	will	become	either	a	source	of	profit	to	
some	group	or	a	problem	to	another…activity	produces	information,	and	information	produces	a	computer	
system.	But	the	computer	system	itself,	as	it	records,	processes	and	stores	all	this	source	data,	becomes	a	
source	of	information…it	is	a	far	richer	source	than	the	activity	itself,	since	the	data	are	already	in	machine-
readable	form”	(cited	in	Mellamphy	and	Mellamphy,	2015:	170).	The	proliferation	of	this	information	is	
synarchic	in	that	the	ways	in	which	it	is	communicated	in	terms	of	its	meta-analytic	procedures	that	have	
rendered	it	machine-readable	are	largely	obscured	by	the	technical	complexities	of	the	data	analysis	itself.	
123	The	panel	comments:	“restrictions	on	the	storage	and	dissemination	of	juvenile	records	resulted	from	the	
orientation	of	juvenile	courts	toward	rehabilitation	rather	than	punishment	and	from	the	belief	that	juveniles	
are	less	responsible	for	the	acts	that	would	be	labelled	as	criminal	by	the	adult	criminal	justice	system”	
(Blumstein	et	al,	1986a:	193).		
124	David	Farrington	was	then	working	at	Cambridge	University	as	a	criminologist,	one	of	the	researchers	who	
participated	in	the	Cambridge	Study	in	Delinquent	Development,	a	longitudinal	prospective	study	that	had	
tracked	411	inner-city	males	(born	in	1953)	living	in	London	from	age	8,	over	a	period	that	began	in	1961	and	
lasted	for	40	years,	tracking	these	men	until	they	were	50	(West,	1969,	1982;	West	and	Farrington,	1973).	
Official	records	and	self-report	data	from	interviews	from	the	young	men,	their	parents,	their	teachers	and	
others	were	conducted	at	regular	intervals	to	investigate	delinquency	and	criminal	development	to	identify	
variables	“measured	before	the	youths	were	officially	convicted,	to	avoid	the	problem	of	retrospective	bias”	
(Zara	and	Farrington,	2016:	38-39).		Zara	and	Farrington	describe	the	research	as	“a	more	integrative	
quantitative	and	qualitative	explanation	of	why	individuals	start	offending,	why	they	continue	offending,	and	
why	some	offenders	persist	while	others	desist	from	a	criminal	career”	(2016:	36).	They	characterize	the	study	
as	being	“a	unique	project	in	criminology…the	only	longitudinal	project	to	include	(five	personal	interviews)”	
(ibid).		
125	“It	is	also	disappointing	that	they	model	did	not	address	the	growth	in	recidivism	probabilities	between	the	
first	and	third	arrests”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1985:	189).	
126	Blumstein	and	Moitra	(1980:	324)	comment:	“This	(probability)	distribution	is	‘memoryless’	in	that	the	
probability	of	accumulating	any	number	of	additional	arrests	is	independent	of	the	number	of	already	
recorded.	The	expected	number	of	future	arrests	at	any	stage	of	a	criminal	career…is	also	independent	of	the	
number	of	arrests	already	recorded”.	
127	The	researchers	describe	their	approach	as	a	prospective	form	of	prediction	that	provides	“a	responsible	
policy	tool	in	criminal	justice	decision	making	by	explicitly	taking	into	account	of	the	costs	of	incorrect	
predictions”	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1985:	191). 	
128	Blumstein	et	al.	(1985:	198)	state	that	their	sample	of	132	convicted	offenders	was	too	small	for	a	split-half	
validation,	however	they	nonetheless	proceeded	to	do	so	by	including	the	entire	cohort	of	offenders	and	non-
offenders.	This	would	seem	to	be	a	significant	variation	to	how	their	data	analysis	had	proceeded	until	then.	
Subsequently	they	lowed	their	expectations	about	predictive	success	by	aiming	for	a	25%	success	rate	as	in	
fact	each	comparison	group	had	roughly	46%	convicted	offenders.	
129	The	prediction	model	used	the	seven	variables	described	earlier;	it	weighted	each	of	these	using	the	
Burgess	method	that	assigned	one	point	to	each	of	the	predictor	variables	to	score	the	probability	of	chronic	
recidivism.	The	Burgess	method	is	the	speediest,	easiest	to	construct,	and	administer	as	well	as	being	the	most	
acceptable	technique	for	deployment	with	correctional	authorities,	as	its	risk	domains	are	a	reconfiguration	of	
the	concerns	of	penal	welfarism	as	risk	screening.	In	this	method	dichotomized	predictor	variables	are	used	in	
“an	unweighted,	linear	additive	fashion	to	predict	(“recidivism”)	(Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson,	1980:	317).	
Gottfredson	and	Gottfredson	(1980)	concluded	that	the	Burgess	method	was	no	less	efficient	in	predicting	
than	any	other	method	for	scoring	(Blumstein	et	al.,	1986a:	199).	
130	Even	this	framing	of	an	ethical	dilemma	is	occluded	as	being	a	labelling	effect,	ignores	not	only	the	“pains	of	
incarceration”,	but	also	the	legal	context	of	the	incapacitation	of	young	offenders	below	the	age	of	criminal	
responsibility.	
131	An	observer	observes	a	signal	event	(eg	a	visual	or	auditory	signal)	that	is	relatively	difficult	to	discern,	and	
the	success	or	failure	is	recorded	across	its	four	possibilities	that	are	equivalent	to	the	Neymar-Pearson	type-I-
type-II	error	statistical	decision	theory:	a	signal	is	detected	(hit),	it	is	not	detected	(miss),	a	non-signal	event	is	
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correctly	perceived	as	containing	a	signal	(correct	rejection),	or	a	non-signal	event	is	incorrectly	perceived	as	
containing	a	signal	(false	alarm)	(Clear	and	Barry,	1983:	534).	
132	In	the	final	section	Blumstein	et	al.	(1985)	re-analysed	the	cohort	data	over	four	jurisdictions	to	
demonstrate	that	they	can	successfully	partition	it	into	three	sub-groups:	innocents,	desisters,	and	persisters	
reporting	that	there	was	a	good	fit	for	the	Philadelphia	and	London	data.	The	authors	acknowledge	that	their	
three-population	model	with	internal	homogeneity	within	each	group	was	“an	abstraction	that	is	formulated	in	
those	terms	for	reasons	of	analytical	convenience	in	displaying	the	effect	of	differential	drop-out”	(1985:	213).	
The	researchers	found	more	“continuity	between	desisters	and	persisters”	than	their	model	would	like	to	
acknowledge.	Faced	with	this	uncertainty	in	the	face	of	contrary	data,	the	researchers	refuse	to	introduce	
greater	complexity	into	their	parameter	modelling,	falling	back	on	their	predictor	instrument	to	confirm	that,	
not	only	could	it	predict	chronics/persisters	at	the	first	conviction,	it	could	distinguish	between	desisters	and	
persisters	at	the	first	conviction.	They	use	the	prediction	score	of	4	to	establish	their	classification	rule,	
claiming	it	will	identify	28%	of	persisters	at	that	threshold.	Having	asserted	that	they	can	now	identify	
persisters	from	desisters	at	the	first	offence,	they	attempt	to	back	this	up	by	comparing	the	drop-out	process	
for	the	two	groups,	finding	that	the	persisters	had	a	much	slower	drop-out	rate	that	can	be	visualized	as	a	very	
long	curve	that	stretches	across	the	age-crime	curve	from	its	left	to	the	right	(1985:	216).		In	a	leap	of	faith,	
they	make	the	claim	that	anticipatory	prediction	instruments	such	as	theirs	that	classifies	offenders	on	the	
basis	of	“probabilistic	expectations”	rather	than	“retrospective	characterizations”	will,	in	spite	of	its	disutilities,	
advance	the	actuarial	project	beyond	its	current	retrospective	probability	modelling.		
133	Blumstein	et	al.,	(1985:	218)	comment:	“the	design	of	prevention	efforts	(would	be)	targeted	at	youths	who	
are	behaving	badly	and	who	matched	the	persister	profile	at	the	earlier	stages”.	
134	Blumstein	et	al.	(1986a),	in	imagining	risk	identification	and	its	control	in	this	way,	reserve	a	special	place	
for	the	academy	as	archons	in	the	protocollary	regulation	of	risk	information	flows	and	their	deployment	
within	actuarial	regimes	of	practice.	By	the	early	1980s	in	the	United	States,	social	scientific	discourse	in	this	
domain	had	begun	to	position	itself	with	a	discourse	about	risk,	risk	screening,	and	risk	prevention.		These	
early	archons	were	not	only	brokers	for	the	interpolation	of	actuarial	prediction	into	the	decision-making	
processes	of	the	criminal	justice	system	for	selective	incapacitation,	they	were	also	inventors	and	builders	of	
new	governmental	infrastructures	for	the	reconfiguration	of	the	criminal	justice	system	as	a	networked	
security	dispositif,	which	accords	a	vital	role	to	the	social	scientific	evaluation	of	risk	interventions,	this	vector	
of	formation	being	founded	upon	a	telos	of	incapacitating	high	rate	offenders.	In	targeting	the	potential	
persistent	young	offender	in	a	shroud	of	evidence-based	risk	interventions,	not	only	is	the	technology	of	
anticipatory	tracking	interpolated	into	these	risk	milieus,	suspicion	is	turned	upon	young	people	who	match	
the	actuarial	profile	but	also	the	effectiveness	of	risk	interventions.	By	the	mid-1980s	then,	the	principle	of	
actuarial	environmental	government	was	in	a	state	of	gestation,	and	at	the	level	of	potential,	one	can	foretell	
its	eventual	undoing	of	the	juvenile	justice	system	as	it	was	then	imagined.		
135	The	alliance	is	either	an	alliance	between	academics	involved	in	two	complimentary	modes	of	truth-telling	
(criminal	career	research,	and	developmental	criminology),	and/or	an	alliance	between	criminal	career	
researchers	within	the	academy	and	bureaucratic	statisticians	in	the	new	data	infrastructures	of	actuarial	
justice.	
136	The	criminal	career	paradigm	is	wedded	to	a	model	of	probability	modelling	that	estimates	the	risk	of	re-
offending	by	focusing	on	the	age	of	onset	using	filtering	methods	premised	on	suspicions	about	the	risk	factors	
that	are	linked	to	critical	periods	in	the	epigenetic	development	of	the	persistent	offender.	This	may	entail	
predictions	about	“late	onset	offenders”,	however,	it	chief	target	is	the	interval	of	projected	acceleration	in	
offending	that	occurs	before	the	peak	in	adolescent	offending	at	16	or	17,	at	ages	14	to	15	years	of	age.	Or	is	
it,	even	earlier	as	I	suspect	Hirschi	and	Gottfredson	are	suggesting?	Farrington	(1983:	237)	articulates	his	will-
to-incapacitate:	“a	major	aim	of	public	policy	should	be	to	prevent	onset	and	encourage	termination.	It	is	
especially	desirable	to	prevent	the	onset	of	offending	at	an	early	age	since	that	is	often	a	precursor	of	a	long	
criminal	career”.	Farrington	contested	Wolfgang	et	al.’s	policy	advice	not	to	intervene	in	the	case	of	young	
offenders	who	quickly	desist,	as	such	a	policy	would	prove	ineffective	with	those	who	begin	offending	earlier.	
Those	under	the	age	of	13,	he	advises,	need	to	be	targeted	for	“special	efforts”,	that	they	should	not	be	dealt	
with	so	leniently	by	the	Juvenile	Court.	
137	Clear	and	Barry	(1983:	540)	argue:	“We	have	a	need	to	develop	new	means	for	incapacitation”.	These	
efforts	should	be	target	specific	given quiet	specific	criterion	behaviours	and	the	most	significant	predictor	
codes	(1983:	530).	For	example,	if	crimes	committed	while	incapacitated	were	of	a	sufficient	magnitude,	new	
tactics	of	control	such	as	permanent	solitary	confinement	could	be	used.	Alcohol-based	offensive	behaviour	
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could	be	prevented	by	restricting	alcohol	intake	on	the	targeted	individual;	or	a	situational	understanding	of	
child	molesting	behaviour	could	be	used	to	develop	non-incarcerative,	incapacitative	methods	(1983:	532).	
138	In	the	case	of	selective	incapacitation,	the	poor	predictive	accuracy	of	actuarial	instruments	in	the	1980s	
resulted	in	a	backdoor	policy	to	identify	low-	and	moderate-risk	offenders	for	diversion	or	early	release	from	
prison.	It	is	an	interesting	question	for	future	research	to	consider,	to	what	extent	diversionary	measures	
might	be	undermined	over	time,	as	a	result	of	negative	feedback	about	their	effectiveness	in	reducing	
recidivism.	This	backdoor	policy	is	evident	in	parole	(which	was	a	major	site	for	the	development	of	actuarial	
instruments	and	guidelines)	and	its	rapid	demise	in	the	period	between	the	late	1970’s	and	the	beginning	of	
the	twentieth	century	(Harcourt,	2007:	77-78).	
